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succesSfUI!f!)assed--fhe - New Hampshire bar exam ca~ be excluded 
from practicing in the state because she is a nonresident. 
2. FACTS AND DECISION BELOW: NHSCt Rule 42 provides that a 
bar applicant must either be a resident of the state or have 
filed a statement of intention to reside in NH. It has been 
interpreted to mean that bar applicants1~ust establish bona fide 
residency at the time of admission. Appe, a resident of Vermont 
~ l 
~ who lives less than 400 ·yards from the NH border and a member of 
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the VT bar, applied for permission to take the NH bar and signed 
a §tate~t~nt to establish residency in NH. She took and 
passed the NH bar exam and requested that she be exempted from 
the residency requirement. Her request was denied, and she filed 
a formal petition with the NHSCt, which also was denied. Appe 
later sued in the DC (NH, Loughlin) alleging that NH had violated 
her rights under the privileges and immunities clause of the 
federal Constitution. 
~ The DC granted appe's motion for summary judgment; it held 
that Rule 42 violated the privileges and immunities clause and 
enjoined enforcement of the rule. It first considered the effect 
of Wilson v. Wilson, 416 F. Supp. 984 (D. Oregon 1976), aff'd 
mem., 430 U.S. 925 (1977), which upheld a citizenship requirement 
that had been interpreted to require a statement of intent to 
reside and actual residence at the time of admission. The DC 
concluded that the narrow and precise holding of Wilson was that 
the requirement of a statement of intent to reside did not 
violate the right to travel, equal protection, or due process. 
Wilson did not decide whether a state may constitutionally 
require residence and it is not dispositive of this case. The 
practice of law is within the ambit of the privileges and 
immunities clause, and the traditional deference afforded the 
states in governing the practice of law does not constitute an 
exception to the clause but rather is a factor to be considered 
in evaluating whether a challenged rule violates the clause. 
Under Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 u.s. 518 (1978), it is necessary to 
ask whether nonresidents represent a particular source of evil 
-3-
that the state seeks to address and whether there is a reasonable 
' 
relationship between the means chosen and the ends desired. 
According to the DC, the fact of appe's nonresidence is not the 
source of any of the evils appt sought to remedy. Moreover, the 
fit of the means adapted to address the alleged evils is 
particularly bad. Accordingly, the residency requirement was 
invalid under the privileges and immunities clause. 
v--
A divided panel of CAl reversed, but the case went en bane. 
On en bane reconsideration~ CAl divided 2-2, and the DC's 
decision was affirmed by an equally divided court. Judges Bownes 
~--------------------------------and Coffin would hold the rule unconstitutional and affirm the 
DC. The privileges and immunities clause prevents a state from 
imposing unreasonable burdens on citizens of other states in 
their pursuit of common callings in the state. Analysis under 
the privileges and immunities clause and the commerce clause is 
not identical. Although a state is not absolutely prohibited 
under the former from establishing residency qualifications, 
citizenship requirements have been struck down except in 
occupations directly affecting state sovereignty interests. 
Lawyers do not fall within the range of occupations on which 
v 
states may impose citizenship requirements. See In re Griffiths, 
413 u.s. 717 (1973). Residency requirements for attorneys should 
thus be scrutinized on the same terms as similar requirements for 
any other commercial or professional livelihood. The DC stated 
the proper standard of review under Hicklin, and it correctly 
concluded that the state had not demonstrated that nonresidents 
pose a peculiar threat to the quality of the state bar. In 
-4-
addition, Rule 42 does not bear a substantial relationship to the 
perceived evils, particularly in light of the fact that it does 
not require continuing residency. And less burdensome means--
like education requirements, professional standards, and 
requirements concerning the maintenance of an office in the 
state--are available to achieve the state's ends. 
~udges Campbell and Breyer argued that the residency 
requirement was constitutional, primarily because principles of 
---~ 
federalism require giving greater weight than did the DC to the 
right of each state to set bar standards. The issue is whether 
there are good reasons for NH to say that the class of potential 
applicants for the bar who have never resided in NH cannot 
practice law there. The desire to avoid domination by large out-
of-state firms and other factors led to the conclusion that NH 
had "substantial reason" for discriminating against nonresidents. 
These judges would not substitute their judgment for NH's because 
of (1} the special connection between bar membership and the 
state's governmental function~ (2} the principle established in 
Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385 (1948}, that states should have 
considerable leeway in analyzing local evils and prescribing 
appropriate cures~ (3} Leis v. Flynt, 439 U.S. 438 (1979} (per 
curiam}, which suggests that states are to be given considrable 
deference in regulating the practice of law by nonresident 
attorneys~ and (4} the challenged qualification has less impact 
in the national "common market" than cases arising under the 
commerce clause. Not only was there a substantial reason for 
-5-
favoring residents, but also the residency requirement was a 
' reasonable method of furthering NH's purpose. 
3. CONTENTIONS: Appt argues: (1) The DC failed to consider 
whether the unique aspects of state control over the legal 
profession place that control outside the scope of the privileges 
and immunities clause and the Hicklin standard of review. State 
courts control the practice of law, and lawyers are essential to 
the primary governmental function of administering justice. (2) 
The DC failed to undertake the proper balancing of interests 
required in Hicklin and Toomer; it did not adjust the intensity 
of its scrutiny in recognition of the important state interest 
involved and the degree of deference owed the NH court. The DC 
in effect scrutinized the residency requirement under a "least 
restrictive alternative" standard. The NHSCt is entitled to 
conclude that nonresident attorneys may be less likely to remain 
familiar with local rules and conditions, less subject to local 
peer pressure on ethical matters, less available for court 
appearances and other activities, etc. (3) Judge Campbell's 
opinion properly held the federalism principles require deference 
to NH's right to set bar standards. Judge Bownes' opinion failed 
to recognize that state bar control measures are matters of 
important state interest entitled to great federal deference. 
Griffiths held that a state may not discriminate on the basis of 
nationality against residents who seek admission to the bar; it 
did not address the issue presented here. 
Appe contends that, although the precise question presented 
here has never been addressed by this Court, virtually all state 
and federal courts facing it in the wake of Hicklin have ruled 
that residency requirements violate the privileges and immunities 
clause. There is no conflict between the line of cases under 
Hicklin and cases holding that state bars are entitled to 
substantial deference in setting admission requirements. This 
Court's decisions clearly establish that where a state 
discriminates against nonresidents by reason of their 
nonresidency with respect to matters of fundamental concern such 
as their right to pursue a common calling or profession, then the 
state must establish that nonresidents are a source of peculiar 
evil and that the discriminatory measure bears a close and 
reasonable relationship to the problem it alleges to address. 
The Court has rejected the contention that lawyers are "somehow 
'above' trade," Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 u.s. 350, 371-
372 (1977), and the most tangible consequence of the residency 
requirement is to insulate NH attorneys from competition from 
nonresident attorneys. Appt's government-function defense cannot 
insulate from review requirements applying to all bar applicants, 
and there is no precedential support for adopting different 
standards of review under the privileges and immunities clause. 
Finally, as the DC found, appt failed to demonstrate that 
nonresidents constituted a peculiar evil or that the residency 
requirement contributes in any way to the resolution of the 
alleged evils. The argument that the DC applied a strict 
standard of scrutiny is specious. 
4. DISCUSSION: The practice of law should be regarded as a 





clause. Although a nonresident attorney's interest in appearing 
' before the courts of another state without having fulfilled the 
admission requirements that most residents must meet does not 
~ 
rise to the level of a due process entitlement, Leis v. Flynt, ~ 
supra, an analysis of the nature of the legal profession for 
purposes of the privileges and immunities clause is likely to 
reveal that providing nonresidents with an equal opportunity for 
bar admission promotes fundamental national values. The Court 
has held that "political rights" are exempt from the strictures 
of the privileges and ' immunities clause, but it is not at all 
clear that the practice of law is sufficiently related to the 
-
states' residual sovereign powers to fall within the exception. 
v. " The Griffiths Court rejecied the "officer of the court" rationale 
for a u.s. citizenship requirement for admission to a state bar; 
Griffiths is distinguishable since it involved strict scrutiny on 
the basis of alienage under the equal protection clause, but its 
language is relevant since it distinguished the practice of law 
from the workings of the political process. 
v 
I see no good reason not to apply the Toomer/Hicklin test to 
bar residency requirements. While it may be appropriate to give 
deference to the states in light of the fact that they have 
traditionally controlled bar admission, the DC did so. Under the 
Toomer/Hicklin test, I think that the DC and Judges Bownes and 
Coffin have the better of the argument. It is difficult to see 
--------------------------~---
exactly what state interests are served by the residency 
requirement that could not be served more efficaciously by other, 
less restrictive, means. But the case presents an important and 
--------~~------~~----------~----~-=-8-
· ... 
substantial federal question that probably is not amenable to 
' summary disposition. If the case were here on a petition for 
certiorari, it might be advisable to await the development of a 
circuit conflict. Since the case falls within the Court's 
appellate jurisdiction, however, it looks to me like one 
deserving plenary consideration. 
5. RECOMMENDATION: I recommend NOTING PROBABLE 
JURISDICTION. 
There is a response. 
April 10, 1984 Werder Opin in juris. stmt. 
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No. 83-1466, Supreme Court of New Hampshire v. Piper 
Memorandum for the File 
This is a summary memorandum on the basis of a preliminary 
reading of the briefs. 
An interesting and important constitutional case presenting 
the question whether: 
"The Privileges and Immunities Clause (P&I Clause) of 
Article IV applies to residency requirements imposed by states as 
a condition to being licensed to practice law within their boun-
dries?" 
The facts are simple and undisputed. Appellee (Piper) lives 
in Vermont only 800 yards from the New Hampshire border. She 
applied for permission to take the New Hampshire Bar examination, 
and signed a statement of intent to establish residency in New 
Hampshire as required by Rule 42 of the Supreme Court of that 
state. This Rule - at issue in this case - provides simply that 
a bar applicant must "either be a resident of the state of New 
Hampshire or have filed a statement of intention to reside in the 
state." Piper passed the bar exam, and would have been eligible 
for admission to the state bar as soon as she established New 
Hampshire residence. It is important to bear in mind that New 
Hampshire has the simplist type of residency requirement. It is 
to be contrasted with a "durational requirement". 
No. 83-1466 2. 
Piper, apparently because of "changed personal circumstances," 
decided she did not wish to move to New Hampshire, and her request 
to be licensed was rejected - even though she had a job offer from 
a New Hampshire firm (apparently would commute back and forth across 
the state line) . 
Piper instituted this suit in U.S. district court alleging a 
violation of the P&I Clause. The DC agreed. On appeal, the initial 
panel revered the DC two to one.. Because of the importance of the 
issue and the division on the panel, the case was then heard er. bane 
by the four circuit judges. They divided 2-2, and therefore affirmed 
by an equally divided court. Judges Coffin and Bownes held that the 
P&I Clause was violated. Chief Judge Campbell and Bryer (the original 
panel majority) adhered to their view, and would reverse. It is 
evident from the opinions of the judges that plausible - if not in 
fact quite strong - arguments can be made on both sides of the 
question. 
Piper understandably emphasizes that the only case before us 
presents her unique facts (living just across the border and willing, 
at least at the outset, to practice with a New Hampshire firm). 
We did not take the case, however, to decide the constitutional 
question on the basis of where one lives in New Hampshire and whether 
one is willing to start practicing with a New Hompshire firm. Rule 42 
necessarily draws the line at the state boundry whether the applicant 
lives a few yards across it or in San Diego. 
No. 83-1466 3. 
The briefs of the parties as well as the opinions below 
appear to cite the relevant cases, and make the best arguments 
for the competing views. I will not get into the merits in this 
memo, beyond conceding surprise that strong arguments can be 
made for the view that a residency requirement to practice law 
is unconstitutional. 
The scope of the P&I Clause has never been defined even 
generally. But the licensing and regulation of lawyers dates 
back prior to the Revolution. This has been achieved by state 
statute or by rules of state's highest court, or by both. In 
Goldfarb (421 U.S. at 792-93, the Court observed that "since the 
founding of the Republic, the licensing and regulation of lawyers 
has been left exclusively to the states The states prescribe 
the qualifications for admission to practice and the standards 
of professional conduct." Moreover, the legal profession tra-
ditionally has been viewed differently from other trades or 
professions. As noted in my Hoover v. Ronwin opinion last May: 
"The regulation of bar activities is at the 
core of the state's power to protect the 
public ... Nor is any trade or other profession 
as 'essential to the primary governmental func-
tion of administering justice.'" 
; 
No. 83-1466 4. 
This relationship between the regulation of lawyers and 
the states sovereign function of assuring the quality of 
justice in its courts, has been recognized repeatedly by 
our decisions. See District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. 
Feldman (1983); Middlesex Ethics Committee v. Garder Bar 
Association, 457 U.S. 423, 434 and n. 11 (1982); Leis v. Flynt, 
439 U.S. 438, 442 (1979); Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 
U.S. 773, 792 (1975), and Hoover v. Ronwin. 
I made the same point in In re: Griffin, though Griffin 
is cited and relied on by the briefs of both parties. 
To be sure, we have never expressly sustained the validity 
of a residency requirement. But the rationale of our cases has 
emphasized the substantiality of the state interest in regulating 
the bar. 
If we were now to hold at this late date that a residency 
requirement is invalid, a number of "negatives" come to mind from 
the viewpoint of a state's right and duty to regulate. What about 
grievance proceedings and enforcement of penalties imposed for 
a breach of professional ethics? The concept of "integrated bars" -
under which all lawyers within a state must be members primary for 
purpose of discipline - reflects the judgement by the states that 
their interest is substantial if not compelling. 
No. 83-1466 5. 
As we all know, there are ongoing activities of state 
bar organizations that are structured on the assumption that 
members are residents. Elaborate structures of committees 
exist, activities include continuing legal education, the 
providing of legal services for the poor, etc. etc. Lawyers 
and judges within a state work together within an integrated 
bar and have interests deeply rooted in the state in which they 
practice. My hypothetical lawyer from San Diego not only would 
lack this interest; he would be beyond the reach of the integrated 
bar both to educate and discipline. 
As evidenced by the opinions of the DC and of Judges Coffin 
and Bownes, responsible arguments can be made to the contrary. 
These are well summarized in the court opinions below, and I 
will read those again in an effort to keep a mind "more open'' 
than this memorandum presently indicates. I will, however, 
not be easy to persuade. 
L.F.P. 
alb 12/15/84 
5$/'/6b& CLJ 3d//f66 {rF 





















No. 83-1466, Supreme Court of New Hampshire v. Piper 
JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
The Rules of the Supreme Court of New Hampshire 
limit bar admission to state residents. We here consider 
whether this restriction violates the Privileges and 




Kathryn Piper lives in Lower Waterford, Vermont, 
about 400 yards from the New Hampshire border. In 1979, 
she applied to take the February 1980 New Hampshire bar 
examination. Piper submitted with her application a 
statement of intent to become a New Hampshire resident. 
2. 
Following an investigation, the Board of Bar Examiners 
found that Piper was of good moral character and met the 
other requirements for admission. She was allowed to 
take, and passed, the examination. Piper was informed by 
the Board that she would have to establish a home address 
in New Hampshire prior to being sworn in. 
On May 7, 1980, Piper requested from the Clerk of 
the New Hampshire Supreme Court a dispensation from the 
residency requirement. Although she had a npossible job" 
with a lawyer in Littleton, New Hampshire, Piper stated 
that becoming a resident of New Hampshire would be 
inconvenient. Her house in Vermont was secured by a 
mortagage with a favorable interest rate, and she and her 
husband recently had become parents. According to Piper, 
these nproblems peculiar to [her] situation 
3. 
warrant[ed] that an exception be made." Letter from 
Appellee to Ralph H. Wood, Esq., Clerk of N.H. Supreme 
Court, App. 13. 
On May 13, 1980, the Clerk informed Piper that 
her request had been denied. She then formally petitioned 
the New Hampshire Supreme Court for permission to become a 
member of the bar. She asserted that she was well-
qualified and that her "situation [was] sufficiently 
unique that the granting of an exception . • . [would] not 
result in the setting of any undesired precedent." Letter 
of Nov. 8, 1980 from Appellee to Hon. William A. Grimes, 
Chief Justice of the N.H. Supreme Court, App. 15. The 




On March 22, 1982, Piper filed this action in the 
United States District Court for the District of New 
Hampshire. She named as defendants the five justices and 
the clerk of the state supreme court. She alleged that 
Rule 42 of the New Hampshire Supreme Court, that excludes 
nonresidents from the bar, 1 violates the Privileges and 
Immunities Clause of the United States Constitution, Art. 
2 IV, §2. 
On May 17, 1982, the District Court granted 
Piper's motion for summary judgment. 539 F.Supp. 1064 
{D. N.H. 1982) 0 The court first stated that the 
opportunity to practice law is a "fundamental" right. See 
Baldwin v. Montana Fish & Game Comm'n, 436 u.s. 371 
{1978). It found that Piper had been denied this right in 
the absence of a "substantial reason," 539 F.Supp., at 
5. 
1072, and that Rule 42 was not "closely tailored" to 
achieve its intended goals, id., at 1073. The court held 
that the New Hampshire's residency requirement violated 
the Privileges and Immunities Clause. 3 
An evenly divided Court of Appeals for the First 
Circuit, sitting en bane, affirmed the judgment in favor 
of Piper. Piper v. Supreme Court of New Hampshire, 723 
F. 2d 110 (CAl 1983). 4 The prevailing judges held that 
Rule 42 violated the Privileges and Immunities Clause. 
After finding that Article IV, §2 protects an individual's 
right to "'pursue a livelihood in a state other than his 
own, '" id., at 112, (quoting Baldwin v. Montana Fish & 
Game Comm'n, supra, at 386), the judges applied the two-
part test set forth in Hicklin v. Or beck, 437 u.S. 518 
(1978). They concluded that there was no "substantial 
6. 
reason" for the different treatment of nonresidents and 
that the challenged discrimination bore no "substantial 
relationship" to the state's objectives. 5 See id., at 525-
527. 
The dissenting judges found that the New 
Hampshire Supreme Court's residency requirement did not 
violate the Privileges and Immunities Clause. While 
recognizing that Rule 42 may "serve the less than 
commendable purpose of insulating New Hampshire 
practitioners from out-of-state competition," 723 F.2d, at 
119, they found several "substantial" reasons to justify 
discrimination against nonresidents. If the residency 
requirement were abolished, "large law firms in distant 
states" might exert significant influence over the state 
bar. Id. These nonresident lawyers would be unfamiliar 
7. 
with local customs and would be less likely to perform ~ 
bono work within the state. The dissenting judges further 
believed the District Court's judgment was inconsistent 
with our decision in Leis v. Flynt, 439 u.s. 438 (1979) 
(per curiam). 
The Supreme Court of New Hampshire filed a timely 
notice of appeal, and we noted probable jurisdiction. We 
now affirm the judgment of the court below. 
II 
A 
Article IV, §2 of the Constitution provides that 
"[t] he Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all 
Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several 
States." 6 Derived, like the Commerce Clause, from the 
fourth of the Articles of Conferation, 7 the Privileges 
8. 
and Immunities Clause was intended to "help fuse into one 
nation a collection of independent, sovereign States." 
Toomer v. Witsell, 334 u.s. 385, 395 (1948). Recognizing 
this purpose, we have stated that it is "[o]nly with 
respect to those 'privileges' and 'immunities' bearing 
upon the vitality of the Nation as a single entity" that a 
state must accord residents and nonresidents equal 
treatment. Baldwin v. Montana Fish & Game Comm' n, 436 
u.s. 371, 383 (1978). In Baldwin, we held that a state 
may charge a nonresident more than it charges a resident 
for the same elk-hunting license. Because elk hunting is 
"recreation" rather than a "means of a livelihood," we 
concluded that the right to a hunting license was not 
"fundamental" to the promotion of interstate harmony. 
Id., at 388. 
9. 
The origins and purpose of article IV, §2 make 
clear why this Court has found that "one of the privileges 
which the clause guarantees to citizens of State A is that 
of doing business in State B on terms of substantial 
equality with the citizens of that state." Toomer v. 
Witsell, supra, at 396 (1948). In Ward v. Maryland, 12 
Wall. 418 (1870), the Court invalidated a statute under 
which nonresidents were required to pay $300 per year for 
a license to trade in goods not manufactured in Maryland, 
while resident traders paid a fee varying from $12 to 
$150. Similarly, under the South Carolina statute 
invalidated in Toomer, supra, nonresident fishermen were 
required to pay a license fee of $2500 for each shrimp 
boat owned: residents were charged only $25 per boat. 





found violative of the privileges and immunities clause a 
statute containing a resident hiring preference for all 
employment related to the development of the State's oil 
and gas resources. 8 
There is nothing in ward, Toomer, or Hicklin 
suggesting that only "the opportunity to pursue a common 
calling" can be viewed as a "privilege" under article IV, 
§2. 9 The practice of law, 10 no less than the occupations 
considered in earlier cases, affects commerce. Legal 
services are relevant to the national economy, for the 
business of a lawyer's client often extends beyond the 
bounds of a single state. In Goldfarb v. Virginia State 
Bar, 421 u.s. 773 (1975), the Court noted that "[i]n the 
modern world, it cannot be denied that the activities of 
lawyers play an important part in commercial intercourse." 
11. 
Id., at 788. Similarly, in Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 
433 u.s. 350 (1977), the Court referred to counsel's 
concession that many "law offices are big business." !d., 
at 368 n.l9. 
Moreover, the noncommercial role and duty of the 
legal profession reinforce the view that the practice of 
law falls within the ambit of the privileges and 
immunities clause.l1 Out-of-state lawyers may--and often 
do--represent persons who raise unpopular federal claims. 
In some cases, representation by nonresident counsel may 
be the only means available for the vindication of federal 
rights. See Leis v. Flynt, 439 u.s. 438, 450 (1979) 
(Stevens, J., dissenting). The lawyer who champions 
unpopular causes surely is more important to the 
"maintenance and well-being of the Union," Baldwin v. 
12. 
Montana Fish & Game Comm'n, supra, at 388, than was the 
shrimp fisherman in Toomer, supra, or the pipeline worker 
in Hicklin, supra. 
B 
The state contends that if it cannot exclude 
nonresidents from the bar, its ability to function as a 
sovereign political body will be threatened. It argues 
that a lawyer's activities are "bound up with the exercise 
of judicial power and the administration of justice." 
Brief for Appellant 12. According to the appellant, if 
the Privileges and Immunities Clause is held applicable to 
the practice of law, the state's sovereign authority to 
1 t th b ld b b . 11 . . d 
12 
regu a e e ar wou e su stant1a y 1mpa1re • 
Lawyers do enjoy a "broad monopoly to do 
things other citizens may not lawfully do." In re 
13. 
Griffiths, 413 u.s. 717, 731 (1973) (BURGER, C. J., 
dissenting). We do not believe, however, that the 
practice of law involves the exercise of a sovereign 
function--as the state seems to argue. In In re 
Griffiths, supra, we held that the state could not exclude 
an alien from the bar on the ground that a lawyer is an 
'"officer of the Court who' is entrusted with the 
'exercise of actual governmental power. '" !d., at 728 
(quoting Brief for Appellee in In re Griffiths, O.T. 1972, 
No. 71-1336, p.5). Instead, we concluded that a lawyer is 
not an "officer" within the ordinary meaning of that word. 
Id. He "'makes his own decisions, follows his own best 
judgment, collects his own fees and runs his own 
business.'" !d., at 729 (quoting Cammer v. United States, 
350 u.s. 399, 405 (1956)). Moreover, the state powers 
·'· 
14. 
entrusted to lawyers do not involve matters of state 
policy or acts of such unique responsibility that they 
should be entrusted only to citizens. We concluded in 
Griffiths that the status of being licensed to practice 
law does not place a person so close to the core of the 
political process as to make him a "formulator of 
governmental policy." 13 413 u.s., at 729. 
Because, under Griffiths, a lawyer is not an 
"officer" of the state in any political sense, there is no 
reason for New Hampshire to exclude from its bar 
nonresidents, even though they are not full-fledged 
members of the political community • 14 We recognize that 
the Supreme Court of New Hampshire acts in a sovereign 
capacity when it regulates the bar. See Hoover v. Ronwin, 
___ u.s. ___ , ___ (1984): Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 
,· 
15. 
u.s. 350, 360 (1977}. The admission of nonresidents to 
the bar, however, would not interfere with that court's 
ability to control the lawyers practicing within the 
state. We therefore conclude that the right to practice 
law is protected by the Privileges and Immunities 
Clause. 15 
III. 
The conclusion that Rule 42 deprives nonresidents 
of a protected privilege does not end our inquiry. The 
Court has stated that "[1] ike many other constitutional 
provisions, the privileges and immunities clause is not an 
absolute." Toomer v. Witsell, 334 u.s. 385, 396 (1948}; 
See United Bldg. & Const. v .• Mayor & Council of Camden, 
u.s. __ , (1984}. The Clause does not preclude 
discrimination against nonresidents where: ( i} there is a 
16. 
substantial reason for the difference in treatment; and 
(ii) the discrimination practiced against nonresidents 
bears a substantial relation to the state's objective. 
Id., at In deciding whether the discrimination bears 
a close or substantial relation to the state's objective, 
the Court has considered the availability of less 
restrictive means. 16 
The Supreme Court of New Hampshire offers several 
justifications for its refusal to admit nonresidents to 
the bar. It asserts that nonresident members would be 
less likely: (i) to become, and remain, familiar with 
local rules and procedures; (ii) to behave ethically; 
(iii) to be available for court proceedings; and (iv) to 
do~ bono and other volunteer work in the state. 17 We 
find that none of these reasons meets the test of 
17. 
"substantiality," and that the means chosen do not bear 
the necessary relation to the state's objectives. 
There is no evidence to support the state's claim 
that nonresidents might be less likely to keep abreast of 
local rules and procedures. Nor may we assume that a 
nonresident lawyer--any more than a resident--would 
disserve his clients by failing to familiarize himself 
with the rules. As a practical matter, we think that 
unless a lawyer has, or anticipates, a considerable 
practice in the New Hampshire courts, he would be unlikely 
to take the bar examination and pay the annual dues of 
$125. Moreover, the discriminatory policy is not closely 
related to the state's objective. 18 The Supreme Court of 
New Hampshire has authority to discipline all members of 
18. 
the bar, regardless of where they reside. See N.H.S.Ct. 
Rule 37. 19 
We also find the state's second justification to 
be without merit, for there is no reason to believe that a 
nonresident lawyer will conduct his practice in a 
dishonest manner. In addition to his professional duty, 
the lawyer's interest in his reputation should provide the 
same incentive to maintain high ethical standards as it 
does for resident lawyers. A lawyer will be concerned 
with his reputation in any community where he practices, 
regardless of where he may live. Furthermore, as we noted 
above, a nonresident lawyer could be disciplined for 
unethical conduct. 
There is more merit to the state's assertion that 
a nonresident member of the bar at times would be 
19. 
unavailable for court proceedings. In the course of 
litigation, pretrial hearings on various matters often are 
held on short notice. At times a court will need to 
confer immediately with counsel. Even the most 
conscientious lawyer residing in a distant state may find 
himself unable to appear in court for an unscheduled 
hearing or proceeding. 20 Nevertheless, we do not believe 
that this type of problem justifies the exclusion of 
nonresidents from the state bar. One may assume that a 
high percentage of nonresident lawyers willing to take the 
state bar examination and pay the annual dues will reside 
in places reasonably convenient to New Hampshire. 
Furthermore, in those cases where the nonresident counsel 
will be unavailable on short notice, the state can protect 
its interests through less restrictive means. The trial 
20. 
court, by rule or as an exercise of discretion, may 
require an out-of-state lawyer to associate local counsel. 
The final reason advanced by the State is that 
nonresident members of its bar would be disinclined to do 
their share of E!.Q_ bono and volunteer work. Perhaps this 
is true to a limited extent, particularly where the member 
resides in a distant location. We think it is reasonable 
to believe, however, that most lawyers who become members 
of a state bar will endeavor to perform their share of 
these services. The nonresident bar member, like the 
resident member, could be required to represent indigents 
and perhaps to participate in formal legal-aid work. 21 
This sort of participation would serve the professional 
interest of a lawyer who practices in the state. 22 
21. 
In summary, the state does not advance a 
"substantial reason" for its discrimination against 
nonresident applicants to the bar. 
IV. 
We conclude that New Hampshire 1 s bar residency 
requirement violates article IV, §2 of the United States 
Constitution. The nonresident 1 s interest in practicing 
law is a "privilege" protected by the Clause. Although 
the lawyer is "an officer of the court," he does not hold 
a position that can be entrusted only to a "full-fledged 
member of the political community." A state may 
discriminate against nonresidents only where its reasons 
are "substantial," and the difference in treatment bears a 
close or substantial relation to those reasons. No such 
22. 
showing has been made in this case. Accordingly, we 
affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals. 
It is so ordered. 
1Rule 42 does not explicitly provide that only New 
Hampshire residents may be admitted to the bar. It does 
require, however, that an applicant either be a resident 
of New Hampshire or file a statement of intent to reside 
there. N.H.S.Ct.Rule 42(3). In an affidavit submitted to 
the District Court, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court 
of New Hampshire said that under the rule, an applicant 
for admission must be "a bona fide resident of the State 
at the time that the oath of office is 
administered." Affidavit of John w. King, App. 32. 
Accordingly, the parties agree that the refusal to admit 
Piper to the bar was based on Rule 42. 
2Piper was not excluded totally from the practice of law 
in New Hampshire. Out-of-state lawyers may appear ~hac 
vice in state court. This alternative, however, does not 
allow the nonresident to practice in New Hampshire on the 
same terms as a resident member of the bar. The lawyer 
appearing E!..9_ hac vice must be associated with a local 
lawyer who is present for trial or argument. See 
N.H.S.Ct. Rule 33(1); N.H.Super.Ct. Rule 19. Furthermore, 
the decision on whether to grant ~ hac vice status to an 
out-of-state lawyer is purely discretionary. See Leis v. 
Flynt, 439 u.s. 438, 442 (1979) (per curiam). 
3The District Court did not consider Piper's claims that 
Rule 42: (i) deprived her of property without due process 
of law, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment; (ii) 
denied her equal protection of the law, in violation of 
the Fourteenth Amendment; and (iii) placed an undue burden 
upon interstate commerce, in violation of Article I, §8 of 
the United States Constitution. The Court of Appeals did 
not address these claims, and our resolution of this case 
makes it unnecessary for us to reach them. 
4The panel, with one judge dissenting, had reversed the 
district court's judgment. Piper v. Supreme Court of New 
Hampshire, 723 F.2d 98 (1983). 
5The prevailing judges thought it significant that three 
state supreme courts had invalidated their own bar 
residency requirements. Sargus v. West Virginia Board of 
Law Examiners, 294 S.E.2d 440 (W.Va. 1983}; Noll v. Alaska 
Bar Assoc., 649 P.2d 241 (Alaska 1982~Gordon v. 
Comm1 ttee on Character and Fitness, 48 N.Y. 2d 266, 422 
N.Y.S.2d 641, 397 N.E.2d 1309 (1979}. Since the Court of 
Appeals decision in this case, another state supreme court 
has reached the same conclusion. In re Jadd, 391 Mass. 
227, 461 N.E.2d 760 (1984}. we also think it significant 
that these courts, that are responsible for regulating the 
bars in their respective states, have found the residency 
requirements unnecessary. 
6under this Clause, the terms "citizen" and "resident" 
are used interchangably. See Austin v. New Hampshire, 420 
u.s. 656, 662 n.8 (1975}. Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 
of course, "[a]ll persons born or naturalized in the 
United States ••• are citiz~ns .•. of the State wherein 
they reside." 
7Both the privileges and immunities clause and the 
commerce clause had their origins in the fourth article of 
the Articles of Confederation, that provided: 
The better to secure and perpetuate mutual 
friendship and intercourse among the people of 
the different States in this Union, the free 
inhabitants of each of these States ... shall be 
entitled to all privileges and immunities of 
free citizens in the several States; and the 
people of each State shall have free ingress and 
regress to and from any other State, and shall 
enjoy therein all the privileges of trade and 
commerce, subject to the same duties, 
impositions and restrictions as the inhabitants 
thereof ••.• 
Not surprisingly, this Court has recognized the "mutually 
reinforcing relationship" between the two clauses. 
Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 u.s. 518, 531 (1978}. 
8rn United Bldg. 
Council of Camden, 
& Const. 
u.s. 
Trades Council v. Mayor & 
(1984}, we stated that "the 
........... -
pursuit of a common calling is one of the most fundamental 
of those privileges protected by the Clause." !d. We 
noted that "many, if not most of our cases expounding the 
Privileges and Immunities Clause have dealt with this 
basic and essential activity." 
9rn Corfield v. Coryell, 6 Fed. Cas. 546 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 
1825) (No. 3230), Justice Bushrod washington, sitting as 
Circuit Justice, stated that the "fundamental rights" 
protected by the Clause included: 
The right of a citizen of one state to pass 
through, or to reside in any other state, for 
purposes of trade, agriculture, professional 
pursuits, or otherwise; to claim the benefit of 
the writ of habeas corpus; to institute and 
maintain actions of any kind in the courts of 
the state; to take, hold and dispose of 
property, either real or personal •••• 
Thus in this initial interpretation of the Clause, 
"professional pursuits," such as the practice of law, were 
said to be protected. 
The "natural rights" theory that underlay 
Corfield was discarded long ago. Hague v. CIO, 307 u.s. 
496, 511 (1939) (opinion of Roberts, J.) , see Paul v. 
Virginia, 8 Wall. 168 (1868). Nevertheless, we have noted 
that those privileges on Justice Washington's list would 
still be protected by the Clause. Baldwin, supra, at 387. 
10 rn Bradwell v. State, 16 Wall. 130 (1873), this Court 
held that the practice of law is not a "privilege or 
immunity" under the Fourteenth Amendment. Given that only 
"privileges or immunities" of national citizenship are 
protected by the amendment, see Slaughterhouse Cases, 16 
Wall. 36, 74 (1873); Twining v. New Jersey, 211 u.s. 78, 
96 (1908), the Bradwell decision is not relevant to the 
issue presented in this case. 
11The Court has never held that the privileges and 
immunities clause protects only economic interests. See 
Doe v. Bolton, 410 u.s. 179 (1973) (Georgia statute 
permitting only residents to secure abortions found 
violative of the privileges and immunities clause). 
12The residency requirement at issue does not pertain to 
government itself. Without certain residency 
requirements, however, the state "would cease to be the 
separate political communit[y] that history and the 
constitutional text make plain w [as] contemplated." 
Simson, Discrimination Against Nonresidents and the 
Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, 128 Pa. 
L.Rev. 379, 387 (1979). For example, the Framers believed 
that a person who did not reside in a state could not 
adequately represent its citizens in the government. This 
belief is evident in Article I of the Constitution, which 
provides that a person is ineligible to serve in the 
Senate or House of Representatives unless he is "an 
Inhabitant of that State in which he shall be chosen." 
This Court also has recognized that a state may restrict 
to its residents both the right to vote, see Baldwin v. 
Montana Fish & Game Comm'n, supra, at 383, and the right 
to hold state elective office, ibid. 
13 It is true that lawyers traditionally have been leaders 
in state and local affairs. Their training qualifies them 
for this role. Nevertheless, lawyers are not in any sense 
officials in the government simply by virtue of being 
lawyers. 
14 In Griffiths, we were concerned with discrimination by 
a state against aliens. Such discrimination usually is 
subject to an enhanced level of scrutiny. Graham v. 
Richardson, 403 u.s. 365 (1971). The difference in the 
levels of scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause and 
the Privileges and Immunities Clause, however, does not 
affect the relevance of Griffiths. The state's argument 
on this point deals not with the level of scrutiny, but 
instead with whether the Privileges and Immunities Clause 
applies at all. 
15our conclusion that Rule 42 violates the privileges and 
irnrnuni ties clause is consistent with Leis v. Flynt, 439 
u.s. 438 (1979). In Leis, we held that a lawyer could be 
denied, without the benefit of a hearing, permission to 
appear ~hac vice. We concluded that the states should 
be left free to "prescribe the qualifications for 
admission to practice and the and the standards of 
professional conduct" for those lawyers who appear in its 
courts. 
Our holding in this case does not interfere with the 
ability of the states to regulate their bars. The 
nonresident who seeks to join a bar, unlike the ~ hac 
vice applicant, must have the same professional and 
personal qualifications required of resident lawyers. 
Furthermore, the nonresident member of the bar is subject 
to the full force of New Hampshire's disciplinary rules. 
N.H.S.Ct. Rule 37. See supra, at 23. 
16Toomer, the Court noted that the state could have used 
less restrictive means to eliminate the danger of 
excessive trawling. South Carolina could have restricted 
the type of equipment used in its fisheries, graduated 
license fees according to the size of the boats, or 
charged nonresidents a differential to compensate for the 
added enforcement burden they imposed. 334 u.s. at 398-
399. 
17A former president of the American Bar Association has 
suggested another possible reason for the rule: "Many of 
the states that have erected fences against out-of-state 
lawyers have done so primarily to protect their own 
lawyers from professional competition." Smith, Time for a 
National Practice of Law Act, 64 A.B.J. 557, 557 (1978). 
This reason is not "substantial." The privileges and 
immunities clause was designed primarily to prevent such 
economic protectionism. 
18A less restrictive alternative would be to require 
mandatory attendance at periodic seminars on state 
practice. There already is a rule requiring all new 
admi ttees to complete a "practical skills course" within 
one year of their admission. N.H.S.Ct. Rule 42(7). 
New Hampshire's "simple residency" requirement is 
under inclusive as well, because it permits lawyers who 
move away from the state to retain their membership in the 
bar. There is no reason to believe that a former resident 
would maintain a more active practice in the New Hampshire 
courts than would a nonresident lawyer who had never lived 
in the state. 
19The New Hampshire bar would be able to discipline a 
nonresident lawyer in the same manner in which it 
disciplines resident members. The Supreme Judicial Court 
of Massachusetts has stated that although there are over 
5,000 nonresident members of the Massachusetts bar, there 
has been no problem "obtaining jurisdiction over them for 
bar discipline purposes." In re Jadd, 391 Mass. 227, 234, 
461 N.E.2d 760, 765 (1984). A committee of the Oregon bar 
voiced a similar sentiment: "[W]hy should it be more 
difficult for the Multnomah County courts to control an 
attorney from Vancouver, washington, than from Lakeview, 
Oregon, if both attorneys are members of the Oregon Bar 
and subject to its rules and discipline?" Bar Admissions 
Study Committee, Report to the Supreme Court of Oregon 19 
(January 19, 1979). 
20 In many situations, unscheduled hearings may pose only 
a minimal problem for the nonresident lawyer. Conference 
telephone calls are being used increasingly as an 
expeditious means of dispatching pretrial matters. 
Hanson, Olson, Shuart, and Thornton, Telephone Hearings in 
Civil Trial Courts: What Do Attorneys Think?, 66 
Judicature 408, 408-409 (1983). 
21The El Paso, Texas bar has adopted a mandatory ~ bono 
plan, under which each of its members must handle two 
divorce cases for indigents each year. Pro Bono Publico: 
Federal Legal-Aid Cuts Spur the Bar to Increase Free Work 
for the Poor, The Wall Street Journal, pp. 1, 12 (March 
30' 1984) . 
22 A nonresident member of the bar would be ineligible for 
public office, and might be less likely to participate in 
community affairs. We cannot say, however, that this 
approaches constitutional significance. Indeed, by no 
means all resident lawyers take part in these activities--
particularly where they reside in the suburbs of great 
metropolitan centers. 
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Supreme Court of New Hampshire v. Piper, No. 83-1466 
~ VY JUSTICE POWELL delivered the op1n1on of the Court 
~ ~ule~ "t of the Supreme Court of New Hampshire 
~ ·~~~r~~~s~~~z>~ 
~~ ~ ~de:::..::::z._ be ' 8dm0tted-to- the ..tete H.t__"'/ 
~~~ae~e whether this ~ ::>~ 
~~~ A violates the privileges and immunities clause of the 
United States Constitution, art. IV., §2. 
I. 
A. 
Kathryn Piper lives in Lower Waterford, Vermont, 
about 400 yards from the New Hampshire border. In 1979, 
-~-~ 
ffie applied to ~tk ier the February 1980 New Hampshire bar 
" 
examination. Piper submitted with her application a 
statement that she intended to become a New Hampshire 
2. 
resident. Following an investigation, the Board of Bar 
Examiners found that Piper possessed good moral character 
7'~~ 
and the other requisite qualifications. ~ graRtQCl hpr 
I\ ) 
~~ a...:~t4-k_. ~ d.~L~ 
fo~ iso ...,s.4..t~r the bar examination. whieh •be 
subeequeRtl¥- ±ook aR~~e~~~. Piper was informed that she 
\\Ould have to establish a home address in New Hampshire 
-1~ 
prior toA"swearing-in ceremonies." 
. ?L~ On May 7, 1980, P1per -1 wr:o R wood,~ the 
Clerk of the New Hampshire Supreme Cour :.z. to .I\ t::;:;:;;( a 
dispensation from the residency requirement. Although she 




with an atto:rney in Littleton, New 
~  Hampshire, 
~ ~.,.r- ,l\,, )1 
Piper stated that becoming a resident of New 
>  Hampshire ~~~d be inconvenient. 
~~ 
She a.ai<'l that bl-er house 
}f~-~ 
- ...e.i · 
~': 
in Vermont was secured by a mortagage with a favorable 
interest rate and 7 she and her husband had recently 
3. 
become parents. According to Piper, these "problems 
~cuiar to [her] situation warrant[ed] that an exception 
be made." 
On May 13, 1980, the td.erk 
informed Piper that her request had been denied. 
fhe then formally petitioned the New Hampshire Supreme 
Court for permission to become a member of the bar. She 
asserted that she was well-qualified and that her 
"situation [was] sufficiently unique that the granting of 
an exception • • • [would] not result in the setting of any 
undesired precedent." The Supreme Court of New Hampshire 
denied Piper's formal request on December 31, 1980. 
B. 
On March 22, 1982, Piper filed this action in the 
United States District Court for the District of New 
· .. 
4. 
Hampshire. She named as defendants the five justices and 
fue clerk of the state supreme court. She that 
id t !L~f 
Rule 42 of the New Hampshire Supreme Court, whie*l excludes 
nonresidents from the bar, 1 violates the privileges and 
immunities clause of the United States Constitution, art. 
2 IV. , §2. 
-fj!t}1 J iZ ~ 
_1_R_u_l_e---4-2-~~
5
o~e~s- not explicitly provide that only New 
Hampshire residents may be admitted to the bar. It does 
require, however, that an applicant either be a resident 
of New Hampshire or file a statement of intent to resire 
fuere. N.H.S.Ct.Rule 42(3}. In an affidavit submitted to 
the District Court, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court 
of New Hampshire said that under the rule, "an applicant 
:lbr admission must be a bona fide resident of the state 
at the time that the oath of office ~ . is 
crlministered." Accordingly, i--t-is -a-setl1fte'd--by-~h'"" parties CJ.A~, 
that the refusal to admit Piper to the bar was based on" --7,~ 
Rule 42. 
.,.(,.' 
2Piper also alleged that Rule 42: (f) deprived her of 
property without due process of law, in violation of the 
Fourteenth Amendment; @ Q21 denied her equal protection of 
the law, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment; and (t}~ 
placed an undue burden upon interstate commerce, in 
violation of Article I, §8 of the United States 
Constitution. The courts below did not consider these 
claims. Our resolution of this case makes it unnecessary 
for us to reach these issues.~l • 
. ' 
5. 
On May 17, 1982, the District Court granted 
Piper's motion for summary judgment. The court first 
stated that the opportunity to practice law is a 
"fundamental" right. See Baldwin v. Montana Fish & Game 
Comm'n, 436 u.s. 371 (1978). 
Piper had been denied this in the 
absence of a "substantial reason," and that Rule 42 was 
not "closely tailored" to acheive its intended goals. 
~~~ 
Therefore, the court heldJ ~ New Hampshire's residency 
requirement violated the privileges and immunities clause 
the United States Constitution, art. IV., §2 539 
F. Supp. 1064 (1982). 
An evenly divided Court of Appeals for the First 
Circuit, sitting en bane, affirmed the judgment in favor 
4 ia-~ 
~ ~ of Piper. 3 The prevailing judges held that Rule 




'1& · '3  ~ Footnote (s) 3 will appear on following pages. 
~UJ·•~. ~ 
a.,~~ 4449 1,~,~ ')4.4~'<1>= 
• 
6. 
violated the privileges and immunities clause. They found 
fuat article IV, section 2 protects an individual's right 
to "pursue a livelihood in a state other than his own." 
After finding that the practice of law was within the 
ambit of the clause, they applied the two-part test set 
forth in Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 u.s. 518 (1978}. The 
judges concluded that there was no "substantial reason" 
for the discrimination against nonresidents, and that the 
challenged discrimination bore no "substantial 
relationship" to the "evil" that the nonresidents were 
said to present. The fact that several states recently 




Court of New 
7. 
that other states found these requirements unnecessary for 
effective regulation of the bar. 
~~ 
~o atber judges found that the New Hampshire 
Supreme Court's residency requirement did not run afoul of 
the privileges and immunities clause. While recognizing 
that Rule 42 may "serve the less than commendable purpo~ 
of insulating New Hampshire practitioners from out-of-
state competition," they found several "substantial" 
reasons to justify discrimination against nonresidents. 
If the residency requirement were abolished, "large law 
firms in distant cities" might gain control of the state 
bar. These nonresident attorneys would be unfamiliar with 
local customs and would be less likely to perform ~bono 
work within the state. F~£thQrmo~, -rhe dissenting judges 
District Court's decision was 
I 
8. 
inconsistent with our decision in Leis v. Flynt, 439 u.s. 
438 (1979) (per curiam). 
The Supreme Court of New Hampshire filed a timely 
~· 
notice of appeal, and we noted probable jurisdiction. We 
now affirm the judgment of the court below. 
II. 
A. 
Article IV, §2 of the Constitution provides that 
.. [t]he Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all 
~ivileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several 
States ... 4 Derived, like the commerce clause, 5 from the 
4under the privileges and immunities clause, the terms 
1 1 1.,... klt, .. citizen .. and .. resident .. are used interchangably. See 
~ .. ..v IV A/ Austin v. New Hampshire, 420 u.s. 656, 662 n.8 (1975). 
,..-- fTV Under the Fourteenth Amendment, of course, .. all persons 
.. ~ born or naturalized in the United States .•• are citizens 
yo-~ ... of the State where they reside ... 
~ ~~ Footnote(s) 5 will appear on following pages. 
"'. ~ ~ """'~· ~ 
r~~.~o.-)-~. 9 -~· 




fourth of the Articles of Conferation, the privileges and 
irnmuni ties clause was intended to "help fuse into one 
nation a collection of independent, sovereign states." 
~omer v. Witsell, 334 u.s. 385 (1948). Recognizing this 
purpose, we have stated that "it is only with respect to 
those 'privileges' and 'immunities' bearing upon the 
vitality of the Nation as a single entity" that a state 
. ~ 
5Both the privileges and immunities clause ~d the 
commerce clause had their origins in the fourth~ of the 
Articles of Confederation, ~provided: 
The better to secure and perpetuate mutual 
friendship and intercourse among the people of 
the different States in this Union, the free 
inhabitants of each of these States ••• shall be 
entitled to all privileges and immunities of 
free citizens in the several States; and the 
people of each State shall have free ingress and 
regress to and from any other State, and shall 
enjoy therin all the privileges of trade and 
commerce, subject to the same duties, 
impositions and restrictions as the inhabitants 
thereof. 
Not surprisingly, this Court has recognized the "mutually 
reinforcing relationship" between the two clauses. 
Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 u.s. 518, 531 (1978). 
·"' ~· 
10. 
must accord residents and nonresidents equal treatment. 
Baldwin v. Montana Fish & Game Comm'n, 436 u.s. (1978). 
In Baldwin, we held that a state may charge a nonresident 
more than it charges a resident for the same elk-hunting 




~~· ~e not 
of a livelihood," we concluded that the"' licensey' 
"fundamental" the promotion of interstate to 
y ~-~ony.6 
~ ~· j..>v The origins and purpose of article IV, §2 make 
~~eb~~«-·~ ~ 
1 6The word "fundamental" has been us1 by the Court to ~ categorize rights protected by variou provisions of the M 
Constitution. Its meaning, however, u.aJ> ,i,Qs wi t:R eM:l:l --<.. 
context. For example, the right to engage in a trade or «n 1 jf: 
occupation has been viewed as "fundamental" under Article j • 
IV, see Baldwin v. Montana Fish & Game Comm'n, 436 u.s. 
371, 383 ( 1978) , but it is not always so regarded for 
purposes of equal protection analysis. See City of New 
Orleans v. Duke, 427 u.s. 297, 304 n.S (1976). See 
generally Note'";-A Constitutional Analysis of State Bar 
Residency Requirements Under the Interstate Privileges and 
Immunities Clause of Article IV, 92 Harv. L. Rev. 1461, 
1464 & nn. 23 and 24 (1979). 
' \ 
11. 
clear why this Court has found that "one of the privileges 
which the clause guarantees to citizens of State A is that 
of doing business in State B on terms of substantial 
equality." Toomer v. Witsell, 334 u.s. 385, 397 (1948). 
m Ward v. Maryland, 12 Wall. 418 (1871), the Court 
invalidated a statute under which nonresidents were 
required to pay $300 per year for a license to trade in 
goods not manufactured in Maryland, while resident traders 
paid a fee varying from $12 to $150. Similarly, under the 
South Carolina statute invalidated in Toomer, supra, 
nonresident fishermen were required to pay a license fee 
of $2500 for each shrimp boat owned; residents were 
charged only $25 per boat. =:7f n Hicklin v. Orbeck, 
"' 437 u.s. 518 (1978), we invalidated as violating the 





resident hiring preference for all employment related to 
the development of the State's oil and gas resources. 7 
There is nothing in Ward, Toomer, or Hicklin 
suggesting that only "the opportunity to pursue a common 
~ 
calling" can be t-reab-eO as a "privilege" under article IV, 
§2. 8 The practice of law, no less than the occupations 
7 In United Bldg. 
u.s. (1984), we 
calling is one of 
protected by the 
most of our cases 
Clause have dealt 
& Const. v. Mayor & Council of Camden, 
stated that "the pursuit of a common 
the most fundamental of those privileges 
Clause. " We noted that "many, if not 
expounding the Privileges and Immunities 
with this basic and essential activity." 
8In Corfield v. Coryell, 6 Fed. Cas. 546 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 
1825) (No. 3230), Justice Bushrod Washington, sitting as 
Circuit Justice, stated that the "fundamental rights" 
protected by the Clause included: 
The right of a citizen of one state to pass 
through, or to reside in any other state, for 
purposes of trade, agriculture, professional 
pursuits, or otherwise; to claim the benefit of 
the writ of habeas corpus; to institute and 
maintain actions of any kind in the courts of 
the state; to take, hold and dispose of 
property, either real or personal. 
Thus in this initial interpretation of the Clause, 
"professional pursuits," such as the practice of law, were 
Footnote continued on next page. 
'· 
13. 
considered in r earlier cases, affects commerce and is 
~ 
ex W;j,Q.al "' to the national economy. 9 In Goldfarb 
1/ut..~/-
Vi.rginia State Bar, 421 u.s. 773 (1975), .we noted that 
"'\ 
11 [i]n the modern world, it cannot be denied that the 
activities of lawyers play an important part in commercial 
intercourse.,. Similarly, in Bates v. State Bar of 
,~k 
Court~~ Arizona, 433 u.s. 350 (1977), the 
said to be protected. 
The "natural rights,. theory that informed 
Corfield was discarded long ago. See Paul v. Virginia, 75 
U.S. (8 Wall.) 168 (1868); Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 511 
(1939) (opinion of Roberts, J.). Nevertheless, we have 
noted that those privileges on Justice Washington's list 
would still be protected by the Clause. Baldwin, supra, 
at 387. 
9In Bradwell v. State, 83 u.s. (16 Wall.) 130 (1873), 
this Court held that the practice of law is not a 
"privilege or immunity" under the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Given that only "privileges or immunities" of national 
citizenship are protected by the amendment, see 
Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 u.s. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873); 
Twining v. New Jersey, 211 u.s. 78 (1908), the Bradwell 
decision is not relevant to the issue presented in this 
case. 
14. 
~counsel's concession that .. law offices are big 
business... Id. at 368 n.l9 (1977). 
their livelihood 
lawyers are 
e trade has become an anachronism ... 
~ ~ ~ a.<c..d.~ 
Furtbe~me~ noncommercialAespeet of the legal 
'\ 
~ ~J.I-d" ~ ~~ ~~ 
profession reinforces oYr co~~usie~ ~ftat it falls within 
A 
the ambit of the privileges and immunities clause. 10 Out-
of-state 
~~ -~"'-~~~~~ 
attorMys may A represent olien-Mi,.J who raise 
~~~ 
unpopular federal claims. In some cases ~ ~1ee and 
asSb '~1n~sident;.._~ay be the only means 
fk;.;t; bzz;pf ~ 
10~ h"a'\'~ never held that the privileges and immunities 
clause protects only economic interests. See . Doe v. 
Iblton, 410 u.s. 179 (1973) (Georgia statute permitting 
only residents to secure abortions found violative of the 




available for the vindication of federal rights. Leis v. 
Elynt, 439 u.s. 438, 450 (1979) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
T)Jeufgu, 1he a~ who ~ champio~ unpopular 
~ 
~ ca:7 A is more important to the "maintenance and 
well-being of the Union" than was the shrimp fisherman in 
1bomer, supra, or the pipeline worker in Hicklin, supra. 
B 
The state contends that if it cannot exclude 
noncitizens from the bar, its ability to function as a 
sovereign political body will be threatened. 
J..~A/1--
AttorA-ey-s, 1 
of course, "enjoy a broad monopoly to do things that other 
citizens may not lawfully do." In re Griffiths, (1973) 
(Burger, C.J., dissenting). In New Hampshire, for 
7? 
• • 
example, only lawyers are entrusted with the blank writs 
that are necessary for commencing lawsuits. According to 
·' 




exercise of state power 
justifies the limitation of bar membership to those who 
are "full-fledged members of the political community." 
c.u-1-~ 
The Framers believed that distinctions based on 
-1 
residence were necessary to ensure the integrity of the 
state as a separate political unit. This belief is 
~ 
evident in Article I of the Constitution, ~h provides 
't-14-1 
~at a person is ineligible to serve in the Senate or the 
House of Representatives unless he is "an Inhabitant of 
that State in which he shall be chos~n accordance 
. -----... -------·-
~----·------------ - -~·-·-
this understanding, we have recognized that . it is 
sometimes necessary for the state to discriminate against 
-TZ-..~~--~ 
w.e b.avej said that states may require that 
voters be bona fide residents of the relevant political 
subdivision. Dunn v. Blumstein, (1972). Moreover, it is 
17. 
beyond doubt that residence may be a requisite 
qJalification of those seeking elective office in a state. 
S:e Kanapaux v. Ellisor, 419 u.s. 891 (1974); Baldwin v. 
M:mtana Fish & Game Comm'n, 436 u.s. 371 (1978). If the 
states did not have such residency requirements, "they 
would cease to be the separate political communities that 
history and the constitutional text make plain were 
contemplated." Simson, Discrimination Against 
Nonresidents and the Privileges and Immunities Clause of 
Art i c 1 e IV , 12 8 P a • L. Rev • 3 7 9 , 3 8 7 ( 19 7 9) • 
Although this "political rights" exception to the 
privileges and immunities clause has been recognized for 
some time, 11 its contours have not been well-developed in 
11see Meyer, The Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in 
the Several States, 1 Mich. L.Rev. 286, 292-293 (1903). 
,. 
18. 
requirement for attorneys ~---
__---
must look elsewbe~f~r guidance. -------------
ositions intimately 
related to the process of self-government. 
Or-dinar ity , - o-f laws that discriminate 
against to "strict scrutiny" under 
the Equal Fourteenth Amendment. 
to this rule is warranted, however, when the 
question involves "broad discretionary power 
formulation or execution of policies importantly 
the citizen population." Bernal v. Fainter 
(1984} • 12 
Footnote(s} 12 will appear on following pages. 
December 10, 1984 
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RIDER A, page 18 83-1466 Piper 
This is evident from decisions with respect to aliens. As 
a general rule, state laws that discriminate against 
aliens are subjected to "strict scrutiny" under the Equal 
~otection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Graham v. 
achardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971). We have held, however, 
th t t t k 1 d 1 . f . . ~~ a s a es rna e exc u e a 1ens rom pos1t1ons ~mlft&n~zY 
related to the process of democratic self government. 
This has been found to exist when the position in question 
involves "broad discretionary power over the formulation 
or execution of policies importantly affecting the citizen 
fOpulation." Bernal v. Fainter, u.s. (1984) 1 
.. ' 
19. 
In In re Griffiths, 413 u.s. 717 
~ 
~at the "political function" exception did not permit the 





the state's argument that the 
discrimination against noncitizens was justified because 
the lawyer is an "officer of the court who is 
entrusted with the exercise of actual governmental power." 
a_~~ 
Instead, we concluded that an at~rnQy is not an "officer" 
within the ordinary meaning of that word. Id. at 728. 
Jk, 
T~y "makes his own decisions, follows his own 
" 
best judgment, collects his own fees and runs his own 
12we have held that the "political function" exception 
justifies the exclusion of aliens from positions as 
policemen, Foley v. Connelie, 435 u.s. 291 (1978}; 
teachers, Ambach v. Norwick, 441 u.s. 68 (1979}; and 
p:trole officers, Cabell v. Chavez-Sal ido, 454 U.s. 432 
(1982}. 
20. 
business." !d. at 729, quoting, Cammer v. United States, 
350 u.s. 399, 405 (1956) • Moreover, the state powers 
entrusted to ~' such as the power to sign writs 
~~!ti~~ 
and subpoenas, do not involve matters of state policy or 
A. 
acts of such unique responsibility as to entrust them only 
of holding a license to practice law does not place one so 
close to the core the political process as to make him a 
"formulator of governmental policy." !d. at 729. 
The "political function" exception, we / Zl 
found inapplicable in Griffiths, allows the state to 
exclude aliens from political decision-making. The 
ability to withhold from these "political outsiders" the 
right to vote and to hold policy-making jobs "goes to the 
heart of representative government." Bernal v. Fainter, 
21. 
supra, at The "political rights" exception, ~ 
~ haY£ recognized in decisions under the privileges and 
immunities clause, serves the same purpose. It allows a 
~~ 
stat~ ait~s to ~-~~t the exercise of governmental 
power to those who owe allegiance to the same sovereign 
~-. 
state. ~ parallel exceptions are necessary, for in our 
"' 
federal system, a state may choose to be governed by 
persons who are citizens of both the state and our nation. 
Given the identical aims of the two exceptions, we 
tu.c.Le~ 
conclude tha\ our decision in Griffiths is coRtrolliAS~ 
the "political rights" exception does not justify the 
exclusion of nonresidents from the New Hampshire bar. 
III. 
rz...._, . 
Ou5 conclus1on that Rule 42 deprives nonresidents 
7h.L t:.cn-1 
of a protected privilege does not end our inquiry. .we--
"' 
22. 
have stated that "[l]ike many other constitutional 
provisions, the privileges and immunities clause is not an 
absolute." Toomer v. Witsell, 334 u.s. 385, 396 (1948): 
United Bldg. & Canst. v. Mayor & Council of Camden, 




discrimination against nonresidents where: ('J ) there is a 
substantial reason for the difference in treatment: and 
I' 
..(./_ 
( ~ ) the discrimination practiced against nonresidents '( 
~ .. ~~· 
~ 
~ "bears a 
~~ 
~~k.-.4-~k~ 
substantial relationship "{j:.~ the 'evil' they are 
1\ 
VI~._, 
./,..e.-~ -- · said to present." Hicklin v. Or beck, supra, at 526-527] "'r ? 
Toomer, supra, at 398. Under the second prong of the 
23. 
test, we have held that the means must bear a "close 
relation" to the state's objective. Id. at 396. In 
making that determination, we must consider whether there 
were less restrictive means available to the state. 13 
The Supreme Court of New Hampshire offers several 
justifications for its refusal to admit nonresidents to 
the bar. It claims that nonresident~ would be less 
; La_) 
likely to become, 
1\ 
and procedures; 
and remain, familiar with local rules 
~ ...... w--.J>e. __..._ -'likMy ~j behave 
(") 1-o 
ethically; WVftTCl''e't:Ni:-tt'tf'""'.......,"eB'i~eo@€ofllft ""' be r a V a i 1 a b 1 e f 0 r CO U r t 
proceedings; and $ wetti<l-b& ""'"illi~:;tJto do Ef_Q_ bono and 
13 rn Toomer, the Court noted that the state could have 
used less restrictive means to eliminate the danger of 
excessive trawling. South Carolina could have restricted 
the type of equipment used in its fisheries, graduated 
license fees acording to the size of the boats, or charged 
nonresidents a differential to compensate for the added 
enforcement burden they imposed. 334 u.s. at 398-399. 
other volunteer work 





We 1\most examiRe 
-
The state certainly has a legitimate interest in 
that the members of its bar are familiar with 
rules and procedures. We do not believe, however, 
that the state has shown a "substantial reason" for its 
discriminatory treatment of nonresidents. There is 
\ evidence that they would be less likely to keep abreast o 
rules. The state's argument assumes 
nresident attorneys would have fewer opportunities 
earn local rules because only a small portion of thei 
ractice would be in the New Hampshire courts. We doubtl 
that an attorney without a substantial practice 
in the state 
25. 
/ 
would want to become a member of the bar. 
r 
A 
difficult examination and annual dues would dissuade those 
attorneys with a minimal practice in the state from 
seeking membership. 14 Therefore, we do not believe that a 
nonresident attorney would lack the incentive or the 
cpportunity to become familar with local rules and 
procedures. I 
Even if we assume that nonresident attorneys 
would tend to be less knowledgable about local rules, the 
total exclusion of all nonresidents is unjustified. Under 
'lbomer and Hicklin, the discrimination against 
nonresidents must bear a "close relation" to the "evil" 
present to the state. Here, there is no close 
14 Annual dues are currently set at $125 a year and, in 
addition, any special assessments that may be imposed. 
26. 
relation between the means and the end; numerous options 
are available to the state which would protect its 
interest without discriminating unduly against those 
outside its borders. The state, for example, could 
exclude from its courts those attorneys who do not 
maintain a substantial litigation practice in New 
Hampshire. 15 This would ensure that only attorneys 
familiar with local rules appeared before the New 
Hampshire courts. Alternatively, the state could require 
all members of its bar to attend periodic seminars on 
local rules and procedures .16 Finally, we believe that 
15The requirement could be based either on billable hours 
or on the number of matters in New Hampshire courts. 
16There already is a rule requiring all new admi ttees to 
complete a practical skills course within one year of 
their admission. N.H.S.Ct. Rule 42(7). 
27. 
the bar could alleviate any potential problems by 
disciplining attorneys for failure to comply with local 
rules. 17 
The second reason proffered by the appellant is 
even less "substantia'l" than the first. The state clearly 
has an interest in ensuring that lawyers behave ethically. 
ThWe is no evidence, however, that nonresidents would 
17New Hampshire's "simple" reside/c~i~ent 
underinclusive because it permits J~ ys who 




ORe t ime 
the New 
who had 
There is no reason to 
residents maintain a more 
Hampshire courts than would 
never lived in the state. 
d~~n~~t~aN-~~~~~~_,~i11,~~~~~~~~ 
" ontinuing" residency requirement, 
d sposi ti ve of the plan's v 
nd immunities clause. 




perform their duties dishonestly. Moreover, we are 
unpersuaded by appellant's contention that an attorney who 
lives in the state will be more concerned with his 
reputation, and hence will "maintain high standards of 
ethics." we believe that an attorney is concerned 
primarily with his reputation in the community where he 
practices. For a member of the New Hampshire bar, a 
relevant legal community is the State of New Hampshire, 
regardless of where that attorney may live. Any "peer 
pressure" that, an attorney feels is likely to come from 
the lawyers with whom he practices, and not from his 
neighbors. 
Even if nonresidents were a "peculiar source" of 
the state's problem, the residency requirement would be 
unjustified, because exclusion does not bear a "close 
/ 
29. 
relation" to the state's objective. The state could 
better preserve the integrity of its bar by conducting a 
more thorough background check of each applicant. 18 If it 
were more expensive to investigate a nonresident, this 
additional cost could be passed on to the out-of-state 
applicant in the form of a higher registration fee. 
Furthermore, disciplinary proceedings could be used to 
deter dishonest conduct. 19 Stringent enforcement of the 
· 18Traditionally, such background checks have been lax. 
Stimson, Discrimination Against Nonresidents and the 
Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, 128 Pa.L. 
Rev • 3 7 9 , 3 91 n . 55 ( 19 7 9} • 
19The New H<\;fs~r would be able to discipline a 
nonresident ~~DQ¥ in the same manner in which it 
disciplines resident members. As a committee of the 
Oregon bar has stated: "Why should it be more ...tMff#~_]-.. t S' /.d-
for the Mul tnomah County courts to control.,~~may 
from Vancourver, Washington, than from Lakev1ew, Oregon, 
if both attorneys are members of the Oregon Bar and 
subject to its ~les and discipline?" Bar Admissions 




state's code of professional ethics would exclude 
unethical attorneys from the bar without discriminating 
against nonresidents. 
) The appellant next argues that nonresi~ 
1 
for court proceedi)l(.• We 
I 
1 attorneys might be unavailable 
find this reason ninsubstantial,n for there is no evidence 
that a lawyer living in another state wpuld fail to appear 
for a scheduled hearing or trial. The threat of 
I malpractice liability would deter most such derelictions 
of duty. Moreover, the exclusion of all nonresidents is 
not closely related to the state's objective. The state 
I 
I 







for scheduled court proceedings. In 
the state might resort to contempt 







413 u.s. 717, 727 (1973). 20 
~ 
31. 
Finally, we find appellant 1 s fourth reason for 
discriminating against nonresident applicants 
insubstantial. No evidence suggests that a nonresident 
who practices law within the state of New Hampshire will 
choose to do his volunteer work elsewhere. Indeed, an 
attorney will be able to represent indigents and do other 
p:ro bono work only in those states where he has been 
admitted to the bar. There is also no reason to believe 
that someone who has chosen to become a member of the New . 
20o e to innovations such as conference calls, very few 
ases should require frequent unscheduled meetings with 
e judge and opposing counsel. Nevertheless, we are 
ware that in some cases, an attorney must be available 
'c;m a moment 1 s notice." In such a case, a nonresident 
attorney could be required to associate with a local 
attorney who would be available for emergency meetings. 
The judge, however, must not treat nonresident1 
differently than equall~ unaccessible attorneys from 
distant parts of the state. 
,·, 
32. 
Hampshire bar will be unwilling to perform volunteer wo 
for that organization simply because he lives in another 
state. 21 Finally, we believe that any potential loss to 
the state will be roughly offset by the volunteer work 
performed in New Hampshire by resident attorneys who 
practice law elsewhere. 
In summary, we conclude that the state does not 
have a "substantial reason" for discriminating against 
nonresident applicants to its bar. Moreover, the 
exclusion of all nonresidents does not bear a "close 
relation" to the state's objectives. Therefore, we hold 
21 rt is also possible that the means chosen do not bear a 
"substantial relationship" to the state's objective. 
Several local bar organizations have implemented mandatory 
..Q[Q_ bono programs. [cite to article on Orlando, Florida 
plan] Presumably, a similar plan could be implemented in 





that Rule 42 of the Supreme Court of New H9mpshire 
violates the privileges and immunities clause of article 
IV, §2 of the Constitution. 
~-- --
conclusion that Rule 42 violates the 
privileges and immunities clause is consistent with our 
decision in Leis v. Flynt, 439 u.s. 438 (1979) (per 
curiam) • In Leis, we held that ;; L~~ could be 
'\ 
denied, without the benefit of a hearing, permission to 
appear 2fQ_ hac vice. In reaching this decision, we noted 
that since the "founding of the Republic, the licensing 
and regulation of lawyers has been left exclusively to the 
States." We concluded that the states are free to 
"prescribe the qualifications and standards of 
professional conduct" for those attorneys who appear 
34. 
its courts. Pro hac vice 
/ 
applicants are not members of 
~ 
subject to its 
Ji'urthermOf.'oe., .....t:bese attort;leys l:la.ve Rot _ 
~~ 
a-Ad ~ may lack the 
professional and personal qualifications that a state may 
require of all its lawyers. 
nonresident attorney admitted to 
lawyer requesting 
vice, poses no special threat to system. 
The state those nonresidents who possess 
the requisite ional and personal qualifications. A 
nonresident the state 1 s bar examination, and 
an exemption from any other requirements 
imposed. Therefore, we do not believe that ou 




There is no basis for appellant's 
the elimination of residency requirements will result 
We conclude that New Hampshire's bar residency 
requirement violates article IV, §2 of the United States 
Constitution. The nonresident's interest in practicing 
law is a "privilege" protected by the Clause. Moreover, 
although L~~ the y is "an of the court, " he 
·-does 
it can be entrusted only to a "full-fledged member of the .......... 
political community." 









Acco~dingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court of 
• 
Appeals and hold that Rule 42 is violative of the 
privileges and immunities clause. 
It is so ordered. 
December 10, 1984 
PIPER3 GINA-POW 
Piper 
If in fact these concerns were realistice with respect to 
ron-residents we would agree that they implicate 
substantial state interests. The case comes to us withe~ 
evidence supporting any of these claims, and we are not 
persuaded that evidence could support the view that non-
residents of the bar generally would be derelict in all of 
these respects. 
It is well to bear in mind that before a lawyer could 
become a member of the New Hmnpshire Bar he must meet the 
same qualifications required of residents, including 
passing its bar examination. Once admitted, the non-
resident would be required to pay the annual dues - at 
present $125.00 a year and be subject to special 
assessments that may be imposed. Moreover, we cannot 
assume that a non-resident lawyer would undertake to 
practice in New Hampshire without familiarizing himself 
with local rules and procedures. Nor can we make a 
negative assumption with respect to compliance with the 
state's Code of Ethical Conduct, particularly since the 
Supreme Court of New Hampshire has adopted the Code 
,, . 
.. .~ ,, 
f, 
2. 
recommending by the American Bar Association and in effect 
in a large majority of the states. (Lee: Ask the Library 
to check to see whether New Hampshire has adopted the ABA 
Code. This perhaps could be done by calling the ABA 
office here in Washington). 
There is greater substance to the state's concern 
that a non-resident member of its bar would at times be 
unavailable for court proceedings. In the course a 
litigation there are pretrial, discovery, motions and 
other proceedings. cCounsel, of course, should be 
readily available for these. Often the court will wish to 
confer with counsel or to settle a matter on short notice, 
even by a telephone conference. Courts have different 
practices with respect to setting their dockets, and 
frequently counsel must be present at a "docket call" to 
minimize conflicting court engagements. 
There are, however, substantial answers to these 
valid points. It is unlikely that a lawyer residing and 
practicing in a distance state would wish to become or 
remain a member of the New Hampshire bar. It is well also 
to remember that a trial court, by rule or as an exercise 
of discretion, may require an out-of-state lawyer to 
associate local counsel in any matter that may require 
3. 
prompt availability of counsel. Indeed, in the absence of 
any such rule or order by the trial court a non-resident 
lawyer may be imprudent indeed to try a jury case in New 
Hampshire without local counsel. He could be handicapped 
in the selection of the jury as well as being recognized 
by the jury as a "foreigner" opposed by a well-known and 
respected New Hampshire lawyer. 
The final negative suggested by the state is that the 
non-resident member of its bar may be disinclined to do 
his share of pro bono and other volunteer work within the 
state. We think the answer to this - and indeed in large 
part to each of the state's argument - is that the courts 
of New Hampshire will have authority to require all 
members of its bar to conform to generally applicable 
rules including service as appointed counsel for 
indigents. And, of coruse, any member of the New 
Hampshire Bar will be subject to disciplinary proceedings 
without regard to his residence or the frequency with 
which he may practice within the state. 
** * * 
Note to Lee: 
,. 
4. 
Part III of your draft (pp. 21-33), identifies and 
answers the arguments advanced by New Hampshire. Although 
you do this very well, it is unnecesary to go into so much 
detail. The force of our opinion would be weakened by 
what could be viewed as an "over argument". I have 
dictated the above as a rough suggested format for a 
substantial condensation of these pages. 
make such changes and additions as you 
helpful. I have dictated this without 
Feel free to 
think will be 
briefs or the 
opinions of the courts below. You might check these to 
see whether my draft omits any significant point in 
response to the state, and perhaps you could add some 
footnotes in elaboration if they may not be important 
enough to go into the text. 
One distinction that we may need to address is the 
difference between a New Hampshire and a New York City or 
Washington, D. c. where a major city is the primary place 
of practice of out-of-state lawyers: In New York, New 
Jersey and Connecticut, and in Washington the surburbs of 
Virginia and Maryland. I am inclined to think that all we 
need say about this is to point out that circumstances 
vary around the country. As a pratical matter (as you 
point out), it is unlikely that in New Hampshire it is 
' , .. 
5. 
unlikely that many out-of-state lawyers - certainly those 
who live in remote states - would ever want to take the 
bar examination, pay annual dues and assessments, and be 
subject to rules of a distant state. On the other hand, 
in situations like New York City and Washington a high 
percentage of lawyers who practice in these cities are 
members of two bars: their state of legal residence and 
the state in which they regularly practice. There is 
nothing in the record before us to indicate that certain 
problems have arisen from these situations, at least 
problems that the courts are not able to control. 
LFP, JR. 
December 10, 1984 
PIPER4 GINA 
Rider A, page ___ 83-1466 Piper 
tbte: Consider adding a note similar to the following: 
It is true that lawyers traditionally have tended to 
be leaders in state and local affairs. Their training 
cpalifies them for this role. This is particularly true 
of politics, the holding of public office, and serving an 
public boards and commissions. Not infrequently~ lawyers 
also participate in the religious, cultural and civic 
activities that are characteristic of American 
communities. A non-resident member of the bar would not 
be eligible to hold public office, probably would take no 
part in politics and only a diminished part - if any - in 
community affairs. We cannot say, however, that this 
ne~rve approaches constitutional significance. Indeed, 
by no means all resident lawyers take part in these 
activities - particularly where they practice in a great 
metropolitan center. 
2. 
tbte to Lee: 
I should have included above leadership in bar 
association activiti~ 
As a separate, we might 
1\ 
mention in a note that 
lawyers, particularly those 
corporate legal departments, 
,..,. 
in the large firms or 
~~ 
in 
often practice in a number of 
I\ 
states. A o~ ..... 
.;:- people;. J usinesses tend to be multi-state and are 
increasingly regulated nationally under federal laws arrl 
regulations. 
'•' r, "' 
lfp/ss 12/17/84 Rider x, p. 15 (Piper) 
PilSX SALLY-POW 
The state first contends that the right to 
practice law is not protected by the Privileges and 
lmmunities Clause. It argues 
lfp/ss 12/17/84 Rider A, p. 15 (Piper) 
Draft No. 2 
PI15 SALLY-POW 
According to the appellant, if the Privileges and 
Immunities Clause is held to aply to the practice of law, 
this would substantially impair its sovereign authority to 
regulate the bar.l2 
Note to Lee: In addition, on p. 15, I suggest changing 
note 12 to read as follows: 
12. The residency requirement at issue is 
unlike certain requirements that pertain to government 
itself. It has been said as to these that a state 
i 
lfp/ss 12/17/84 Rider A, p. 18 (Piper) 
PI18 SALLY-POW 
Note to Lee: I am still troubled by the use in footnote 
14, p. 18, of the Foley v. Connelie line of cases. New 
Hampshire has never relied on these cases and does not 
really argue lawyers are performing na political functionn 
or that there is a 0 political rights exception° to the P&I 
clause. I think note 14 as now drafted may give us 
trouble with other Justices and also - if it remains in 
the opinion - may be confusing in future cases. New 
Hampshire's basic argument is that the exercise of its 
sovereign power over the practice of law would be 
adversely affected by being required to admit 
nonresidents. I therefore suggest that we avoid the 
problem by revising note 14 along the following lines: 
2. 
In Griffiths, the discrimination at issue was by 
a state against aliens. We held Connecticut's refusal to 
admit otherwise qualified aliens to its bar violated the 
Equal Protection Clause. Although the analysis in 
determining whether there has been a denial of equal 
protection is different from that applicable to the 
Privilege and Immunities Clause, there is some similarity. 
In the alien cases, the Court has considered whether 
certain state or local employees performed political 
functions of such a character as to justify confining the 
holding of these positions to citizens. See, e.g., (here, 
Lee, cite your three cases). In this case, lawyers as 
such are not employees of the state or a subdivision 
thereof and they are not members as such of the "political 
community". The state here therefore bases its argument 
3. 
essentially on the ground that its admitted sovereign 
authority to regulate the bar would be weakened merely by 
the fact of nonresidency. 
llfp/ss 12/17/84 ____ ~M~e~m~o~P~·~2~0~(~P~ip~e~r~) 
LEEP SALLY-POW 
Memo to Lee: As you will see from my scribbling, 
particularly on p. 21, I have trouble with the sentence 
beginning at the bottom of p. 20 to the effect that a 
reason for discriminating "exists only where there is 
something to indicate that noncitizens would constitute a 
peculiar source of the state's problem", citing Toomer. 
The state does not talk in terms of a "source" of its 
problem. What you have in mind, of course, is that some 
problems will arise with respect to licensing nonresident 
lawyers. But the sentence does not seem to fit smoothly 
into our discussing, and I would simply omit it. Then, 
you can forget my scribbling. 
lfp/ss 12/14/84 Rider A, p. 26 (Piper) 
PI26 SALLY-POW 
It is unlikely that many lawyers residing in distant 
locations will wish to become members of the New Hampshire 
bar. It is not unreasonable to expect that a high 
percentage of nonresident lawyers willing to take the 
examination and pay the dues, will reside in places 
reasonably convenient to New Hampshire. 
lfp/ss 12/14/84 Rider A, p. 24 (Piper) 
PI24 SALLY-POW 
We are unpersuaded by the implication that a 
member of the New Hampshire bar who is a nonresident would 
be less responsive to his professional duty to practice 
ethically than resident lawyers. And apart from duty, if 
a nonresident expects to engage in practice in New 
Hampshire self interest in his reputation should provide 
the same incentive to maintain high ethical standards as 
applied to resident lawyers. Again, a nonresident lawyer 
would be subject to disciplinary proceedings when 
practicing in New Hampshire to the same extent as 
residents if problems of jurisdiction arose, at least the 
offending nonresident lawyer could be disbarred from 
further practice int he state. 
lfp/ss 12/14/84 Rider A, p. 27 (Piper) 
PI27 SALLY-POW 
The final reason advanced by the state is that 
nonresident members of its bar would be disinclined to do 
their share of pro bono and volunteer work. Perhaps this 
is true to a limited extent particularly where the member 
resides in a distant location. We think it reasonable to 
believe that most lawyers who become members of a state 
bar will endeavor to perform their share of these 
services. Certainly he may be appointed and required to 
represent indigents and perhaps expected to participate in 
formal legal aid work. This sort of participation would 
serve the professional interest of a lawyer who actually 
practiced in the state • 
• 
December 10, 1984 
PIPER3 GINA-POW 
RIDER A - page 
If in fact these concerns 
non-residents we would agree that they 
respect to 
implicate 
substantial state interests. The case comes to us without 
evidence supporting any of these claims, and we are not 
persuaded that evidence could support the view that non-
residents of the bar generally would be derelict in all of 
these respects. 
It is well to bear in mind that before a lawyer could 
become a member of the New Hmnpshire Bar he must meet the 
same qualifications required of residents, including 
passing its bar examination. Once admitted, the non-
resident would be required to pay the annual dues - at 
present $125.00 a year and be subject to special 
assessments that may be imposed. Moreover, we cannot 
assume that a non-resident lawyer would undertake to 
~act ice in New Hampshire without familiarizing himself 
with local rules and procedures. Nor can we make a 
negative assumption with respect to compliance with the 
state's Code of Ethical Conduct, particularly since the 
Supreme Court of New Hampshire has adopted the Code 
2. 
recommending by the American Bar Association and in effect 
in a large majority of the states. (Lee: Ask the Library 
to check to see whether New Hampshire has adopted the ABA 
Code. This perhaps could be done by calling the ABA 
office here in Washington). 
There is greater substance to the state's concern 
that a non-resident member of its bar would at times be 
unavailable for court proceedings. In the course a 
litigation there are pretrial, discovery, motions and 
other proceedings. cCounsel, of course, should be 
readily available for these. Often the court will wish to 
confer with counsel or to settle a matter on short notice, 
even by a telephone conference. Courts have different 
practices with respect to setting their dockets, and 
frequently counsel must be present at a "docket call" ~ 
rinimize conflicting court engagements. 
There are, however, substantial answers to these 
valid points. It is unlikely that a lawyer residing and 
practicing in a distance state would wish to become or 
remain a member of the New Hampshire bar. It is well also 
to remember that a trial court, by rule or as an exercise 
of discretion, may require an out-of-state lawyer to 
associate local counsel in any matter that may require 
,, 
3. 
prompt availability of counsel. Indeed, in the absence of 
~Y such rule or order by the trial court a non-resident 
lawyer may be imprudent indeed to try a jury case in New 
Hampshire without local counsel. He could be handicapped 
in the selection of the jury as well as being recognized 
by the jury as a "foreigner" opposed by a well-known and 
respected New Hampshire lawyer. 
The final negative suggested by the state is that the 
non-resident member of its bar may be disinclined to do 
his share of pro bono and other volunteer work within the 
&ate. We think the answer to this - and indeed in large 
part to eac~ of the state's argument - is that the courts 
of New Hampshire will have authority to require all 
members of its bar to conform to generally applicable 
rules including service as appointed counsel for 
indigents. And, of ceruse, any member of the New 
Hampshire Bar will be subject to disciplinary proceedings 
without regard to his residence or the frequency with 
which he may practice within the state. 
** * * 
N:')te to Lee : 
4. 
Part III of your draft (pp. 21-33), identifies and 
answers the arguments advanced by New Hampshire. Although 
you do this very well, it is unnecesary to go into so much 
detail. The force of our opinion would be weakened by 
what could be viewed as an "over argument". I have 
dictated the above as a rough suggested format for a 
substantial condensation of these pages. Feel free to 
make such changes and additions as you think will be 
helpful. I have dictated this without briefs or the 
opinions of the courts below. You might check these to 
see whether my draft omits any significant point in 
response to the state, and perhaps you could add some 
footnotes in elaboration if they may not be important 
enough to go into the text. 
<he distinction that we may need to address is the 
difference between a New Hampshire and a New York City or 
Washington, D. c. where a major city is the primary place 
of practice of out-of-state lawyers: In New York, New 
Jersey and Connecticut, and in Washington the surburbs of 
Virginia and Maryland. I am inclined to think that all we 
need say about this is to point out that circumstances 
vary around the country. As a pratical matter (as you 
point out), it is unlikely that in New Hampshire it is 
5. 
unlikely that many out-of-state lawyers - certainly those 
who live in remote states - would ever want to take the 
bar examination, pay annual dues and assessments, and be 
subject to rules of a distant state. On the other hand, 
in situations like New York City and Washington a high 
percentage of lawyers who practice in these cities are 
members of two bars: their state of legal residence and 
the state in which they regularly practice. There is 
nothing in the record before us to indicate that certain 
problems have arisen from these situations, at least 
problems that the courts are not able to control. 
LFP, JR. 
December 10, 1984 
PIPER4 GINA 
Rider A, page __ _ 
Note: Consider adding a note similar to the following: 
It is true that lawyers traditionally have tended to 
be leaders in state and local affairs. Their training 
q.Ialifies them for this role. This is particularly true 
of politics, the holding of public office, and serving on 
public boards and commissions. Not infrequently, lawyers 
also participate in the religious, cultural and civic 
activities that are character is tic of American 
communities. A non-resident member of the bar would not 
be eligible to hold public office, probably would take no 
part in politics and only a diminished part - if any - in 
community affairs. We cannot say, however, that this 
negative approaches constitutional significance. 
by no means all resident lawyers take part 
Indeed, 
in these 
activities - particularly where they practice in a great 
metropolitan center. 
2. 
Note to Lee: 
I should have included above leadership in bar 
association activities. 
As a separate, we might mention in a note that 
lawyers, particularly those in the large firms or in 
corporate legal departments, often practice in a number of 
states. 
people, 
A part from the ever-increasing mobility of our 
businesses tend to be multi-state and are 












Recirculated: ________ _ 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 83-1466 
SUPREME COURT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE, 
· APPELLANT v. KATHRYN A. PIPER 
ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT 
[December -, 1984] 
JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
The Rules of the Supreme Court of New Hampshire limit 
bar admission to state residents. We here consider whether 
this restriction violates the Privileges and Immunities Clause 
of the United States Constitution, Art. IV, § 2. 
I 
A 
Kathryn Piper lives in Lower Waterford, Vermont, about 
400 yards from the New Hampshire border. In 1979, she ap-
plied to take the February 1980 New Hampshire bar exami-
nation. Piper submitted with her application a statement of 
intent to become a New Hampshire resident. Following an 
investigation, the Board of Bar Examiners found that Piper 
was of good moral character and met the other requirements 
for admission. She was allowed to take, and passed, the 
examination. Piper was informed by the Board that she 
would have to establish a home address in New Hampshire 
prior to being sworn in. 
On May 7, 1980, Piper requested from the Clerk of the 
New Hampshire Supreme Court a dispensation from the resi-
dency requirement. Although she had a "possible job" with 
a lawyer in Littleton, New Hampshire, Piper stated that be-
coming a resident of New Hampshire would be inconvenient. 
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favorable interest rate, and she and her husband recently had 
become parents. According to Piper, these "problems pe-
culiar to [her] situation ... warrant[ed] that an exception 
be made." Letter from Appellee to Ralph H. Wood, Esq., 
Clerk of N. H. Supreme Court, App. 13. 
On May 13, 1980, the Clerk informed Piper that her re-
quest had been denied. She then formally petitioned the 
New Hampshire Supreme Court for permission to become a 
member of the bar. She asserted that she was well-qualified 
and that her "situation [was] sufficiently unique that the 
granting of an exception . . . [would] not result in the setting 
of any undesired precedent." Letter of Nov. 8, 1980 from 
Appellee to Hon. William A. Grimes, Chief Justice of the 
N. H. Supreme Court, App. 15. The Supreme Court denied 
Piper's formal request on December 31, 1980. 
B 
On March 22, 1982, Piper filed this action in the United 
States District Court for the District of New Hampshire. 
She named as defendants the five justices and the clerk of the 
state supreme court. She alleged that Rule 42 of the New 
Hampshire Supreme Court, that excludes nonresidents from 
the bar, 1 violates the Privileges and Immunities Clause of 
the United States Constitution, Art. IV, § 2. 2 
1 Rule 42 does not explicitly provide that only New Hampshire residents 
may be admitted to the bar. It does require, however, that an applicant 
either be a resident of New Hampshire or file a statement of intent to re-
side there. N. H. S. Ct~ule 42(3). In an affidavit submitted to the Dis- ::ff 
trict Court, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of New Hampshire said 
that under the rule, an applicant for admission must be "a bona fide resi-
dent of the State . . . at the time that the oath of office ... is adminis-
tered." Affidavit of John W. King, App. 32. Accordingly, the parties 
agree that the refusal to admit Piper to the bar was based on Rule 42. 
2 Piper was not excluded totally from the practice of law in New Hamp-
shire. Out-of-state lawyers may appear pro hac vice in state court. This 
alternative, however, does not allow the nonresident to practice in 'New 
Hampshire on the same terms as a resident member of the bar. The law-
yer appearing pro hac vice must be associated with a local lawyer who is 
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On May 17, 1982, the District Court granted Piper's motion 
for summary judgment. 539 F. Supp. 1064 (D. N. H. 1982). 
The court first stated that the opportunity to practice law is a 
"fundamental" right. See Baldwin v. Montana Fish & 
Game Comm'n, 436 U. S. 371 (1978). It found that Piper 
had been denied this right in the absence of a "substantial 
reason," 539 F. Supp., at 1072, and that Rule 42 was not 
"closely tailored" to achieve its intended goals, id., at 1073. 
The court held that ~New Hampshire's residency require-
ment violated the Privileges and Immunities Clause. 3 
An eyenly divided Court of Appeals for· the First Circuit, 
sitting en bane, affirmed the judgment in favor of Piper. 
Piper v. Supreme Court of New Hampshire, 723 F. 2d 110 
(CAl 1983). 4 The prevailing judges held that Rule 42 vio-
lated the Privileges and Immunities Clause. After finding 
that Article IV, § 2 protects an individual's right to "'pursue 
a livelihood in a state other than his own,"' id., at 112, (quot-
ing Baldwin v. Montana Fish & Game Comm'n, supra, at 
386), the judges applied the two-part test set forth in Hicklin 
v. Orbeck, 437 U. S. 518 (1978). They concluded that there 
was no "substantial reason" for the different treatment of 
nonresidents and that the challenged discrimination bore no 
present for trial or argument. SeeN. H. S. Ct. Rule 33(1); N. H. Super. 
Ct. Rule 19. Furthermore, the decision on whether to grant pro hac vice 
status to an out-of-state lawyer is purely discretionary. See Leis v. Flynt, 
439 U. S. 438, 442 (1979) (per curiam). 
3 The District Court did not consider Piper's claims that Rule 42: (i) de-
prived her of property without due process of law, in violation of the Four-
teenth Amendment; (ii) denied her equal protection of the law, in viotation 
of the Fourteenth Amendment; and (iii) placed an undue burden upon in-
terstate commerce, in violation of Article I, § 8 of the United States Con-
stitution. The Court of Appeals did not address these claims, and our 
resolution of this case makes it unnecessary for us to reach them. 
'The panel, with one judge dissenting, had reversed the district court's 
judgment. Piper v. Supreme Court of New Hampshire, 723 F. 2d 98 
(1983). 
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"substantial relationship" to the state's objectives. 5 See id., 
at 525-527. 
The dissenting judges found that the New Hampshire Su-
preme Court's residency requirement did not violate the 
Privileges and Immunities Clause. While recognizing that 
Rule 42 may "serve the less than commendable purpose of in-
sulating New Hampshire practitioners from out-of-state com-
petition," 723 F. 2d, at 119, they found several "substantial" 
reasons to justify discrimination against nonresidents. If 
the residency re-quirement were abolished, "large law firms 
in distant states" might exert significant influence over the 
state bar. Id. These nonresident lawyers would be unfa-
miliar with local customs and would be less likely to perform 
pro bono work within the state. The dissenting judges fur-
ther believed the District Court's judgment was inconsistent 
with our decision in Leis v. Flynt, 439 U. S. 438 (1979) (per 
curiam). 
The Supreme Court of New Hampshire filed a timely no-
tice of appeal, and we noted probable jurisdiction. We now 
affirm the judgment of the court below. 
II 
A 
Article IV, § 2 of the Constitution provides that "[t]he Citi-
zens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Im-
5 The prevailing judges thought it significant that three state supreme 
courts had invalidated their own bar residency requirements. Sargus v. 
West Virginia Board of Law Examiners, 294 S. E. 2d 440 (W. Va. 1983); 
Noll v. Alaska Bar Assoc., 649 P. 2d 241 (Alaska 1982); Gordon v. Com· 
mittee on Character and Fitness, 48 N. Y.2d 266, 422 N. Y. S. 2d 641, 397 
N. E. 2d 1309 (1979). Since the Court of Appeals decision in this case, 
another state supreme court has reached the same conclusion. In re J add, 
391 Mass. 227, 461 N. E. 2d 760 (1984). We also think it significant that 
these courts, that are responsible for regulating the bars in their respec-
tive states, have found the residency requirements unnecessary. 
.. 
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munities of Citizens in the several States." 6 Derived, like 
the Commerce Clause, from the fourth of the Articles of Con-
feration, 7 the Privileges and Immunities Clause was in-
tended to "help fuse into one nation a collection of independ-
ent, sovereign States." Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U. S. 385, 
395 (1948). Recognizing this purpose, we have stated that it 
is "[o]nly with respect to those 'privileges' and 'immunities' 
bearing upon the vitality of the Nation as a single entity" that 
a state must accord residents and nonresidents equal treat-
ment. Baldwin v. Montana Fish & Game Comm'n, supra, 
3B3Q~ In Baldwin, we held that a state may 
charge a nonresident more than it charges a resident for the 
same elk-hunting license. Because elk hunting is "recrea-
tion" rather than a "means of a livelihood," we concluded that 
0 the right to a hunting license was not "fundamental" to the 
promotion of interstate harmony. !d., at 388. 
The origins and purpose of article IV, § 2 make clear why 
this Court has found that "one of the privileges which the 
clause guarantees to citizens of State A is that of doing busi-
ness in State B on terms of substantial equality with the citi-
6 Under this Clause, the terms "citizen" and ''resident" are used inter-
changeably. See Austin v. New Hampshire, 420 U. S. 656, 662 n. 8 
(1975). Under the Fourteenth Amendment, of course, "[a]ll persons born 
or naturalized in the United States ... are citizens ... of the State wherein 
they reside." 
7 Both the Privileges and Immunities Clause and the Commerce Clause 
had their origins in the fourth article of the Articles of Confederation, that 
provided: 
"The better to secure and perpetuate mutual friendship and intercourse 
among the people of the different States in this Union, the free inhabitants 
of each of these States ... shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities 
of free citizens in the several States; and the people of each State shall have 
free ingress and regress to and from any other State, and shall enjoy 
therein all the privileges of trade and commerce, subject to the same 
duties, impositions and restrictions as the inhabitants thereof . 0 •• " 
Not surprisingly, this Court has recognized the "mutually reinforcing rela-
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zens of that state." Toomer v. Witsell, supra, at 396. In 
Ward v. Maryland, 12 Wall. 418 (1870), the Court invali-
dated a statute under which nonresidents were required to 
pay $300 per year for a license to trade in goods not manufac-
tured in Maryland, while resident traders paid a fee varying 
from $12 to $150. Similarly, under the South Carolina stat-
ute invalidated in Toomer, supra, nonresident fishermen 
were required to pay a license fee of $2500 for each shrimp 
boat owned; residents were charged only $25 per boat. Re-
cently, in Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 U. S. 518 (1978), we found 
violative of the Privileges and Immunities Clause a statute 
containing a resident hiring preference for all employment 
related to the development of the State's oil and gas 
resources. 8 
There is nothing in Ward, Toomer, or Hicklin suggesting 
that only "the opportunity to pursue a common calling" can 
be viewed as a "privilege" under article IV, § 2.9 The prac-
8 In United Bldg. & Const. Trades Council v. Mayor & Council of Cam-
den,-- U. S. -- (1984), we stated that "the pursuit of a common call-
ing is one of the most fundamental of those privileges protected by the 
Clause." !d. We noted that "many, if not most of our cases expounding 
the Privileges and Immunities Clause have dealt with this basic and essen-
tial activity." Ibid. 
9 In Garfield v. Coryell, 6 Fed. Cas. 546 (C. C. ED Pa. 1825) (No. 3230), 
Justice Bushrod Washington, sitting as Circuit Justice, stated that the 
"fundamental rights" protected by the Clause included: 
"The right of a citizen of one state to pass through, or to reside in any other 
state, for purposes of trade, agriculture, professional pursuits, or other-
wise; to claim the benefit of the writ of habeas corpus; to institute and 
maintain actions of any kind in the courts of the state; to take, hold and 
dispose of property, either real or personal .... " 
Thus in this initial interpretation of the Clause, "professional pursuits," 
such as the practice of law, were said to be protected. 
The "natural rights" theory that underlay Garfield was discarded long 
ago. Hague v. CIO, 307 U. S. 496, 511 (1939) (opinion of Roberts, J.); see 
Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall. 168 (1868). Nevertheless, we have noted that 
those privileges on Justice Washington's list would still be protected by the • 
.. 
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tice of law, 10 no less than the occupations considered in earlier 
cases, affects commerce. Legal services are relevant to the 
national economy, for the business of a lawyer's client often 
extends beyond the bounds of a single state. In Goldfarb v. 
Virginia State Bar, 421 U. S. 773 (1975), the Court noted 
that "[i]n the modern world, it cannot be denied that the ac-
tivities of lawyers play an important part in commercial in-
tercourse." !d., at 788. Similarly, in Bates v. State Bar of 
Arizona, 433 U. S. 350 (1977), the Court referred to counsel's 
concession that many "law offices are big business." I d., at 
368 n. 19. 
Moreover, the legal profession has a noncommercial role 
and duty, as well, that reinforce the view that the practice of 
law falls within the ambit of the Privileges and Immunities 
Clause. 11 Out-of-state lawyers may-and often do-repre-
sent persons who raise unpopular federal claims. In some 
cases, representation by nonresident counsel may be the only 
means available for the vindication of federal rights. See 
Leis v. Flynt, 439 U. S. 438, 450 (1979) (STEVENS, J., 
dissenting). The lawyer who champions unpopular causes 
surely is more important to the "maintenance and well-being 
of the Union," Baldwin v. Montana Fish & Game Comm'n, 
supra, at 388, than was the shrimp fisherman in Toomer, 
supra, or the pipeline worker in Hicklin, supra. 
Clause. Baldwin v. Montana Fish & Game Comm'n, 436 U.S. 371, 387 
(1978). 
10 In Bradwell v. State, 16 Wall. 130 (1873), this Court held that the prac-
tice of law is not a "privilege or immunity" under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. Given that only "privileges or immunities" of national citizenship 
are protected by the Amendment, see Slaughterhouse Cases , 16 Wall. 36, 
74 (1873); Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U. S. 78, 96 (1908), the Bradwell 
decision is not relevant to the issue presented in this case. 
11 The Court has never held that the Privileges and Immunities clause 
protects only economic interests. See Doe v. Bolton, 410 U. S. 179 (1973) 
(Georgia statute permitting only residents to secure abortions found vio-
lative of the Privileges and Immunities Clause). 
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B 
The state contends that if it cannot exclude nonresidents 
from the bar, its ability to function as a sovereign political 
body will be threatened. It argues that in New Hampshire 
the lawyer is an "officer of the court," and that he "exercises 
state power on a daily basis!' According to the appellant, the 
Privileges and Immunities Clause should be held inapplicable 
to the practice of law because a lawyer's activities are "bound 
up with the exercise of judicial power and the administration 
of justice." 12 
Lawyers do enjoy a "broad monopoly ... to do things other 
citizens ·may not lawfully do." In re Griffiths, 413 U. S. 717, 
731 (1973) (BURGER, C. 1., dissenting). We do not believe, 
however, that the practice of law involves "the exercise of 
~tate power" -as the state argues. In In re Griffiths, 
supra, we held that the state could not exclude an alien from 
the bar on the ground that a lawyer is an "'officer of the 
Court who' ... is entrusted with the 'exercise of actual gov-
ernmental power."' I d., at 728 (quoting Brief for Appellee 
in In re Griffiths, 0. T. 1972, No. 71-1336, p. 5). Instead, 
we concluded that a lawyer is not an "officer" within the ordi-
nary meaning of that word. Ibid. He "'makes his own deci-
sions, follows his own best judgment, collects his own fees 
12 The residency requirement at issue does not pertain to government 
itself. Without certain residency requirements, however, the state 
"would cease to be the separate political communit[y] that history and the 
constitutional text make plain w[as] contemplated." Simson, Discrimina-
tion Against Nonresidents and the Privileges and Immunities Clause of 
Article IV, 128 Pa. L.Rev. 379, 387 (1979). For example, the Framers 
believed that a person who did not reside in a state could not adequately 
represent its citizens in the government. This belief is evident in Article I 
of the Constitution, which provides that a person is ineligible to serve in 
the Senate or House of Representatives unless he is "an Inhabitant of that 
State in which he shall be chosen." This Court also has recognized that a 
state may restrict to its residents both the right to vote, see Baldwin v. 
Montana Fish & Game Comm'n, supra, at 383, and the right to hold state 
elective office, ibid. 
f o ... 
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and runs his own business."' Id., at 729 (quoting Cammer 
v. United States, 350 U. S. 399, 405 (1956)). Moreover, the 
state powers entrusted to lawyers do not involve matters of 
state policy or acts of such unique responsibility that they 
should be entrusted only to citizens. We concluded in Grif-
fiths that the status of being licensed to practice law does not 
place a person so close to the core of the political process as to 
make him a "formulator of governmental policy." 413 U. S., 
at 729. 13 
Because, under Griffiths, a lawyer is not an "officer" of the 
State in any political sense, there is no reason for New 
Hampshire to exclude from its bar nonresidents. 14 We 
therefore conclude that the right to practice law is protected 
by the Privileges and Immunities Clause. 15 
18 It is true that lawyers traditionally have been leaders in state and local 
affairs. Their training qualifies them for this role. Nevertheless, law-
yers are not in any sense officials in the government simply by virtue of 
being lawyers. 
14 In Griffiths, we were concerned with discrimination by a State against 
aliens. Such discrimination usually is subject to an enhanced level of scru-
tiny. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U. S. 365 (1971). The difference be-
tween the levels of scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause and the 
Privileges and Immunities Clause, however, does not affect the relevance 
of Griffiths. The State's argument on this point deals not with the level of 
scrutiny, but instead with whether the Privileges and Immunities Clause 
applies at all. 
16 Our conclusion that Rule 42 violates the Privileges and Immunities 
Clause is consistent with Leis v. Flynt, 439 U. S. 438 (1979). In Leis, we 
held that a lawyer could be denied, without the benefit of a hearing, per-
mission to appear pro hac vice. We concluded that the states should be 
left free to "prescribe the qualifications for admis.sion to practice and the 
and the standards of professional conduct" for those lawyers who appear in 
its courts. I d., at 442. 
Our holding in this case does not interfere with the ability of the states to 
regulate their bars. The nonresident who seeks to join a bar, unlike the 
pro hac vice applicant, must have the same professional and personal quali-
fications required of resident lawyers. Furthermore, the nonresident 
member of the bar is subject to the full force of New Hampshire's discipli-
nary rules. N. H. S. Ct. Rule 37. See supra, at 23. 
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III 
The conclusion that Rule 42 deprives nonresidents of a pro-
tected privilege does not end our inquiry. The Court has 
stated that "[l]ike many other constitutional provisions, the 
privileges and immunities clause is not an absolute." 
Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U. SJ85 396 1~48); See United 
Bldg. & Const. v. Mayor & Council of Camden, -- U. S. 
--, -- (1984 . The Clause does not preclude discrimina-
tion against nonresidents where: (i) there is a substantial rea-
son for the difference in treatment; and (ii) the discrimination 
practiced against nonresidents bears a substantial relation to 
the state's objective. I d., at--. In deciding whether the 
discrimination bears a close or substantial relation to the 
state's objective, the Court has considered the availability of 
less restrictive means. 16 
The Supreme Court of New Hampshire offers several jus-
tifications for its refusal to admit nonresidents to the bar. It 
asserts that nonresident members would be less likely: (i) to 
become, and remain, familiar with local rules and procedures; 
(ii) to behave ethically; (iii) to be available for court proceed-
ings; and (iv) to do pro bono and other volunteer work in the 
state. 17 We find that none of these reasons meets the test of 
"substantiality," and that the means chosen do not bear the 
necessary relation to the state's objectives. 
16 In Toomer, for example, the Court noted that the state could have 
used less restrictive means to eliminate the danger of excessive trawling. 
South Carolina could have restricted the type of equipment used in its fish-
eries, graduated license fees according to the size of the boats, or charged 
nonresidents a differential to compensate for the added enforcement bur-
den they imposed. 334 U. S., at 398-399. 
17 A former president of the American Bar Association has suggested an-
other possible reason for the rule: "Many of the states that have erected 
fences against out-of-state lawyers have done so primarily to protect their 
own lawyers from professional competition." Smith, Time for a National 
Practice of Law Act, 64 A. B. A. J. 557, 557 (1978). This reason is not 
"substantial." The Privileges and Immunities Clause was designed pri-
marily to prevent such economic protectionism. 
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There is no evidence to support the state's claim that non-
residents might be less likely to keep abreast of local rules 
and procedures. Nor may we assume that a nonresident 
lawyer-any more than a resident-would disserve his cli-
ents by failing to familiarize himself with the rules. As a 
practical matter, we think that unless a lawyer has, or antici-
pates, a considerable practice in the New Hampshire courts, 
he would be unlikely to take the bar examination and pay the 
annual dues of $125. Moreover, the discriminatory policy is 
not closely related to the state's objective. 18 The Supreme 
Court of New Hampshire has authority to discipline all 
members of the bar, regardless of where they reside. See 
N. H. S. Ct. Rule 37. 19 
We also find the state's second justification to be without 
merit, for there is no reason to believe that a nonresident 
lawyer will conduct his practice in a dishonest manner. In 
addition to his professional duty, the lawyer's interest in his 
reputation should provide the same incentive to maintain 
18 A less restrictive alternative would be to require mandatory atten-
dance at periodic seminars on state practice. There already is a rule re-
quiring all new admittees to complete a "practical skills course" within one 
year of their admission. N. H. S. Ct. Rule 42(7). 
New Hampshire's "simple residency" requirement is underinclusive as 
well, because it permits lawyers who move away from the state to retain 
their membership in the bar. There is no reason to believe that a former 
resident would maintain a more active practice in the New Hampshire 
courts than would a nonresident lawyer who had never lived in the state. 
19 The New Hampshire bar would be able to discipline a nonresident law-
yer in the same manner in which it disciplines resident members. The Su-
preme Judicial Court of Massachusetts has stated that although there are 
over 5,000 nonresident members of the Massachusetts bar, there has been 
no problem "obtaining jurisdiction over them for bar discipline purposes." 
InreJadd, 391 Mass. 227,234,461 N. E. 2d 760,765 (1984). A committee 
of the Oregon bar voiced a similar sentiment: "[W]hy should it be more dif-
ficult for the Multnomah County courts to control an attorney from Van-
couver, Washington, than from Lakeview, Oregon, if both attorneys are 
members of the Oregon Bar and subject to its rules and discipline?" Bar 
Admissions Study Committee, Report to the Supreme Court of Oregon 19 
(January 19, 1979). 
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high ethical standards as it does for resident lawyers. A 
lawyer will be concerned with his reputation in any commu-
nity where he practices, regardless of where he may live. 
Furthermore, as we noted above, a nonresident lawyer could 
be disciplined for unethical conduct. 
There is more merit to the state's assertion that a nonres-
ident member of the bar at times would be unavailable for 
court proceedings. In the course of litigation, pretrial hear-
ings on various matters often are held on short notice. At 
times a court will need to confer immediately with counsel. 
Even the most conscientious lawyer residing in a distant 
state may find himself unable to appear in court for an un-
scheduled hearing or proceeding. 20 Nevertheless, we do not 
believe that this type of problem justifies the exclusion of 
nonresidents from the state bar. One may assume that a 
high percentage of nonresident lawyers willing to take the 
state bar examination and pay the annual dues will reside in 
places reasonably convenient to New Hampshire. Further-
more, in those cases where the nonresident counsel will be 
unavailable on short notice, the state can protect its interests 
through less restrictive means. The trial court, by rule or as 
an exercise of discretion, may require any lawyer who re-
sides at a great distance to associate local counsel. 
The final reason advanced by the State is that nonresident 
members of its bar would be disinclined to do their share of 
pro bono and volunteer work. Perhaps this is true to a lim-
ited extent, particularly where the member resides in a dis-
tant location. We think it is reasonable to believe, however, 
that most lawyers who become members of a state bar will 
endeavor to perform their share of these services. The non-
resident bar member, like the resident member, could be re-
20 In many situations, unscheduled hearings may pose only a minimal 
problem for the nonresident lawyer. Conference telephone calls are being 
used increasingly as an expeditious means of dispatching pretrial matters. 
Hanson, Olson, Shuart, and Thornton, Telephone Hearings in Civil Trial 
Courts: What Do Attorneys Think?, 66 Judicature 408, 408-409 (1983). 
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quired to represent indigents and perhaps to participate in 
formal legal-aid work. 21 This sort of participation would 
serve the professional interest of a lawyer who practices in 
the state. 22 
In summary, the state does not advance a "substantial rea-
son" for its discrimination against nonresident applicants to 
the bar. 
IV 
We conclude that New Hampshire's bar residency require-
ment violates article IV, § 2 of the ·United States Constitu-
tion. The nonresident's interest in practicing law is a "privi-
lege" protected by the Clause. Although the lawyer is "an 
officer of the court," he does not hold a position that can be 
entrusted only to a "full-fledged member of the political 
community." A state may discriminate against nonresidents 
only where its reasons are "substantial," and the difference in 
treatment bears a close or substantial relation to those rea-
sons. No such showing has been made in this case. Accord-
ingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals. 
It is so ordered. 
21 The El Paso, Texas bar has adopted a mandatory pro bono plan, under 
which each of its members must handle two divorce cases for indigents 
each year. Pro Bono Publico: Federal Legal-Aid Cuts Spur the Bar to 
Increase Free Work for the Poor, The Wall Street Journal, pp. 1, 12 
(March 30, 1984). 
22 A nonresident member of the bar would be ineligible for public office, 
and might be less likely to participate in community affairs. We cannot 
say, however, that this approaches constitutional significance. Indeed, by 
no means all resident lawyers take part in these activities-particularly 
when they reside in the suburbs of great metropolitan centers. 
. ;~ 
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JUSTICE PowELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
The Rules of the Supreme Court of New Hampshire limit 
bar admission to state residents. We here consider whether 
this restriction violates the Privileges and Immunities Clause 
of the United States Constitution, Art. IV, § 2. 
I 
A 
Kathryn Piper lives in Lower Waterford, Vermont, about 
400 yards from the New Hampshire border. In 1979, she ap-
plied to take the February 1980 New Hampshire bar exami-
nation. Piper submitted with her application a statement of 
intent to become a New Hampshire resident. Following an 
investigation, the Board of Bar Examiners found that Piper 
was of good moral character and met the other requirements 
for admission. She was allowed to take, and passed, the 
examination. Piper was informed by the Board that she 
would have to establish a home address in New Hampshire 
prior to being sworn in. 
On May 7, 1980, Piper requested from the Clerk of the 
New Hampshire Supreme Court a dispensation from the resi-
dency requirement. Although she had a "possible job" with 
a lawyer in Littleton, New Hampshire, Piper stated that be-
coming a resident of New Hampshire would be inconvenient. 
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favorable interest rate, and she and her husband recently had 
become parents. According to Piper, these "problems pe-
culiar to [her] situation . . . warrant[ ed] that an exception 
be made." Letter from Appellee to Ralph H. Wood, Esq., 
Clerk of N. H. Supreme Court, App. 13. 
On May 13, 1980, the Clerk informed Piper that her re-
quest had been denied. She then formally petitioned the 
New Hampshire Supreme Court for permission to become a 
member of the bar. She asserted that she was well-qualified 
and that her "situation [was] sufficiently unique that the 
granting of an exception . . . [would] not result in the setting 
of any undesired precedent." Letter of Nov. 8, 1980 from 
Appellee to Hon. William A. Grimes, Chief Justice of the 
N. H. Supreme Court, App. 15. The Supreme Court denied 
Piper's formal request on December 31, 1980. 
B 
On March 22, 1982, Piper filed this action in the United 
States District Court for the District of New Hampshire. 
She named as defendants the five justices and the clerk of the 
state supreme court. She alleged that Rule 42 of the New 
Hampshire Supreme Court, that excludes nonresidents from 
the bar, 1 violates . the Privileges and Immunities Clause of 
the United States Constitution, Art. IV, § 2. 2 
1 Rule 42 does not explicitly provide that only New Hampshire residents 
may be admitted to the bar. It does require, however, that an applicant 
either be a resident of New Hampshire or file a statement of intent to re-
side there. N. H. S. Ct.Rule 42(3). In an affidavit submitted to the Dis-
trict Court, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of New Hampshire said 
that under the rule, an applicant for admission must be "a bona fide resi-
dent of the State . . . at the time that the oath of office . . . is adminis-
tered." Affidavit of John W. King, App. 32. Accordingly, the parties 
agree that the refusal to admit Piper to the bar was based on Rule 42. 
2 Piper was not excluded totally from the practice of law in New Hamp-
shire. Out-of-state lawyers may appear pro hac vice in state court. This 
alternative, however, does not allow the nonresident to practice in New 
Hampshire on the same terms as a resident member of the bar. The law-
yer appearing pro hac vice must be associated with a local lawyer who is 
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On May 17, 1982, the District Court granted Piper's motion 
for summary judgment. 539 F. Supp. 1064 (D. N. H. 1982). 
The court first stated that the opportunity to practice law is a 
"fundamental" right. See Baldwin v. Montana Fish & 
Game Comm'n, 436 U. S. 371 (1978). It found that Piper 
had been denied this right in the absence of a "substantial 
reason," 539 F. Supp., at 1072, and that Rule 42 was not 
"closely tailored" to achieve its intended goals, id., at 1073. 
The court held that the New Hampshire's residency require-
ment violated the Privileges and Immunities Clause. 3 
An evenly divided Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, 
sitting en bane, affirmed the judgment in favor of Piper. 
Piper v. Supreme Court of New Hampshire, 723 F. 2d 110 
(CAl 1983). 4 The prevailing judges held that Rule 42 vio-
lated the Privileges and Immunities Clause. After finding 
that Article IV, § 2 protects an individual's right to '"pursue 
a livelihood in a state other than his own,"' id., at 112, (quot-
ing Baldwin v. Montana Fish & Game Comm'n, supra, at 
386), the judges applied the two-part test set forth in Hicklin 
v. Orbeck, 437 U. S. 518 (1978). They concluded that there 
was no "substantial reason" for the different treatment of 
nonresidents and that the challenged discrimination bore no 
present for trial or argument. SeeN. H. S. Ct. Rule 33(1); N. H. Super. 
Ct. Rule 19. Furthermore, the decision on whether to grant pro hac vice 
status to an out-of-state lawyer is purely discretionary. See Leis v. Flynt, 
439 U. S. 438, 442 (1979) (per curiam). 
3 The District Court did not consider Piper's claims that Rule 42: (i) de-
prived her of property without due process of law, in violation of the Four-
teenth Amendment; (ii) denied her equal protection of the law, in violation 
of the Fourteenth Amendment; and (iii) placed an undue burden upon in-
terstate commerce, in violation of Article I, § 8 of the United States Con-
stitution. The Court of Appeals did not address these claims, and our 
resolution of this case makes it unnecessary for us to reach them. 
• The panel, with one judge dissenting, had reversed the district court's 
judgment. Piper v. Supreme Court of New Hampshire, 723 F. 2d 98 
(1983). 
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"substantial relationship" to the state's objectives. 5 See id., 
at 525-527. 
The dissenting judges found that the New Hampshire Su-
preme Court's residency requirement did not violate the 
Privileges and Immunities Clause. While recognizing that 
Rule 42 may "serve the less than commendable purpose of in-
sulating New Hampshire practitioners from out-of-state com-
petition," 723 F. 2d, at 119, they found several "substantial" 
reasons to justify discrimination against nonresidents. If 
the residency requirement were abolished, "large law firms 
in distant states" might exert significant influence over the 
state bar. ld. These nonresident lawyers would be unfa-
miliar With local customs and would be less likely to perform 
pro bono work within the state. The dissenting judges fur-
ther believed the District Court's judgment was inconsistent 
with our decision in Leis v. Flynt, 439 U. S. 438 (1979) (per 
curiam). 
The Supreme Court of New Hampshire filed a timely no-
tice of appeal, and we noted probable jurisdiction. We now 
affirm the judgment of the court below. 
II 
A 
Article IV, § 2 of the Constitution provides that "[t]he Citi-
zens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Im-
~The prevailing judges thought it significant that three state supreme 
courts had invalidated their own bar residency requirements. Sargus v. 
West Virginia Board of Law Examiners, 294 S. E. 2d 440 (W. Va. 1983); 
Noll v. Alaska Bar Assoc., 649 P. 2d 241 (Alaska 1982); Gordon v. ·com-
mittee on Character and Fitness, 48 N. Y.2d 266, 422 N. Y. S. 2d 641, 397 
N. E. 2d 1309 (1979). Since the Court of Appeals decision in this case, 
another state supreme court has reached the same conclusion. In re Jadd, 
391 Mass. 227, 461 N. E. 2d 760 (1984). We also think it significant that 
these courts, that are responsible for regulating the bars in their respec-
tive states, have found the residency requirements unnecessary. 
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munities of Citizens in the several States." 6 Derived, like 
the Commerce Clause, from the fourth of the Articles of Con-
feration, 7 the Privileges and Immunities Clause was in-
tended to "help fuse into one nation a collection of independ-
ent, sovereign States." Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U. S. 385, 
395 (1948). Recognizing this purpose, we have stated that it 
is "[o]nly with respect to those 'privileges' and 'immunities' 
bearing upon the vitality of the Nation as a single entity" that 
a state must accord residents and nonresidents equal treat-
ment. Baldwin v. Montana Fish & Game Comm'n, 436 
U. S. 371, 383 (1978). In Baldwin, we held that a state may 
charge a nonresident more than it charges a resident for the 
same elk-hunting license. Because elk hunting is "recrea-
tion" rather than a "means of a livelihood," we concluded that 
the right to a hunting license was not "fundamental" to the 
promotion of interstate harmony. I d., at 388. 
The origins and purpose of article IV, § 2 make clear why 
this Court has found that "one of the privileges which the 
clause guarantees to citizens of State A is that of doing busi-
ness in State B on terms of substantial equality with the citi-
6 Under this Clause, the terms "citizen" and "resident" are used 
interchangably. See Austin v. New Hampshire, 420 Uo S. 656, 662 n. 8 
(1975). Under the Fourteenth Amendment, of course, "[a]ll persons born 
or naturalized in the United States . 0 0 are citizens ... of the State 
wherein they reside." 
7 Both the privileges and immunities clause and the commerce clause 
had their origins in the fourth article of the Articles of Confederation, that 
provided: 
The better to secure and perpetuate mutual friendship and intercourse 
among the people of the different States in this Union, the free inhabitants 
of each of these States .. 0 shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities 
of free citizens in the several States; and the people of each State shall have 
free ingress and regress to and from any other State, and shall enjoy 
therein all the privileges of trade and commerce, subject to the same du-
ties, impositions and restrictions as the inhabitants thereof . 0 •• 
Not surprisingly, this Court has recognized the "mutually reinforcing rela-
tionship" between the two clauses. Hicklin v. Orbeck , 437 U. S. 518, 531 
(1978). 
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zens of that state." Toomer v. Witsell, supra, at 396 (1948). 
In Ward v. Maryland, 12 Wall. 418 (1870), the Court invali-
dated a statute under which nonresidents were required to 
pay $300 per year for a license to trade in goods not manufac-
tured in Maryland, while resident traders paid a fee varying 
from $12 to $150. Similarly, under the South Carolina stat-
ute invalidated in Toomer, supra, nonresident fishermen 
were required to pay a license fee of $2500 for each shrimp 
boat owned; residents were charged only $25 per boat. Re-
cently, in Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 U. S. 518 (1978), we found 
violative of the privileges and immunities clause a statute 
containing a resident hiring preference for all employment 
related to the development of the State's oil and gas 
resources. 8 
There is nothing in Ward, Toomer, or Hicklin suggesting 
that only "the opportunity to pursue a common calling" can 
be viewed as a "privilege" under article IV, § 2. 9 The prac-
8 In United Bldg. & Canst. Trades Council v. Mayor & Council of Cam-
den.,-- U. S. -- (1984), we stated that "the pursuit of a common call-
ing is one of the most fundamental of those privileges protected by the 
Clause." !d. We noted that "many, if not most of our cases expounding 
the Privileges and Immunities Clause have dealt with this basic and essen-
tial activity." 
9 In Garfield v. Coryell, 6 Fed. Cas. 546 (C. C. ED Pa. 1825) (No. 3230), 
Justice Bushrod Washington, sitting as Circuit Justice, stated that the 
"fundamental rights" protected by the Clause included: 
The right of a citizen of one state to pass through, or to reside in any other 
state, for purposes of trade, agriculture, professional pursuits, or other-
wise; to claim the benefit of the writ of habeas corpus; to institute and 
maintain actions of any kind in the courts of the state; to take, hold and 
dispose of property, either real or personal .... 
Thus in this initial interpretation of the Clause, "professional pursuits," 
such as the practice of law, were said to be protected. 
The "natural rights" theory that underlay Garfield was discarded long 
ago. Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 511 (1939) (opinion of Roberts, J.), see 
Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall. 168 (1868). Nevertheless, we have noted that 
those privileges on Justice Washington's list would still be protected by the 
Clause. Baldwin, supra, at 387. 
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tice of law, 10 no less than the occupations considered in earlier 
cases, affects commerce. Legal services are relevant to the 
national economy, for the business of a lawyer's client often 
extends beyond the bounds of a single state. In Goldfarb v. 
Virginia State Bar, 421 U. S. 773 (1975), the Court noted 
that "[i]n the modern world, it cannot be denied that the ac-
tivities of lawyers play an important part in commercial in-
tercourse." Id., at 788. Similarly, in Bates v. State Bar of 
Arizona, 433 U. S. 350 (1977), the Court referred to counsel's 
concession that many "law offices are big business." I d., at 
368 n. 19. 
Moreover, the noncommercial role and duty of the legal 
profession reinforce the view that the practice of law falls 
within the ambit of the privileges and immunities clause. 11 
Out-of-state lawyers may-and often do-represent persons 
who raise unpopular federal claims. In some cases, repre-
sentation by nonresident counsel may be the only means 
available for the vindication of federal rights. See Leis v. 
Flynt, 439 U. S. 438, 450 (1979) (STEVENS, J., dissenting). 
The lawyer who champions unpopular causes surely is more 
important to the "maintenance and well-being of the Union," 
Baldwin v. Montana Fish & Game Comm'n, supra, at 388, 
than was the shrimp fisherman in Toomer, supra, or the 
pipeline worker in Hicklin, supra. 
B 
The state contends that if it cannot exclude nonresidents 
from the bar, its ability to function as a sovereign political 
10 In Bradwell v. State, 16 Wall. 130 (1873), this Court held that the prac-
tice of law is not a "privilege or immunity" under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. Given that only "privileges or immunities" of national citizenship 
are protected by the amendment, see Slaughterhouse Cases, 16 Wall. 36, 
74 (1873); Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U. S. 78, 96 (1908), the Bradwell 
decision is not relevant to the issue presented in this case. 
11 The Court has never held that the privileges and immunities clause 
protects only economic interests. See Doe v. Bolton, 410 U. S. 179 (1973) 
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body will be threatened. It argues that a lawyer's activities 
are "bound up with the exercise of judicial power and the 
administration of justice." Brief for Appellant 12. Accord-
ing to the appellant, if the Privileges and Immunities Clause 
is held applicable to the practice of law, the state's sovereign 
authority to regulate the bar would be substantially 
impaired. 12 
Lawyers do enjoy a "broad monopoly . . . to do things 
other citizens may not lawfully do." In re Griffiths, 413 
U. S. 717, 731 (1973) (BURGER, C. J., dissenting). We do 
not believe, however, that the practice of law involves the ex-
ercise of a sovereign function-as the state seems to argue. 
In In re Griffiths, supra, we held that the state could not ex-
clude an alien from the bar on the ground that a lawyer is an 
"'officer of the Court who' . . . is entrusted with the 'exercise 
of actual governmental power."' Id., at 728 (quoting Brief 
for Appellee in In re Griffiths, 0. T. 1972, No. 71-1336, 
p. 5). Instead, we concluded that a lawyer is not an "officer" 
within the ordinary meaning of that word. I d. He " 'makes 
his own decisions, follows his own best judgment, collects his 
own fees and runs his own business."' Id., at 729 (quoting 
Cammer v. United States, 350 U. S. 399, 405 (1956)). More-
(Georgia statute permitting only residents to secure abortions found vio-
lative of the privileges and immunities clause). 
12 The residency requirement at issue does not pertain to government 
itself. Without certain residency requirements, however, the state 
"would cease to be the separate political communit[y] that history and the 
constitutional text make plain w[as] contemplated." Simson, Discrimina-
tion Against Nonresidents and the Privileges and Immunities Clause of 
Article IV, 128 Pa. L.Rev. 379, 387 (1979). For example, the Framers 
believed that a person who did not reside in a state could not adequately 
represent its citizens in the government. This belief is evident in Article I 
of the Constitution, which provides that a person is ineligible to serve in 
the Senate or House of Representatives unless he is "an Inhabitant of that 
State in which he shall be chosen." This Court also has recognized that a 
state may restrict to its residents both the right to vote, see Baldwin v. 
Montana Fish & Game Comm'n, supra, at 383, and the right to hold state 











SUPREME COURT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE v. PIPER 9 
83-1466-0PINION 
10 SUPREME COURT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE v. PIPER 
III 
The conclusion that Rule 42 deprives nonresidents of a pro-
tected privilege does not end our inquiry. The Court has 
stated that "[l]ike many other constitutional provisions, the 
privileges and immunities clause is not an absolute." 
Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U. S. 385, 396 (1948); See United 
Bldg. & Canst. v. Mayor & Council of Camden,-- U.S. 
--, -- (1984). The Clause does not preclude discrimina-
tion against nonresidents where: (i) there is a substantial rea-
son for the difference in treatment; and (ii) the discrimination 
practiced against nonresidents bears a substantial relation to 
the state's objective. I d., at--. In deciding whether the 
discrimination bears a close or substantial relation to the 
state's objective, the Court has considered the availability of 
less restrictive means. 16 
The Supreme Court of New Hampshire offers several jus-
tifications for its refusal to admit nonresidents to the bar. It 
asserts that nonresident members would be less likely: (i) to 
become, and remain, familiar with local rules and procedures; 
(ii) to behave ethically; (iii) to be available for court proceed-
ings; and (iv) to do pro bono and other volunteer work in the 
state. 17 We find that none of these reasons meets the test of 
Our holding in this case does not interfere with the ability of the states to 
regulate their bars. The nonresident who seeks to join a bar, unlike the 
pro hac vice applicant, must have the same professional and personal quali-
fications required of resident lawyers. Furthermore, the nonresident 
member of the bar is subject to the full force of New Hampshire's discipli-
nary rules. N. H. S. Ct. Rule 37. See supra, at 23. 
16 Toomer, the Court noted that the state could have used less restrictive 
means to eliminate the danger of excessive trawling. South Carolina 
could have restricted the type of equipment used in its fisheries, graduated 
license fees according to the size of the boats, or charged nonresidents a 
differential to compensate for the added enforcement burd~n they imposed. 
334 U. S. at 398-399. 
17 A former president of the American Bar Association has suggested an-
other possible reason for the rule: "Many of the states that have erected 
fences against out-of-state lawyers have done so primarily to protect their 
own lawyers from professional competition." Smith, Time for a National 
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"substantiality," and that the means chosen do not bear the 
necessary relation to the state's objectives. 
There is no evidence to support the state's claim that non-
residents might be less likely to keep abreast of local rules 
and procedures. Nor may we assume that a nonresident 
lawyer-any more than a resident-would disserve his cli-
ents by failing to familiarize himself with the rules. As a 
practical matter, we think that unless a lawyer has, or antici-
pates, a considerable practice in the New Hampshire courts, 
he would be unlikely to take the bar examination and pay the 
annual dues of $125. Moreover, the discriminatory policy is 
not closely related to the state's objective. 18 The Supreme 
Court of New Hampshire has authority to discipline all 
members of the bar, regardless of where they reside. See 
N. H. S. Ct. Rule 37. 19 
Practice of Law Act, 64 A. B. J. 557, 557 (1978). This reason is not "sub-
stantial." The privileges and immunities clause was designed primarily to 
prevent such economic protectionism. 
18 A less restrictive alternative would be to require mandatory atten-
dance at periodic seminars on state practice. There already is a rule re-
quiring all new admittees to complete a "practical skills course" within one 
year of their admission. N. H. S. Ct. Rule 42(7). 
New Hampshire's "simple residency" requirement is underinclusive as 
well, because it permits lawyers who move away from the state to retain 
their membership in the bar. There is no reason to believe that a former 
resident would maintain a more active practice in the New Hampshire 
courts than would a nonresident lawyer who had never lived in the state. 
19 The New Hampshire bar would be able to discipline a nonresident law-
yer in the same manner in which it disciplines resident members. The Su-
preme Judicial Court of Massachusetts has stated that although there are 
over 5,000 nonresident members of the Massachusetts bar, there has been 
no problem "obtaining jurisdiction over them for bar discipline purposes." 
Inre Jadd, 391 Mass. 227, 234, 461 N. E. 2d 760, 765 (1984). A comririttee 
of the Oregon bar voiced a similar sentiment: "[W]hy should it be more dif-
ficult for the Multnomah County courts to control an attorney from Van-
couver, Washington, than from Lakeview, Oregon, if both attorneys are 
members of the Oregon Bar and subject to its rules and discipline?" Bar 
Admissions Study Committee, Report to the Supreme Court of Oregon 19 
(January 19, 1979). 
83-146&--0PINION 
12 SUPREME COURT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE v. PIPER 
We also find the state's second justification to be without 
merit, for there is no reason to believe that a nonresident 
lawyer will conduct his practice in a dishonest manner. In 
addition to his professional duty, the lawyer's interest in his 
reputation should provide the same incentive to maintain 
high ethical standards as it does for resident lawyers. A 
lawyer will be concerned with his reputation in any commu-
nity where he practices, regardless of where he may live. 
Furthermore, as we noted above, a nonresident lawyer could 
be disciplined for unethical conduct. 
There is more merit to the state's assertion that a nonres-
ident member of the bar at times would be unavailable for 
court proceedings. In the course of litigation, pretrial hear-
ings on various matters often are held on short notice. At 
times a court will need to confer immediately with counsel. 
Even the most conscientious lawyer residing in a distant 
state may find himself unable to appear in court for an un-
scheduled hearing or proceeding. 20 Nevertheless, we do not 
believe that this type of problem justifies the exclusion of 
nonresidents from the state bar. One may assume that a 
high percentage of nonresident lawyers willing to take the 
state bar examination and pay the annual dues will reside in 
places reasonably convenient to New Hampshire. Further-
more, in those cases where the nonresident counsel will be 
unavailable on short notice, the state can protect its interests 
through less restrictive means. The trial court, by rule or as 
an exercise of discretion, may require an out-of-state lawyer 
to associate local counsel. 
The final reason advanced by the State is that nonresident 
members of its bar would be disinclined to do their share of 
pro bono and volunteer work. Perhaps this is true to a lim-
20 In many situations, unscheduled hearings may pose only a minimal 
problem for the nonresident lawyer. Conference telephone calls are being 
used increasingly as an expeditious means of dispatching pretrial matters. 
Hanson, Olson, Shuart, and Thornton, Telephone Hearings in Civil Trial 
Courts: What Do Attorneys Think?, 66 Judicature 408, 408-409 (1983). 
7? 
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ited extent, particularly where the member resides in a dis-
tant location. We think it is reasonable to believe, however, 
that most lawyers who become members of a state bar will 
endeavor to perform their share of these services. The non-
resident bar member, like the resident member, could be re-
quired to represent indigents and perhaps to participate in 
formal legal-aid work. 21 This sort of participation would 
serve the...J>rofessional interest of a lawyer who practices in / 
the stateQ:J --(;7 
In summary, the state does not advance a "substantial rea-
son" for its discrimination against nonresident applicants to 
the bar. 
IV 
We conclude that New Hampshire's bar residency require-
ment violates article IV, § 2 of the United States Constitu-
tion. The nonresident's interest in practicing law is a "privi-
lege" protected by the Clause. Although the lawyer is "an 
officer of the court," he does not hold a position that can be 
entrusted only to a "full-fledged member of the political 
community." A state may discriminate against nonresidents 
only where its reasons are "substantial/' and the difference in 
treatment bears a close or substantial relation to those rea-
sons. No such showing has been made in this case. Accord-
ingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals. 
It is so ordered. 
'
1 The El Paso, Texas bar has adopted a mandatory pro bono plan, under 
which each of its members must handle two divorce cases for indigents 
each year. Pro Bono Publico: Federal Legal-Aid Cuts Spur the Bar to 
Increase Free Work for the Poor, The Wall Street Journal, pp. 1, 12 
(March 30, 1984). . 
A nonresident member of the bar would be ineligible for public office, 
and might be less likely to participate in community affairs. We cannot 
say, however, that this approaches constitutional significance. Indeed, by 
no means all resident lawyers take part in these activities-particularly 
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The Rules of the Supreme Court of New Hampshire limit 
bar admission to state residents. We here consider whether 
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I 
A 
Kathryn Piper lives in Lower Waterford, Vermont, about 
400 yards from the New Hampshire border. In 1979, she ap-
plied to take the February 1980 New Hampshire bar exami-
nation. Piper submitted with her application a statement of 
intent to become a New Hampshire resident. Following an 
investigation, the Board of Bar Examiners found that Piper 
was of good moral character and met the other requirements 
for admission. She was allowed to take, and passed, the 
examination. Piper was informed by the Board that she 
would have to establish a home address in New Hampshire 
prior to being sworn in. 
On May 7, 1980, Piper requested from the Clerk of the 
New Hampshire Supreme Court a dispensation from the resi-
dency requirement. Although she had a "possible job" with 
a lawyer in Littleton, New Hampshire, Piper stated that be-
coming a resident of New Hampshire would be inconvenient. 
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favorable interest rate, and she and her husband recently had 
become parents. According to Piper, these "problems pe-
culiar to [her] situation ... warrant[ed] that an exception 
be made." Letter from Appellee to Ralph H. Wood, Esq., 
Clerk of N. H. Supreme Court, App. 13. 
On May 13, 1980, the Clerk informed Piper that her re-
quest had been denied. She then formally petitioned the 
New Hampshire Supreme Court for permission to become a 
member of the bar. She asserted that she was well-qualified 
and that her "situation [was] sufficiently unique that the 
granting of an exception . . . [would] not result in the setting 
of any undesired precedent." Letter of Nov. 8, 1980 from 
Appellee to Hon. William A. Grimes, Chief Justice of the 
N. H. Supreme Court, App. 15. The Supreme Court denied 
Piper's formal request on December 31, 1980. 
B 
On March 22, 1982, Piper filed this action in the United 
States District Court for the District of New Hampshire. 
She named as defendants the five justices and the clerk of the 
state supreme court. She alleged that Rule 42 of the New 
Hampshire.Supreme Court, that excludes nonresidents from 
the bar, 1 violates the Privileges and Immunities Clause of 
the United States Constitution, Art. IV, § 2. 2 
1 Rule 42 does not explicitly provide that only New Hampshire residents 
may be admitted to the bar. It does require, however, that an applicant 
either be a resident of New Hampshire or file a statement of intent to re-
side there. N. H. S. Ct. Rule 42(3). In an affidavit submitted to the Dis-
trict Court, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of New Hampshire said 
that under the rule, an applicant for admission must be "a bona fide resi-
dent of the State . . . at the time that the oath of office .. . is adminis-
tered." Affidavit of John W. King, App. 32. Accordingly, the parties 
agree that the refusal to admit Piper to the bar was based on Rule 42. 
2 Piper was not excluded totally from the practice of law in New Hamp-
shire. Out-of-state lawyers may appear pro hac vice in state court. This 
alternative, however, does not allow the nonresident to practice in New 
Hampshire on the same terms as a resident member of the bar. The law-
yer appearing pro hac vice must be associated with a local lawyer who is 
83-1466-0PINION 
SUPREME COURT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE v. PIPER 3 
On May 17, 1982, the District Court granted Piper's motion 
for summary judgment. 539 F. Supp. 1064 (D. N. H. 1982). 
The court first stated that the opportunity to practice law is a 
"fundamental" right. See Baldwin v. Montana Fish & 
Game Comm'n, 436 U. S. 371 (1978). It found that Piper 
had been denied this right in the absence of a "substantial 
reason," 539 F. Supp., at 1072, and that Rule 42 was not 
"closely tailored" to achieve its intended goals, id., at 1073. 
The court held that the New Hampshire's residency require-
ment violated the Privileges and Immunities Clause. 3 
An evenly divided Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, 
sitting en bane, affirmed the judgment in favor of Piper. 
Piper v. Supreme Court of New Hampshire, 723 F. 2d 110 
(CAl 1983). 4 The prevailing judges held that Rule 42 vio-
lated the Privileges and Immunities Cl~use. After finding 
that Article IV, § 2 protects an individual's right to "'pursue 
a livelihood in a state other than his own,"' id., at 112, (quot-
ing Baldwin v. Montana Fish & Game Comm'n, supra, at 
386), the judges applied the two-part test set forth in Hicklin 
v. Orbeck, 437 U. S. 518 (1978). They concluded that there 
was no "substantial reason" for the different treatment of 
nonresidents and that the challenged discrimination bore no 
present for trial or argument. SeeN. H. S. Ct. Rule 33(1); N. H. Super. 
Ct. Rule 19. Furthermore, the decision on whether to grant pro hac vice 
status to an out-of-state lawyer is purely discretionary. See Leis v. Flynt, 
439 U. S. 438, 442 (1979) (per curiam). 
3 The District Court did not consider Piper's claims that Rule 42: (i) de-
prived her of property without due process of law, in violation of the Four-
teenth Amendment; (ii) denied her equal protection of the law, in violation 
of the Fourteenth Amendment; and (iii) placed an undue burden upon in-
terstate commerce, in violation of Article I, § 8 of the United States Con-
stitution. The Court of Appeals did not address these claims, and our 
resolution of this case makes it unnecessary for us to reach them. 
• The panel, with one judge dissenting, had reversed the district court's 
judgment. Piper v. Supreme Court of New Hampshire, 723 F. 2d 98 
(1983). 
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"substantial relationship" to the state's objectives. 5 See id., 
at 525-527. 
The dissenting judges found that the New Hampshire Su-
preme Court's residency requirement did not violate the 
Privileges and Immunities Clause. While recognizing that 
Rule 42 may "serve the less than commendable purpose of in-
sulating New Hampshire practitioners from out-of-state com-
petition," 723 F. 2d, at 119, they found several "substantial" 
reasons to justify discrimination against nonresidents. If 
the residency requirement were abolished, "large law firms 
in distant states" might exert significant influence over the 
state bar. I d. These nonresident lawyers would be unfa-
miliar With local customs and would be less likely to perform 
pro bono work within the state. The dissenting judges fur-
ther believed the District Court's judgment was inconsistent 
with our decision in Leis v. Flynt, 439 U. S. 438 (1979) (per 
curiam). 
The Supreme Court of New Hampshire filed a timely no-
tice of appeal, and we noted probable jurisdiction. We now 
affirm the judgment of the court below. 
II 
A 
Article IV, § 2 of the Constitution provides that "[t]he Citi-
zens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Im-
5 The prevailing judges thought it significant that three state supreme 
courts had invalidated their own bar residency requirements. Sargus v. 
West Virginia Board of Law Examiners, 294 S. E. 2d 440 (W. Va. 1983); 
Noll v. Alaska Bar Assoc., 649 P. 2d 241 (Alaska 1982); Gordon v. Com-
mittee on Character and Fitness, 48 N. Y.2d 266, 422 N. Y. S. 2d 641, 397 
N. E. 2d 1309 (1979). Since the Court of Appeals decision in this case, 
another state supreme court has reached the same conclusion. In re Jadd, 
391 Mass. 227, 461 N. E. 2d 760 (1984). We also think it significant that 
these courts, that are responsible for regulating the bars in their respec-
tive states, have found the residency requirements unnecessary. 
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munities of Citizens in the several States." 6 Derived, like 
the Commerce Clause, from the fourth of the Articles of Con-
feration, 7 the Privileges and Immunities Clause was in-
tended to "help fuse into one nation a collection of independ-
ent, sovereign States." Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U. S. 385, 
395 (1948). Recognizing this purpose, we have stated that it 
is "[o]nly with respect to those 'privileges' and 'immunities' 
bearing upon the vitality of the Nation as a single entity" that 
a state must accord residents and nonresidents equal treat-
ment. Baldwin v. Montana Fish & Game Comm'n, --486-
~. 371, 383 (1978). In Baldwin, we held that a state may 
charge a nonresident more than it charges a resident for the 
same elk-hunting license. Because elk hunting is "recrea-
tion" rather than a "means of a livelihood," we concluded that 
the right to a hunting license was not "fundamental" to the 
promotion of interstate harmony. !d., at 388. 
The origins and purpose of article IV, § 2 make clear why 
this Court has found that "one of the privileges which the 
clause guarantees to citizens of State A is that of doing busi-
ness in State B on terms of substantial equality with the citi-
6 Under this Clause, the terms "citizen" and "resident" are used 
interchangably. See Austin v. New Hampshire, 420 U. S. 656, 662 n. 8 
(1975). Under the Fourteenth Amendment, of course, "[a]ll persons born 
or naturalized in the United States ... are citizens ... of the State 
wherein they reside. " 
7 Both the~ivileges and j mmunities £lause and the,..commerce _£lause 
had their origins in the fourtli article of tne Articles of Confederatiorl, that 
provided: 
1
' The better to secure and perpetuate mutual friendship and intercourse 
among the people of the different States in this Union, the free inhabitants 
of each of these States . . . shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities 
of free citizens in the several States; and the people of each State shall have 
free ingress and regress to and from any other State, and shall enjoy 
therein all the privileges of trade and commerce, subject to the same du-
ties, impositions and restrictions as the inhabitants thereof . . . . '' 
Not surprisingly, this Court has recognized the "mutually reinforcing rela-
tionship" between the two clauses. Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 U. S. 518, 531 
(1978). 
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zens of that state." Toomer v. Witsell, supra, at 39~~ ~ 
In Ward v. Maryland, 12 Wall. 418 (1870), the Court invali-
dated a statute under which nonresidents were required to 
pay $300 per year for a license to trade in goods not manufac-
tured in Maryland, while resident traders paid a fee varying 
from $12 to $150. Similarly, under the South Carolina stat-
ute invalidated in Toomer, supra, nonresident fishermen 
were required to pay a license fee of $2500 for each shrimp 
boat owned; residents were charged only $25 per boat. Re-
cently, in Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 U. S. 518 (1978), we found / 
violative of the Jlrivileges and j mmunities _slause a statute I f1,v;_ ~ 
containing a resident hiring preference for -an employment 
related to the development of the State's oil and gas 
resources. 8 
There is nothing in Ward, Toomer, or Hicklin suggesting 
that only "the opportunity to pursue a common calling" can 
be viewed as a "privilege" under article IV, § 2. 9 The prac-
8 In United Bldg. & Canst. Trades Council v. Mayor & Council of Cam-
den,-- U. S. -- (1984), we stated that "the pursuit of a common call-
ing is one of the most fundamental of those privileges protected by the 
Clause." I d. We noted that "many, if not most of our cases expounding 1 I/ 
the Privileges andJ mmunities Clause have dealt with this basic and essen- J ~ 
tial activity." I b. • tf J.fw!. · 
9 In Garfield v. Coryell, 6 Fed. Cas. 546 (C. C. ED Pa. 1825) (No. 3230), 
Justice Bushrod Washington, sitting as Circuit Justice, stated that the 
"fundamental rights" protected by the Clause included: 
11The right of a citizen of one state to pass through, or to reside in any other 
state, for purposes of trade, agriculture, professional pursuits, or other-
wise; to claim the benefit of the writ of habeas corpus; to institute and 
I 
,., 
maintain actions of any kind in the courts of the state; to take, hold and I " l 
dispose of property, either real or personal . . . . " . 
Thus in this initial interpretation of the Clause, "professional pursuits," 
such as the practice of law, were said to be protected. 
The "natural rights" theory that underlay Garfield was discarded long / J• J 
ago. Hague v. CIO, 307 U. S. 496, 511 (1939) (opinion of Roberts, J.); see 
Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall. 168 (1868). Nevertheless, we have noted that 
those privileges on Justice Washington's list would still be protected by the All L . ,:,-,) L ~ h(HJ._ 
Clause. BaldwinJ..-8Up!a, at 38'1r 11'• n~ 
/ ---:- L{ 3 (, ()' s . 37 J ) 
~'""'~-) 
3~7 (1978) 
The state contends that if it cannot exclude 
nonresidents from the bar, its ability to function as a sovereign 
political body will be threatened. It argues that in New 
Hampshire the lawyer is an "officer of the court," and that he 
"exercises state power on a daily basis. According to the 
appellant, the Privileges and Immunities Clause should be held 
\ erJu "/ I~ ../ 
inapplicable to the ..a.&.rA because a lawyer's activities are "bound 
up with the exercise of judicial power and the administration of 
' ' II /;). JUStiCe. 
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tice of law, 10 no less than the occupations considered in earlier 
cases, affects commerce. Legal services are relevant to the 
national economy, for the business of a lawyer's client often 
extends beyond the bounds of a single state. In Goldfarb v. 
Virginia State Bar, 421 U. S. 773 (1975), the Court noted 
that "[i]n the modern world, it cannot be denied that the ac-
tivities of lawyers play an important part in commercial in-
tercourse." Id., at 788. Similarly, in Bates v. State Bar of 
Arizona, 433 U. S. 350 (1977), the Court referred to counsel's 
concession that many "law offices are big business." I d., at /)v 
368 n. 19. l ~ ~ .. ~.~ A~ tit 1 tr' 
Moreover, t mmerc1al role and duty of the legft¥2 1 J 
-p~njreinforce the view that the practice of law falls / '1- 4 .5 (JI(UA .> 
within th~ ambit of the _Rrivileges and j mmunities ~lause. 11 /jw--b ~ 1 
Out-of-state lawyers may-and often do-represent persons Q 
who raise unpopular federal claims. In some cases, repre-
sentation by nonresident counsel may be the only means 
available for the vindication of federal rights. See Leis v. 
Flynt, 439 U. S. 438, 450 (1979) (STEVENS, J., dissenting). 
The lawyer who champions unpopular causes surely is more 
important to the "maintenance and well-being of the Union," 
Baldwin v. Montana Fish & Game Comm'n, supra, at 388, 
than was the shrimp fisherman in Toomer, supra, or the 
pipeline worker in Hicklin, supra. 
10 In Bradwell v. State, 16 Wall. 130 (1873), this Court held that the. prac-
tice of law is not a "privilege or immunity" under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. Given that only "privileges or immunities" of national citizenship 
are protected by the ~endment, see Slaughterhouse Cases, 16 Wall. 36, 
74 (1873); Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U. S. 78, 96 (1908), the Bradwell 
decision is not relevant to the issue presented in this case. 
11 The Court has never held that the ..privileges and ·mmunities clause 
protects only economic interests. See Doe v. Bolton, 4fO U. S. 179 (i973) 
~I 
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Lawyers do enjoy a "broad monopoly to do things __L 
other citizens may not lawfully do." In re Griffiths, 413 J} ~~ 
U. S. 717, 731 (1973) (BURGER, C. J., dissenting). ~ I 
not believe, however, that the practice oflaw involve 
11 
he ex- ;sJA ~ 11 
ercise of .a....so\'ereig:n fu -as t e state -seems to argu~ .. 
In In re Griffiths, supra, we held that the state could not ex- . c;JJ ,Is/ 
elude an alien from the bar on the ground that a lawyer is an 
"'officer of the Court who' . . . is entrusted with the 'exercise 
of actual governmental power."' !d., at 728 (quoting Brief 
for Appellee in In re Griffiths, 0. T. 1972, No. 71-1336, 
p. 5). Instead, we concluded that a lawyer is not an "officer" • _ / JJ_ j 
within the ordinary meaning of that word. 1 . e rna es / · 
his own decisions, follows his own best judgment, collects his 
own fees and runs his own business."' Id., at 729 (quoting 
Cammer v. United States, 350 U. S. 399, 405 (1956)). More-
(Georgia statute permitting only residents to secure abortions found vio- /•.JI-"Jl c:....do·J 
lative of the ..wivileges and.iJnmunities s_lause). 7"' - t 
12 The resf ency requirement at issue does not pertain to government 
itself. Without certain residency requirements, however, the state 
"would cease to be the separate political communit[y] that history and the 
constitutional text make plain w[as] contemplated." Simson, Discrimina-
tion Against Nonresidents and the Privileges and Immunities Clause of 
Article IV, 128 Pa. L.Rev. 379, 387 (1979). For example, the Framers 
believed that a person who did not reside in a state could not adequately 
represent its citizens in the government. This belief is evident in Article I 
of the Constitution, which provides that a person is ineligible to serve in 
the Senate or House of Representatives unless he is "an Inhabitant of that 
State in which he shall be chosen." This Court also has recognized that a 
state may restrict to its residents both the right to vote, see Baldwin v. 
Montana Fish & Game Comm'n, supra, at 383, and the right to hold state 
elective office, ibid. 
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over, the state powers entrusted to lawyers do not involve 
matters of state policy or acts of such unique responsibility 
that they should be entrusted only to citizens. We con-
cluded in Griffiths that the status of being licensed to practice 
law does not place a person so close to the core of the political 
process as to make him a "formulator of governmental pol-
icy." 413 u. s., at 729,13 I I nAJ I 
Because, under Griffiths, a lawyer is not an "officer" of the ~ 1
1 
• _}_, } <-{ 
. .state in any political sense, there is no reaso!lJ.or New Ramp- ~ 
s hire to exclude from its bar nonresident~)~ theag:B. they -
full·fledg:ed membQrsof the politi~:~mt;~-r 
We therefore conclude that the right to 
practice law is protected by the Privileges and Immunities 
Clause. 15 
13 It is true that lawyers traditionally have been leaders in state and local 
affairs. Their training qualifies them for this role. Nevertheless, law-
yers are not in any sense officials in the government simply by virtue of 
being lawyers. 
1
' In Griffiths, we were concerned with discrimination by ·a~tate against 
aliens. Such discrimination usually is subject to an enhanced1evel of scru-
tiny. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U. S. 365 (1971). The difference the 
levels of scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause and the Privileges and 
Immunities Clause, however, does not affect the relevance of Griffiths. 
The ,lltate's argument on this point deals not with the level of scrutiny, but 
instead with whether the Privileges and Immunities Clause applies at all. 
15 Our conclusion that Rule 42 violates the .privileges andJmmunities 
lause is consistent with Leis v. Flynt, 439 U. S. 438 (1979). I n Leis, we 
held that a lawyer could be denied, without the benefit of a hearing, per-
mission to appear pro hac vice. We concluded that the states should be 
left free to "prescribe the qualifications for admission to practice and the 
and the standards of professional conduct" for those lawyers who appear in 
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III 
The conclusion that Rule 42 deprives nonresidents of a pro-
tected privilege does not end our inquiry. The Court has 
stated that "[l]ike many other constitutional provisions, the 
privileges and immunities clause is not an absolute." 
Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U. S. 385, 396 (1948); See United 
Bldg. & Canst. v. Mayor & Council of Camden,-- U.S. 
--, -- (1984). The Clause does not preclude discrimina-
tion against nonresidents where: (i) there is a substantial rea-
son for the difference in treatment; and (ii) the discrimination 
practiced against nonresidents bears a substantial relation to 
the state's objective. !d., at--. In deciding whether the 
discrimination bears a close or substantial relation to the 
state's objective, the Court has considered the availability of 
less restrictive means. 16 
The Supreme Court of New Hampshire offers several jus-
tifications for its refusal to admit nonresidents to the bar. It 
asserts that nonresident members would be less likely: (i) to 
become, and remain, familiar with local rules and procedures; 
(ii) to behave ethically; (iii) to be available for court proceed-
ings; and (iv) to do pro bono and other volunteer work in the 
state. 17 We find that none of these reasons meets the test of 
Our holding in this case does not interfere with the ability of the states to I r - ~ I 
regulate their bars. The nonresident who seeks to join a bar, unlike the .j-TrF ~ ";/ 
pro hac vice applicant, must have the same professional and personal qualiv: 
fications required of resident lawyers. Furthermore, the nonresident 
member of the bar is subject to the full force of New Hampshire's discipli-~ -- I 
nary rules. N. H. S. Ct. Rule 37. upxa, at 23. y-
;Yi'oomer,(.fJ).e Court noted t at the state could have used less restrictive J:. ft 
nre\ns to eliminate the danger of excessive trawling. South Carolina 
could have restricted the type of equipment used in its fisheries, graduated 
license fees according to the size of the boats, or charged nonresidents a 
differential to compensate for the added enforcement burden they imposed. 
334 u. sl at 398-399. 1 
17 A former president of the American Bar Association has suggested an-
other possible reason for the rule: "Many of the states that have erected 
fences against out-of-state lawyers have done so primarily to protect their 
own lawyers from professional competition." Smith, Time for a National 
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"substantiality," and that the means chosen do not bear the 
necessary relation to the state's objectives. 
There is no evidence to support the state's claim that non-
residents might be less likely to keep abreast of local rules 
and procedures. Nor may we assume that a nonresident 
lawyer-any more than a resident-would disserve his cli-
ents by failing to familiarize himself with the rules. As a 
practical matter, we think that unless a lawyer has, or antici-
pates, a considerable practice in the New Hampshire courts, 
he would be unlikely to take the bar examination and pay the 
annual dues of $125. Moreover, the discriminatory policy is 
not closely related to the state's objective. 18 The Supreme 
Court of New Hampshire has authority to discipline all 
members of the bar, regardless of where they reside. See 
N.H. S. Ct. Rule 37. 19~ 
A· . 
Practice of Law Act, 64 .A.J3. . 557, 557 (1978). This reason is not "sub-
stantial." The ,J?rivileges Yn .immunities lause was designed primarily to 
prevent such economic protectionism. -
18 A less restrictive alternative would be to require mandatory atten-
dance at periodic seminars on state practice. There already is a rule re-
quiring all new admittees to complete a "practical skills course" within one 
year of their admission. N. H. S. Ct. Rule 42(7). 
New Hampshire's "simple residency" requirement is underinclusive as 
well, because it permits lawyers who move away from the state to retain 
their membership in the bar. There is no reason to believe that a former 
resident would maintain a more active practice in the New Hampshire 
courts than would a nonresident lawyer who had never Jived in the state. 
19 The New Hampshire bar would be able to discipline a nonresident law-
yer in the same manner in which it disciplines resident members. The Su-
preme Judicial Court of Massachusetts has stated that although there are 
over 5,000 nonresident members of the Massachusetts bar, there has been 
no problem "obtaining jurisdiction over them for bar discipline purposes." 
In re Jadd, 391 Mass. 227, 234, 461 N. E. 2d 760, 765 (1984). A committee 
of the Oregon bar voiced a similar sentiment: "[W]hy should it be more dif-
ficult for the Multnomah County courts to control an attorney from Van-
couver, Washington, than from Lakeview, Oregon, if both attorneys are 
members of the Oregon Bar and subject to its rules and discipline?" Bar 
Admissions Study Committee, Report to the Supreme Court of Oregon 19 
(January 19, 1979). 
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We also find the state's second justification to be without 
merit, for there is no reason to believe that a nonresident 
lawyer will conduct his practice in a dishonest manner. In 
addition to his professional duty, the lawyer's interest in his 
reputation should provide the same incentive to maintain 
high ethical standards as it does for resident lawyers. A 
lawyer will be concerned with his reputation in any commu-
nity where he practices, regardless of where he may live. 
Furthermore, as we noted above, a nonresident lawyer could 
be disciplined for unethical conduct. 
There is more merit to the state's assertion that a nonres-
ident member of the bar at times would be unavailable for 
court proceedings. In the course of litigation, pretrial hear-
ings on various matters often are held on short notice. At 
times a court will need to confer immediately with counsel. 
Even the most conscientious lawyer residing in a distant 
state may find himself unable to appear in court for an un-
scheduled hearing or proceeding. 20 · Nevertheless, we do not 
believe that this type of problem justifies the exclusion of 
nonresidents from the state bar. One may assume that a 
high percentage of nonresident lawyers willing to take the 
state bar examination and pay the annual dues will reside in 
places reasonably convenient to New Hampshire. Further-
more, in those cases where the nonresident counsel will be 
unavailable on short notice, the state can protect its interests 
through less restrictive means. The trial court, by rule or as 
an exercise of discretion, may requir~t=Of~tate-lawyer 
to associate local counsel. 
The final reason advanced by the State is that nonresident 
members of its bar would be disinclined to do their share of 
pro bono and volunteer work. Perhaps this is true to a lim-
20 In many situations, unscheduled hearings may pose only a minimal 
problem for the nonresident lawyer. Conference telephone calls are being 
used increasingly as an expeditious means of dispatching pretrial matters. 
Hanson, Olson, Shuart, and Thornton, Telephone Hearings in Civil Trial 
Courts: What Do Attorneys Think?, 66 Judicature 408, 408-409 (1983). 
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ited extent, particularly where the member resides in a dis-
tant location. We think it is reasonable to believe, however, 
that most lawyers who become members of a state bar will 
endeavor to perform their share of these services. The non-
resident bar member, like the resident member, could be re-
quired to represent indigents and perhaps to participate in 
formal legal-aid work. 21 This sort of participation would 
serve the professional interest of a lawyer who practices in 
the state. 22 
In summary, the state does not advance a "substantial rea-
son" for its discrimination against nonresident applicants to 
the bar. 
IV 
We conclude that New Hampshire's bar residency require-
ment violates article IV, § 2 of the United States Constitu-
tion. The nonresident's interest in practicing law is a "privi-
lege" protected by the Clause. Although the lawyer is "an 
officer of the court," he does not hold a position that can be 
entrusted only to a "full-fledged member of the political 
community." A state may discriminate against nonresidents 
only where its reasons are "substantial," and the difference in 
treatment bears a close or substantial relation to those rea-
sons. No such showing has been made in this case. Accord-
ingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals. 
It is so ordered. 
21 The El Paso, Texas bar has adopted a mandatory pro bono plan, under 
which each of its members must handle two divorce cases for indigents 
each year. Pro Bono Publico: Federal Legal-Aid Cuts Spur the Bar to 
Increase Free Work for the Poor, The Wall Street Journal, pp. 1, 12 
(March 30, 1984). 
22 A nonresident member of the bar would be ineligible for public office, 
and might be less likely to participate in community affairs. We cannot 
say, however, that this approaches constitutional significance. Indeed, by 
no means all resident lawyers take part in these activities-particularly 
wh~ they reside in the suburbs of great metropolitan centers. 
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No. 83-1466 Supreme Court of New Hampshire v. Piper 
Dear Lewis, 
I anticipate joining your excellent op1n1on in this 
case. I have several concerns with the present draft, 
however, and I list them in hopes you might consider some 
minor modifications. 
1. I would prefer that the last sentence of footnote 5 
be deleted. I think it is quite possible that one state--
Alaska, for example--might have a substantial reason for a 
residency requirement for some state benefit even if other {r1~ 
states do not. Federalism inherently involves diversity, 
and I would prefer to avoid even the suggestion that 
privileges and immunities clause analysis turns on the 
practices of other states. 
2. The last sentence on page 7 might jar the 
sensibilities of shrimp fishermen and pipeline workers among~ 
others. Could you substitute the words "no less" for the 
word "more" in this sentence so as to avoid suggesting that 
lawyers are more important than people who provide our food 
or furnish our utilities? 
3. I would hope you would consider changing footnote 
10. While it is true that Bradwell involved the privileges 
and immunities clause of the Fourteenth Amendment rather 
than Article IV, it is inconceivable to me that the practice 
of law could be a privilege of state citizenship but not a 
privilege of national citizenship. I would prefer that the 
last sentence of the footnote be replaced with something 
along the following lines: "The Fourteenth Amendment, of 
course, protects only privileges and immunities of national 
citizenship, see Slaughterhouse Cases, 16 Wall. 36, 74 
(1873); Twining v. New Jersey, 211 u.s. 78, 96 (1908), and 
~ Bradwell can be ~stinguished on that basis. Nevertheless, 
it would be disin~enuous to ignore the analytical 
~ inconsistency ar1s1~g from Bradwell's holding that the 
~~fi~ ... ~practice of law is not a privilege of national citizenship 
''~and today's holding~at the practice of law is a privilege 
~ of state citizenship. To the extent the reasoning in 




4. On page 12 the op1n1on asserts that the state's 
substantial interest in having lawyers available for court 
proceedings can be promoted by a less restrictive means: 
"The trial court, by rule or as an exercise of discretion, 
may require any lawyer who resides at a great distance to 
associate local counsel." This statement raises some 
ambiguity in what the term "associate" means. New Hampshire 
now requires that out-of-state attorneys who are admitted 
pro hac vice must "associate" a New Hampshire attorney who 
must accompany the out-of-state attorney to trial and 
argument. See footnote 2. Do you mean to suggest that New 
. Hampshire courts can require non-resident New Hampshire bar 
mbers to bring a resident New Hampshire attorney to each 
trial and argument? 
Sincerely, 
Justice Powell 
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its omission of any provision that even remotely 
resembled the Commerce Clause. I wonder, therefore, 
if you would consider omitting the suggestion that 
the Commerce Clause was derived from the Articles of 
Confederation. 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 83-1466 
SUPREME COURT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE, 
APPELLANT v. KATHRYN A. PIPER 
ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT 
[February -, 1985] 
JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
The Rules of the Supreme Court of New Hampshire limit 
bar admission to state residents. We here consider whether 
this restriction violates the Privileges and Immunities Clause 
of the United States Constitution, Art. IV, § 2. 
I 
A 
Kathryn Piper lives in Lower Waterford, Vermont, about 
400 yards from the New Hampshire border. In 1979, she ap-
plied to take the February 1980 New Hampshire bar exami-
nation. Piper submitted with her application a statement of 
intent to become a New Hampshire resident. Following an 
investigation, the Board of Bar Examiners found that Piper 
was of good moral character and met the other requirements 
for admission. She was allowed to take, and passed, the 
examination. Piper was informed by the Board that she 
would have to establish a home address in New Hampshire 
prior to being sworn in. 
On May 7, 1980, Piper requested from the Clerk of the 
New Hampshire Supreme Court a dispensation from the resi-
dency requirement. Although she had a "possible job" with 
a lawyer in Littleton, New Hampshire, Piper stated that be-
coming a resident of New Hampshire would be inconvenient. 
Her house in Vermont was secured by a mortgage with a fa-
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On May 17, 1982, the District Court granted Piper's motion 
for summary judgment. 539 F. Supp. 1064 (1982). The 
court first stated that the opportunity to practice law is a 
"fundamental" right within the meaning of Baldwin v. M on-
tana Fish & Game Comm'n, 436 U. S. 371 (1978). It then 
found that Piper had been denied this right in the absence of 
a "substantial reason," 539 F. Supp., at 1072, and that Rule 
42 was not "closely tailored" to achieve its intended goals, 
id., at 1073. The court therefore concluded that New Hamp-
shire's residency requirement violated the Privileges and 
Immunities Clause. 3 
An evenly divided Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, 
sitting en bane, affirmed the judgment in favor of Piper. 723 
F. 2d 110 (1983).' The prevailing judges held that Rule 42 
violated the Privileges and Immunities Clause. After find-
ing that Art. IV, § 2, protects an individual's right to '"pur-
sue a livelihood in a State other than his own,"' id., at 112, 
(quoting Baldwin v. Montana Fish & Game Comm'n, supra, 
at 386), the judges applied the two-part test set forth in 
Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 U. S. 518 (1978). They concluded 
that there was no "substantial reason" for the different treat-
ment of nonresidents and that the challenged discrimination 
bore no "substantial relationship" to the state's objectives. 5 
present for trial or argument. SeeN. H. S. Ct. Rule 33(1); N. H. Super. 
Ct. Rule 19. Furthermore, the decision on whether to grant rm> hac vice 
status to an out-of-state lawyer is purely discretionary. See Leis v. Flynt, 
439 U. S. 438, 442 (1979) (per curiam). 
1 The District Court did not consider Piper's claims that Rule 42: (i) de-
prived her of property without due process of law, in violation of the Four-
teenth Amendment; (ii) denied her equal protection of the law, in violation 
of the Fourteenth Amendment; and (iii) placed an undue burden upon in-
terstate commerce, in violation of Art. I, § 8, of the United States Con-
stitution. The Court of Appeals did not address these claims, and our 
resolution of this case makes it unnecessary for us to reach them. 
' The panel, with one judge dissenting, had reversed the District 
Court's judgment. 723 F . 2d 98 (1983). 
5 The prevailing judges thought it significant that three state supreme 
courts had invalidated their own bar residency requirements. Sargus v. 
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sovereign States." Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U. S. 385, 395 
(1948). Recognizing this purpose, we have held that it is 
"[o]nly with respect to those 'privileges' and 'immunities' 
bearing on the vitality of the nation as a single entity" that a 
State must accord residents and nonresidents equal treat-
ment. Baldwin v. Montana Fish & Game Comm'n, supra, 
at 383. In Baldwin, for example, we concluded that a State 
may charge a nonresident more than it charges a resident 
for the same elk-hunting license. Because elk-hunting is 
''recreation" rather than a "means of a livelihood," we found 
that the right to a hunting license was not "fundamental" to 
the promotion of interstate harmony. 436 U. S., at 388. 
Derived, like the Commerce Clause, from the fourth of the I 
Articles of Confederation, 7 the Privileges and Immunities 
Clause was intended to create a national economic union. 8 
It is therefore not surprising that this Court repeatedly has 
found that "one of the privileges which the Clause guarantees 
to citizens of State A is that of doing business in State B on 
terms of substantial equality with the citizens of that State." 
Toomer v. Witsell, supra, at 396. In Ward v. Maryland, 12 
Wall. 418 (1871), the Court invalidated a statute under which 
nonresidents were required to pay $300 per year for a license 
7 Article IV of the Articles of Confederation provided: 
"The better to secure and perpetuate mutual friendship and intercourse 
among the people of the different States in this Union, the free inhabitants 
of each of these States ... shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities 
of free citizens in the several States; and the people of each State shall have 
free ingress and regress to and from any other State, and shall enjoy 
therein all the privileges of trade and commerce, subject to the same du-
ties, impositions and restrictions as the inhabitants thereof .... " 
Charles Pinckney, who drafted the Privileges and Immunities Clause, I 
stated that it was ''formed exactly upon the principles of the 4th article of 
the present Confederation." 3 M. Farrand, Records of the Federal Con-
vention of 1787, at 112 (1911). 
• This Court has recognized the "mutually reinforcing relationship" be- { 
tween the Commerce Clause and the Privileges and Immunities Clause. 
Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 U. S. 518, 531 (1978). 
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The lawyer's role in the national economy is not the only 
reason that the opportunity to practice law should be consid-
ered a "fundamental right." We believe that the legal pro-
fession has a noncommercial role and duty that reinforce the 
view that the practice of law falls within the ambit of the 
Privileges and Immunities Clause. 11 Out-of-state lawyers 
may-and often do-represent persons who raise unpopular 
federal claims. In some cases, representation by nonres-
ident counsel may be the only means available for the vindica-
tion of federal rights. See Leis v. Flynt, 439 U. S., at 450 
(STEVENS, J., dissenting). The lawyer who champions un-
popular causes surely is as important to the "maintenance or 
well-being of the Union," Baldwin, as was the shrimp fisher-
man in Toomer, supra, or the pipeline worker in Hicklin. 
B 
The State asserts that the Privileges and Immunities 
Clause should be held inapplicable to the practice of law be-
cause a lawyer's activities are "bound up with the exercise of 
judicial power and the administration of justice." 12 Its con-
tention is based on the premise that the lawyer is an "officer 
Clause. Baldwin v. Montana Fish & Game Comm'n, 436 U.S. 371, 387 
(1978). 
11 The Court has never held that the Privileges and Immunities Clause 
protects only economic interests. See Doe v. Bolton, 410 U. S. 179 (1973) 
(Georgia statute permitting only residents to secure abortions found vio-
lative of the Privileges and Immunities Clause). 
12 JUSTICE REHNQUIST makes a similar argument in his dissent. He as-
serts that lawyers, through their adversary representation of clients' inter-
ests, ''play an important role in the fonnulation of state policy." Post, at 
4. He therefore concludes that the residency requirement is necessary to 
ensure that lawyers are "intimately conversant with the local concerns that 
should infonn such policies." Ibid. We believe that this argument, like 
the one raised by the State, is foreclosed by our reasoning in In re Grif-
fiths, 413 U. S. 717 (1973). There, we held that the status of being li-
censed to practice law does not place a person so close to the core of the 
political process as to make him a "fonnulator of government policy." I d., 
at 728. 
. ~ t • . 
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Because, under Griffiths, a lawyer is not an "officer" of the 
State in any political sense, 15 there is no reason for New 
Hampshire to exclude from its bar nonresidents. We there-
fore conclude that the right to practice law is protected by 
the Privileges and Immunities Clause. 16 
III 
The conclusion that Rule 42 deprives nonresidents of a pro-
tected privilege does not end our inquiry. The Court has 
stated that "[l]ike many other constitutional provisions, 
the privileges and immunities clause is not an absolute." 
Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U. S., at 396; see United Building & 
Construction Trades Council v. Mayor & Council of Cam-
den, 465 U. S. --, -- (1984). The Clause does not pre-
clude discrimination against nonresidents where: (i) there is a 
substantial reason for the difference in treatment; and (ii) the 
discrimination practiced against nonresidents bears a sub-
stantial relationship to the State's objective. I d., at --. 
the "exercise of actual governmental power." Instead, we considered this \ 
argument only in deciding whether "strict scrutiny" should be applied at all 
to the challenged classification. ld., at 727. 
16 It is true that lawyers traditionally have been leaders in state and local 
affairs-political as well as cultural, religious, and civic. Their training 
qualifies them for this type of participation. Nevertheless, lawyers are 
not in any sense officials in the government simply by virtue of being 
lawyers. 
15 Our conclusion that Rule 42 violates the Privileges and Immunities 
Clause is consistent with Leis v. Flynt, 439 U. S. 438 (1979). In Leis, we 
held that a lawyer could be denied, without the benefit of a hearing, per-
mission to appear pro hac vice. We concluded that the States should be 
left free to "prescribe the qualifications for admission to practice and the 
standards of professional conduct" for those lawyers who appear in its 
courts. ld., at 442. 
Our holding in this case does not interfere with the ability of the states to 
regulate their bars. The nonresident who seeks to join a bar, unlike the 
pro hac vice applicant, must have the same professional and personal quali-
fications required of resident lawyers. Furthermore, the nonresident 
member of the bar is subject to the full force of New Hampshire's discipli-
nary rules. N. H. S. Ct. Rule 37. See supra, at 23. 
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pates, a considerable practice in the New Hampshire courts, 
he would be unlikely to take the bar examination and pay the 
annual dues of $125. 19 
We also find the State's second justification to be without 
merit, for there is no reason to believe that a nonresident 
lawyer will conduct his practice in a dishonest manner. The 
nonresident lawyer's professional duty and interest in his 
reputation should provide the same incentive to maintain 
high ethical standards as they do for resident lawyers. A 
lawyer will be concerned with his reputation in any commu-
nity where he practices, regardless of where he may live. 
Furthermore, a nonresident lawyer may be disciplined for 
unethical conduct. The Supreme Court of New Hampshire 
has the authority to discipline all members of the bar, regard-
less of where they reside. SeeN. H. S. Ct. Rule 37. 20 
"Because it is markedly overinclusive, the residency requirement does 
not bear a substantial relationship to the State's objective. A less re-
strictive alternative would be to require mandatory attendance at periodic 
seminars on state practice. There already is a rule requiring all new 
admittees to complete a "practical skills course" within one year of their 
admission. N. H. S. Ct. Rule 42(7). 
New Hampshire's "simple residency" requirement is underinclusive as 
well, because it permits lawyers who move away from the State to retain 
their membership in the bar. There is no reason to believe that a former 
resident would maintain a more active practice in the New Hampshire 
courts than would a nonresident lawyer who had never lived in the State. 
20 The New Hampshire bar would be able to discipline a nonresident law-
yer in the same manner in which it disciplines resident members. The Su-
preme Judicial Court of Massachusetts has stated that although there are 
over 5,000 nonresident members of the Massachusetts bar, there has been 
no problem "obtaining jurisdiction over them for bar discipline purposes." 
In re Jadd, 391 Mass., at 234, 461 N. E. 2d, at 765. A committee of the 
Oregon bar voiced a similar sentiment: "[W]hy should it be more difficult 
for the Multnomah County courts to control an attorney from Vancouver, 
Washington, than from Lakeview, Oregon, if both attorneys are members 
of the Oregon Bar and subject to its rules and discipline?" Bar Admissions 
Study Committee, Report to the Supreme Court of Oregon 19 (Jan. 19, 
1979). 
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required to represent indigents and perhaps to participate in 
formal legal-aid work. 22 
In summary, the State neither advances a "substantial rea-
son" for its discrimination against nonresident applicants to 
the bar, 23 nor demonstrates that the discrimination practiced 
bears a close relationship to its proffered objectives: 
IV 
We conclude that New Hampshire's bar residency require-
ment violates Art. IV, §2, of the United States Constitution. 
The nonresident's interest in practicing law is a "privilege" 
protected by the Clause. Although the lawyer is "an officer 
of the court," he does not hold a position that can be en-
trusted only to a "full-fledged member of the political commu-· 
nity." A State may discriminate against nonresidents only 
where its reasons are "substantial," and the difference in 
treatment bears a close or substantial relation to those rea-
sons. No such showing has been made in this case. Accord-
ingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals. 
It is so ordered. 
Zl The El Paso, Texas, bar has adopted a mandatory pro bono plan, 
under which each of its members must handle two divorce cases for indi-
gents each year. Pro Bono Publico: Federal Legal-Aid Cuts Spur the Bar 
to Increase Free Work for the Poor, The Wall Street Journal, Mar. 30, 
1984, pp. 1, 12. 
11 JUSTICE REHNQUIST suggests another "substantial reason" for the 
residency requirement: the State's "interest in maximizing the number of 
resident lawyers, so as to increase the quality of the pool from which its 
lawmakers can be drawn." Post, at 4. Only 8 of the 424 members of New 
Hampshire's bicameral legislature are lawyers. Statistics compiled by the 
Clerk of the New Hampshire House of Representatives and the Clerk of 
the New Hampshire Senate. Moreover, New Hampshire, unlike many 
other States, see e. g., Mich. Const., Art. 6, § 19, does not prohibit non-
lawyers from serving on its Supreme Court, N. H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 490:1 
et seq., or its intermediate appellate court, N. H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 491:1 et 
seq. Therefore, it is not surprising that the dissent's justification for the 
residency requirement was not raised by the petitioner or addressed by the 
courts below. 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 83-1466 
SUPREME COURT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE, 
APPELLANT v. KATHRYN A. PIPER 
ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT 
[March - , 1985] 
JUSTICE REHNQUIST, dissenting. 
Today the Court holds that New Hampshire cannot decide 
that a New Hampshire lawyer should live in New Hamp-
shire. This may not be surprising to those who view law as 
just another form of business frequently practiced across 
state lines by interchangeable actors; the Privileges and 
Immunities Clause of Art. IV, § 2 has long been held to apply 
to States' attempts to discriminate against nonresidents who 
seek to ply their trade interstate. The decision will be sur-
prising to many, however, because it so clearly disregards 
the fact that the practice of law is-almost by definition-
fundamentally different from those other occupations that 
are practiced across state lines without significant deviation 
from State to State. The fact that each State is free, in a 
large number of areas, to establish independently of the 
other States its own laws for the governance of its citizens, is 
a fundamental precept of our Constitution that, I submit, is 
of equal stature with the need for the States to form a cohe-
sive union. What is at issue here is New Hampshire's right 
to decide that those people who in many ways will intimately 
deal with New Hampshire's self-governance should reside 
within that State. 
The Court's opinion states that the .;Privileges and Immuni-
ties Clause of Art. IV "was intended to 'help fuse into one 
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Nation a collection of independent, sovereign States.' " 
Ante, at 4-5 (quoting Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U. S. 385, 395 
(1948)). To this end, we are told, the Clause has been con-
strued to protect the fundamental "privilege" of citizens of 
one State to do business in another State on terms substan-
tially equal with that State's citizens. This privilege must be 
protected to effectuate the Clause's purpose to "create a na-
tional economic union." Ante, at 5. And for the Court, the 
practice of law is no different from those occupations consid-
ered in earlier Privileges and Immunities Clause cases, be-
cause "the practice of law is important to the national econ-
omy." Ante, at 6. After concluding that the Clause applies 
to lawyers the Court goes on to reject the many reasons the 
State advances for limiting its lawyers to those who reside in 
state. The Court either labels these reasons insubstantial, 
or it advances, with the assurance of an inveterate second-
guesser, a "less restrictive means" for the State to attack the 
perceived problem. 
The Framers of our Constitution undoubtedly wished to 
ensure that the newly created union did not revert back to its 
component parts because of interstate jealousies and insular 
tendencies, and it seems clear that the Art. IV Privileges and 
Immunities Clause was one result of these concerns. But 
the Framers also created a system of federalism that deliber-
ately allowed for the independent operation of many sover-
eign States, each with their own laws created by their own 
legislators and judges. The assumption from the beginning 
was that the various States' laws need not, and would not, 
be the same; the lawmakers of each State might endorse dif-
ferent philosophies and would have to respond to differing in-
terests of their constituents, based on various factors that 
were of inherently local character. Any student of our Na-
tion's history is well aware of the differing interests of the 
v.arious States that were represented at Philadelphia; despite 
the tremendous improvements in transportation and commu-
83-1466---DISSENT 
SUPREME COURT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE v. PIPER 3 
nication that have served to create a more homogeneous 
country the differences among the various States have hardly 
disappeared. 
It is but a small step from these facts to the recognition 
that a State has a very strong interest in seeing that its legis-
lators and its judges come from among the constituency of 
state residents, so that they better understand the local in-
terests to which they will have to respond. The Court does 
not contest this point; it recognizes that a State may require 
its lawmakers to be residents without running afoul of the 
Privileges and Immunities Clause of Art. IV, § 2. See ante, 
at 8, n. 13. 
Unlike the Court, I would take the next step, and recog-
nize that the State also has a very "substantial" interest in 
seeing that its lawyers also are members of that constitu-
ency. I begin with two important principles that the Court 
seems to have forgotton: first, that in reviewing state stat-
utes under this Clause "States should have considerable lee-
way in analyzing local evils and prescribing appropriate 
cures," United Building & Construction Trades Council v. 
Camden, 465 U. S. -- (1984) (citing Toomer, 334 U. S., at 
396), and second, that regulation of the practice of law gener-
ally has been "left exclusively to the States .... " Leis v. 
Flynt, 439 U. S. 438, 442 (1979) (per curiam). My belief 
that the practice of law differs from other trades and busi-
nesses for Art. IV, § 2 purposes is not based on some notion 
that law is for some reason a superior profession. The rea-
son that the practice of law should be treated differently is 
that law is one occupation that does not readily translate 
across state lines. 1 Certain aspects of legal practice are dis-
1 I do not mean to suggest that the practice of law, unlike other occupa-
tions, is not a "fundamental" interest subject to the two-step analysis out-
lined by the Court. It makes little difference to me which prong of the 
Court's analysis is implicated, although the thrust of my position is that 
there are significant state interests justifying this type of interstate dis-
crimination. Although one might wonder about the logical extensions of 
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tinctly and intentionally nonnational; in this regard one 
might view this country's legal system as the antithesis of the 
norms embodied in the Art. IV Privileges and Immunities 
Clause. Put simply, the State has a substantial interest in 
creating its own set of laws responsive to its own local inter-
ests, and it is reasonable for a State to decide that those peo-
ple who have been trained to analyze law and policy are bet-
ter equipped to write those state laws and adjudicate cases 
arising under them. The State therefore may decide that it 
has an interest in maximizing the number of resident law-
yers, so as to increase the quality of the pool from which its 
lawmakers can be drawn. 2 A residency law such as the one 
at issue is the obvious way to accomplish these goals. Since 
at any given time within a State there is only enough legal 
work to support a certain number of lawyers, each out-of-
state lawyer who is allowed to practice necessarily takes 
legal work that could support an in-state lawyer, who would 
otherwise be available to perform various functions that a 
State has an interest in promoting. 3 
the Court's loose language concerning "less restrictive means," see post, at 
--, the Court's opinion clearly contemplates that some residency require-
ments concerning trades or businesses will be permissible under the Privi-
leges and Immunities Clause. I note that New Hampshire's decision with 
respect to lawyers certainly will not be the only residency requirement for 
which States could forward substantial reasons, nor will any valid resi-
dency requirement necessarily involve only one particular trade or busi-
ness. We indicated as much last Term in United Building and Construe· 
tion Trades Council v. Camden, 465 U.S.- (1984). 
2 The Court attempts to rebut this argument with statistics indicating 
the number of presently practicing lawyers in the New Hampshire Legisla-
ture. Ante, at 13, n. 23. While I am not convinced of the usefulness of 
these statistics, I note in any event that the Court neglects to point out 
that only 6 of the 124 judges presently sitting in New Hampshire courts are 
nonlawyers, and that only 12 of the 89 Supreme Court Justices in the 
State's history have been nonlawyers. 
3 In New Hampshire's case, lawyers living 40 miles from the state bor-
der in Boston could easily devote part of their practice to New Hampshire 
clients. If this occurred a significant amount of New Hampshire legal 
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Nor does the State's interest end with enlarging the pool of 
qualified lawmakers. A State similarly might determine 
that because lawyers play an important role in the formula-
tion of State policy through their adversary representation, 
they should be intimately conversant with the local concerns 
that should inform such policies. And the State likewise 
might conclude that those citizens trained in the law are 
likely to bring their useful expertise to other important func-
tions that benefit from such expertise and are of interest to 
state governments-such as trusteeships, or directorships of 
corporations or charitable organizations, or school board posi-
tions, or merely the role of the interested citizen at a town 
meeting. Thus, although the Court suggests that state bars 
can require out-of-state members to "represent indigents and 
perhaps to participate in formal legal-aid work," ante, at 13, 
the Court ignores a host of other important functions that a 
State could find would likely be performed only by in-state 
bar members. States may find a substantial interest in 
members of their bar being residents, and this insular inter-
est-as with the opposing interest in interstate harmony rep-
resented by Art. IV, § 2-itself has its genesis in the lan-
guage and structure of the Constitution. 4 
work might wind up in Boston, along with lawyers who might otherwise 
reside in New Hampshire. 
• I do not find the analysis of In re Griffiths, 413 U. S. 717 (1973), to be 
controlling here. Griffiths dealt with an Equal Protection Clause chal-
lenge to a state bar admission rule that excluded aliens. In the course of 
striking down that restriction this Court held that lawyers should not be 
considered "officers of the court" in the sense that they actually wield state 
powers. ld., at 727-729. Whatever the merits of that conclusion, my 
point here is different; whether or not lawyers actually wield state powers, 
the State nevertheless has a substantial interest in having resident law-
yers. In Griffiths the alien lawyers were state residents. The harms I 
that a State can identify from allowing nonresident lawyers to practice are 
very different from the harms posited in Griffiths as arising from allowing 
resident alien lawyers to practice. I note in addition that the standards 
established for reviewing alienage classifications under the Equal Protec-
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It is no answer to these arguments that many lawyers sim-
ply will not perform these functions, or that out-of-state law-
yers can perform them equally well, or that the State can 
devise less restrictive alternatives for accomplishing these 
goals. Conclusory second-guessing of difficult legislative 
decisions, such as the Court resorts to today, is not an attrac-
tive way for federal courts to engage in judicial review. 
Thus, whatever the reality of how much New Hampshire can 
expect to gain from having the members of its bar reside 
within that State, the point is that New Hampshire is enti-
tled to believe and hope that its lawyers will provide the vari-
ous unique services mentioned above, just as it is entitled 
to believe that the residency requirement is the appropriate 
way to that end. As noted, some of these services can only 
be provided by lawyers who also are residents. With re-
spect to the other services, the State can reasonably find that 
lawyers who reside in state are more likely to undertake 
them. 
In addition, I find the Court's "less restrictive means" anal-
ysis both ill-advised and potentially unmanageable. Initially 
I would note, as I and other Members of this Court have be-
fore, see Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv-
ice Comm'n of New York, 447 U. S. 557, 599-600 (1980) 
(REHNQUIST, J., dissenting) (citing Illinois Elections Bd. v. 
Socialist Workers' Party, 440 U. S. 173, 188-189 (1979) 
(BLACKMUN, J., concurring)); cf. Florida v. Royer, 460 U. S. 
491, 528-529 (1983) (REHNQUIST, J., dissenting), that such an 
analysis, when carried too far, will ultimately lead to striking 
down almost any statute on the ground that the Court could 
think of another "less restrictive" way to write it. This ap-
proach to judicial review, far more than the usual application 
of a standard of review, tends to place courts in the position 
of second-guessing legislators on legislative matters. Surely 
this is not a consequence to be desired. 
tion Clause are not equated with the standard of review under the Art. IV 
Privileges and Immunities Clause. 
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In any event, I find the less restrictive means analysis, 
which is borrowed from our First Amendment jurisprudence, 
to be out of place in the context of the Art. IV Privileges and 
Immunities Clause. Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U. S. 385, 396 
(1948), and Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 U. S. 518, 529-530 (1978), 
indicate that the means employed by the State should bear a 
"substantial" or "close relation" to the State's objectives, and 
they speak in terms of whether the the State's approach is 
"tailored" to its stated goal. This approach perhaps has a 
place: to the extent that an obvious way to accomplish the 
State's proffered goal is apparent, the fact that the State did 
not follow that path may indicate that the State had another, 
less legitimate goal in mind. But I believe the challenge of a 
"less restrictive means" should be overcome if merely a le-
gitimate reason exists for not pursuing that path. And in 
any event courts should not play the game that the Court has 
played here-independently scrutinizing each asserted state 
interest to see if it could devise a better way than the State to 
accomplish that goal. Here the appellees primarily argue 
that if the State really was concerned about out-of-state law-
yers it would not allow those who leave the State after join-
ing the bar to remain members. The answer to this argu-
ment was well stated by the dissenting judges in the Court of 
Appeals for the First Circuit: "the Supreme Court of New 
Hampshire might have concluded that not many New Hamp-
shire lawyers will both pull up stakes and continue to practice 
in the state. And it might further believe that the bureau-
cracy required to keep track of such comings and goings 
would not be worth the trouble .... " 723 F. 2d 110, 122, 
n. 4 (1983) (opinion of Campbell, C. J., and Breyer, J.). 
There is yet another interest asserted by the State that I 
believe would justify a decision to limit membership in the 
state bar to state residents. The State argues that out-of-
state bar members pose a problem in situations where coun-
sel must be available on short notice to represent clients on 
unscheduled matters. The Court brushes this argument 
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aside, speculating that "a high percentage of nonresident law-
yers willing to take the state bar examination and pay the 
annual dues will reside in places reasonably convenient to 
New Hampshire," and suggesting that in any event the trial 
court could alleviate this problem by requiring the lawyer to 
retain local counsel. Ante, at 12. Assuming that the latter 
suggestion does not itself constitute unlawful discrimination 
under the Court's test, there nevertheless may be good rea-
sons why a State or a trial court would rather not get into 
structuring attorney-client relationships by requiring the 
retention of local counsel for emergency matters. The situa-
tion would have to be explained to the client, and the alloca-
tion of responsibility between resident and nonresident coun-
sel could cause as many problems as the Court's suggestion 
might cure. 
Nor do I believe that the problem can be confined to emer-
gency matters. The Court admits that even in the ordinary 
course of litigation a trial judge will want trial lawyers to be 
available on short notice; the uncertainties of managing a 
trial docket are such that lawyers rarely are given a single 
date on which a trial will begin; they may be required to 
"stand by" -or whatever the local terminology is-for days 
at a time, and then be expected to be ready in a matter of 
hours, with witnesses, when the case in front of them sud-
denly settles. A State reasonably can decide that a trial 
court should not have added to its present scheduling difficul-
ties the uncertainties and added delays fostered by counsel 
who might reside one thousand miles from New Hampshire. 
If there is any single problem with state legal systems that 
this Court might consider "substantial," it is the problem of 
delay in litigation-a subject that has been profusely ex-
plored in the literature over the past several years. See, 
e. g., Attacking Litigation Costs and Delay, Final Report of 
the Action Commission to Reduce Court Costs and Delay 
(American Bar Association 1984); S. Washy, T. Marvell & 
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A. Aikman, Volume and Delay in State Appellate Courts: 
Problems and Responses (1979). Surely the State has a sub-
stantial interest in taking steps to minimize this problem. 
Thus·, I think that New Hampshire had more than enough 
"substantial reasons" to conclude that its lawyers should also 
be its residents. I would hold that the Rule of the New 
Hampshire Supreme Court does not violate the Privileges 
and Immunities Clause of Art. IV. 
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TO: Justice Powell 
FROM: Lee 
RE: No. 83-1466, Supreme Court of New Hampshire v. Piper, 
revisions in Justice Rehnquist's dissent 
I do not believe that the three minor changes in Justice 
Rehnquist's dissent necessitate a change in our opinion. If you 
agree, I think that Piper can be handed down this Monday. 
you. 
I hope you are feeling well today--our thoughts are with 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
You Can Practice 
HERE, but Not 
THERE 
By David 0. Stewart 
KATHRYN A. Piper lives in Lower Wa-
terford, Vt., 400 yards from the New 
Hampshire border. She can shop, visit 
friends and even work in a wide variety 
of jobs there . But the New Hampshire 
Supreme Court says she cannot practice 
law there because she is a resident of 
Vermont. 
The U.S. Supreme Court heard oral 
a rguments Oct. 31 in Piper's five-year 
effort to gain admission to the New 
Hampshire bar. No. 83-1466. The 
Court's ruling , which will interpret the 
privileges and immunities clause in Arti-
cle IV of the Constitution, could affect 
bar admission practices in numerous ju-
risdictions. 
The residency requirement 
Rule 42 of the New Hampshire Su-
preme Court states that a bar applicant 
must either be "a resident of the State of 
New Hampshire or [have] filed a state-
ment of intention to reside in the State 
of New Hampshire ." In applying Rule 
42, the state court has re·quired that resi-
dency be established when the oath of 
admission is taken . 
Piper, a 1976 graduate of Suffolk Law 
School in Boston , was admitted to the 
Vermont bar in 1978 and worked first as 
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a public defender in St. Johnsbury. Next 
she worked for a year as a law clerk to 
Judge Sterry Waterman, a St. Johns-
bury resident , who held senior status on 
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sec-
ond Circuit. 
Because her husband , William , was a 
lawyer with the largest law firm in Ver-
mont at the time, in late 1979 she began 
to explore the possibility of practicing in 
New Hampshire to reduce possible con-
flicts of interest with her husband. 
She worked for a short time as a non-
lawyer in the office of a lawyer in nearby 
Littleton, N.H. , and agreed to join that 
practice if she could gain admission to 
the New Hampshire bar. 
Piper signed a statement of intent to 
establish residency in New Hampshire 
in order to take that state's bar examina-
tion in February 1980. She was notified 
in April 1980 that she had passed the ex-
amination and would be eligible for bar 
admission on establishing residency in 
the state. 
At that point, Piper requested a 
waiver of the residency requirement, ex-
plaining that her plans had changed and 
she no longer intended to move to New 
Hampshire . She wrote to the clerk of 
the state supreme court: " Moving to 
New Hampshire ... would present a 
considerable hardship for my husband 
and myself due to the tight mortgage 
market and due to the fact that we are 
expecting a child in the middle of 
March." 
Her application for a waiver was de-
nied in December 1980 , and she filed a 
lawsuit in March 1982 in federal district 
court in New Hampshire challenging the 
residency requirement on three constitu-
tional grounds. She claimed Rule 42 de-
prived her of the privileges and 
immunities of citizenship guaranteed by 
Article IV of the Constitution , burdened 
Photography by John Somers 
interstate commerce and violated the 
equal protection clause. 
The lower courts divide 
District Judge Martin F. Laughlin 
granted Piper's motion for summary 
judgment in May 1982, applying a two-
step test under the privileges and immu-
nities clause. 539 F.Supp. 1064. 
First, Judge Laughlin concluded that 
non-residents pose no "peculiar evil" to 
the legal profession, noting that the New 
Kathryn A. Piper of Vermont has been 
seeking admission to the New 
Hampshire bar for five years . 
Hampshire bar included 269 non-resi-
dent members who had once lived in the 
state but moved away. He also rejected 
the state supreme court's justifications 
for Rule 42: that non-residents are less 
likely to become familiar with local 
rules, that they are less concerned about 
maintaining a good local reputation and 
that they are less available for court ap-
pearances or bar disciplinary actions. 
Second , Judge Laughlin ruled that ex-
cluding non-residents from the bar is an 
"overbroad" restriction, "not substan-
tially related to in-court conduct or 
availability." 
A three-judge panel of the U.S. Court 
of Appeals for the First Circuit reversed, 
with Judge Hugh H . Bownes dissenting. 
723 F.2d 98 (1983). In an opinion by 
Judge Levin H. Campbell, the court rea-
soned that the ordinary standard under 
the privileges and immunities clause 
does not apply with full force to restric-
tions on bar admission, which is closely 
related "to the state's ability to function 
as a unique sovereign entity." 
Because "the bar is a vital component 
of the state judiciary," he concluded, the 
court need not apply the "strict test" for 
privileges and immunities clause ques-
tions announced in Hicklin v. Orbeck, 
437 U.S. 518 (1978), and applied by the 
district court. Under a Jess restrictive 
standard, the panel majority sustained 
Rule 42. 
The .First Circuit granted rehearing en 
bane and divided 2-2 on the case. As a 
result, the district court ruling was re-
stored as affirmed by an equally divided 
court. 
Now writing in support of affirming 
the district court, Judge Bownes, joined 
by Judge Coffin , conceded that states 
may establish residency requirements on 
matters involving a state's "sovereign 
identity," such as public employment, 
suffrage or qualifications for elective of-
fice. But the right to practice law, he in-
sisted, was excluded from this category 
of sovereign activity by In re Griffiths, 
413 U .S. 717 (1973), in which the Su-
preme Court held that non-citizens 
could not be excluded from the bar be-
cause they are aliens . He also concluded 
that the privileges and immunities clause 
required that Rule 42 be struck down. 
Judge Campbell and Judge Stephen G. 
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Breyer, a member of the orginal panel, 
would have upheld New Hampshire' s 
position. 
A national problem 
According to the brief amicus curiae 
filed on behalf of bar admission au-
thorities in 12 states , there are 41 states 
that have some form of residency re-
quirement. The requirements are not 
uniform . In Tennessee, for example, bar 
admission is permitted to those living in 
"an area closely contiguous to the 
boundaries of the State of Tennessee." 
Indiana does not condition admission on 
state domicile but does require the appli-
cant to submit an affidavit stating an in-
tent to practice law in the state within 
two years of admission. 
Residency requirements increasingly 
have been under attack. The Mas-
sachusetts Supreme Judicial Court 
struck down that state's residency re-
quirement in Matter of Jadd, 461 
N.E.2d 76 (1984), and a federal district 
court invalidated the Virginia restriction 
in Giller v. Virginia Board of Bar Exam-
iners , C.A. 83-1282-A (E .D. Va . Feb. 8, 
1984). an unpublished decision which is 
pending before the Fourth Circuit. 
Similar decisions have come in West 
Virginia (Sargus v. West Virginia Board 
of Law Examiners, 294 S .E .2d (1982)) , 
South Dakota (Stalland v. South Da-
kota Board of Bar Examiners, 530 
F.Supp. 155 (1982)), Alabama (Strauss 
v. Alabama State Bar, 520 F.Supp. 173 
( 1981)), Alaska (Sheley v. Alaska Bar 
Association , 620 P.2d 640 (1980)), and 
New York (Gordon v. Committe e on 
Character Fitness, 397 N. E.2d 1309 
( 1979)). 
The weak spot 
In argument before the Supreme 
Court , the New Hampshire Supreme 
Court was represented by Martin Gross 
of Concord, N .H., who insisted that the 
residency requirement protects the 
state's interest in maintaining a bar com-
mitted to the local community and in-
volved in bar activities. 
Gross was questioned sharply by the 
justices concerning a statistic high-
lighted in the brief amicus curiae submit-
ted by the Vermont Bar Association in 
support of Piper's challenge: because 
New Hampshire attorneys retain their 
bar membership even after moving from 
the state, some 13 percent of the current 
members of the New Hampshire bar live 
in other states. 
Gross conceded to Justice Blackmun 
that the statistic is "the weak spot" in 
his argument. He insisted , nonetheless, 
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that Rule 42 is "a reasonable proxy for 
sustained physical presence in the 
state." which is necessary if an attorney 
is to perform the extra duties required of 
bar members. He also asked rhetorically 
whether the rule had to be more restric-
tive-by terminating membership for 
lawyers leaving the state-in order to 
pass constitutional scrutiny. 
Excluding women 
Gross aroused the apparent ire of Jus-
tice O'Connor by attempting to rely on 
the decision in Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 
U.S. 130 ( 1873), which rejected a chal-
lenge under the privileges and immu-
nities clause to the 19th century practice 
in Illinois excluding women from the 
practice of law. 
Justice O'Con-nor asked pointedly 
whether Bradwell v. Illinois was still 
good law, and whether states may ex-
clude women from the bar. Gross re-
Is Rule 42 
a valid aHempt 
to protect the 
integrity of the 
profession, or is 
it simple 
economic protectionism? 
plied that the 14th Amendment might 
invalidate an exclusion of women, but 
that Bradwell has never been overruled 
and thus the privileges and immunities 
clause does not bar the exclusion of 
women from law practice. 
Jon Meyer, appearing on behalf of 
Piper, argued that attorney regulation 
cannot be protected from the privileges 
and immunities clause because attorneys 
are involved in state judicial processes, 
and noted that several state courts have 
recently struck down residency require-
ments. 
Meyer also told the justices that a bar 
requirement that an attorney maintain 
an office in the state is unconstitutional, 
but pointed out that this requirement 
would not injure Piper. 
The biggest laugh of the argument 
came at the end of a dialogue between 
Justice Rehnquist and Meyer, when the 
justice tried to extract the concession 
that a local attorney will learn of recent 
decisions more quickly than an out-of-
state lawyer. 
Meyer assured him that a weekly pub-
lication for New Hampshire lawyers 
provides prompt notice of recent deci-
sions to its subscribers. Undeterred, 
Justice Rehnquist established that 
Meyer practices law in Manchester, 
N.H., and asked whether Meyer there-
fore would be able to read about court 
rulings in the daily newspaper. Evi-
dently referring to the Manchester 
Union-Leader, a well-known newspaper 
in his home town, Meyer said. "In Man-
chester, it's very difficult to rely on 
what you read in the newspaper." 
Professionalism of protectionism? 
The constitutional issue presented by 
Piper's case likely will turn on the New 
Hampshire court's claim that the in-
volvement of attorneys in the judicial 
process sets the practice of law apart 
from other economic activities for pur-
poses of applying the privileges and im-
munrtres clause . Under the usual 
interpretation of that provision. Rule 42 
has serious problems. Underlying the 
constitutional analysis. however. is the 
question whether Rule 42 is a valid at-
tempt to protect the integrity of the pro-
fession or is simple economic protec-
tionism. 
At oral argument, Justice Stevens 
asked Piper's lawyer whether the record 
in the case reflected that Rule 42 was 
designed to exclude competition, and 
Meyer told him that no such facts ap-
pear in the record. 
A different perspective was offered by 
the American Corporate Counsel Asso-
ciation in its brief amicus curiae in sup-
port of Piper. It stressed that many 
corporations are increasingly using 
house counsel to handle litigation mat-
ters, and these attempts to economize 
have run afoul of residency require-
ments. Citing the experience of corpora-
tions like Sears, Alcan Aluminum Corp., 
Budd Co., and A.M. Castle & Co ., the 
ACCA said that companies often are 
"forced to hire outside counsel in a 
number of states ... that have a resi-
dency requirement for admission to the 
bar." Without those requirements , the 
ACCA argued, in-house attorneys could 
handle many matters more effectively 
and economically. 
Bar quality 
The brief amicus curiae of Iowa at-
tempted to reinforce the New 
Hampshire court's assertion that a resi-
Piper and children at home in Lower Waterford, Vt.-400 yards from the 
New Hampshire border. 
dency requirement improves the quality 
of the bar. 
Over a seven-year period , according 
to the brief, 32 resident Iowa lawyers 
were suspended for failure to meet con-
tinuing legal education requirements, 
while 88 lawyers who had moved from 
Iowa had been suspended for that rea-
son. Of course, lawyers moving from 
Iowa may have substantially less inter-
est in meeting Iowa's continuing educa-
tion requirements. Iowa also claimed 
that over a nine-year period, 31 attor-
neys living in Iowa were suspended for 
failure to pay client security fund fees , 
while 61 non-residents were suspended 
for that reason. 
The jurisdiction with perhaps the 
largest percentage of non-resident bar 
members is the District of Columbia. Of 
the 41,000 members of that bar, 12,000 
live outside of the Washington , D .C., 
area, and many more live in suburban 
Maryland and Virginia. 
Thomas Henderson, disciplinary 
counsel for the D.C. Bar, reported that 
his office has not seen a disproportio-
nate level of disciplinary violations by 
non-resident lawyers . 
Marna Tucker, current president of 
the D.C. Bar, provided some support for 
the New Hampshire argument that out-
of-state lawyers do not fully support the 
duties of the bar. Because so many 
members of the D.C. Bar live outside 
the area, Tucker said, "they can be a 
very powerful force" in bar politics . She 
pointed to a recent unsuccessful attempt 
to raise bar dues in order to support a 
local law library. That attempt was de-
feated in part by non-resident lawyers 
who wish to keep bar dues as low as 
possible. Non-resident lawyers are likely 
"to oppose any issue involving the ex-
penditure of funds," Tucker stated. 
Family practices 
Piper does not question the motiva-
tion of the New Hampshire Supreme 
Court in adopting Rule 42 but insists 
that the effect is "pure economic protec-
tionism." Her previous opportunity to 
practice in Littleton, N.H., has long 
since passed . 
For now, Piper is staying at home 
with her two young children, and attend-
ing classes to acquire a master's degree 
in education from Lyndon State College 
in Lyndonville, Vt. Her long-term goal 
is to establish a practice that will focus 
on family and juvenile law, and she 
would like to start working part-time 
over the next year or two. 
"Because this is a rural area," she 
said, "it is very difficult to develop any 
kind of legal specialty. For years, when-
ever a specialist was needed, he would 
have to be imported from somewhere 
else." The state courts could control 
those specialists better by admitting 
them to the bar than by admitting them 
to practice on an ad hoc basis, she insis-
ted. 
To make a living at the specialty she 
hopes to develop in juvenile and family 
law, Piper continued, she needs to be 
able to draw clients from both Vermont 
and New Hampshire. 
The professional development of 
Piper and of other lawyers who would 
like to develop law practices across 
state lines ultimately may turn on the 
Supreme Court's decision. 
(David 0. Stewart practices law in 
Washington, D.C., with Miller, Cas-
sidy, Larroca & Lewis and writes Su-
preme Court Report for the ABA 
Journal.) 
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BENCH MEMORANDUM • 
~~~--~~~)"?~/~ 
e.~~? £.1· ~~~----
To: Mr. Justice Powell October 9, 1984 
/.$if vi. ~ ~~~ 
From: Lee ~r fi.....,f .~~ '1( .. J{.~ 
No. 83-1466,~upreme Court of New Hampshire v. Kathryn Piper (~;91~ 
~~Ill( cA I ,..,..$L4.( .6-<.-- J-J , 
/IJ/~~-~ .... ~LA w~ ~~4 ~,~ 
QUESTION PRE8Er:JfE[} ~ ~ ~G~-r--ut,..G.. .. ..,..c.-..~~ 
Under the Privileges and Immunities Clause of article IV, 
2, may residence in the state be made a condition of admission to 
thebar? ~~4_.-.S~~ 
BACKGROUND 
I. Factual Background 
Kathryn Piper lives in waterford, Vermont, about 400 
yards from the New Hampshire border. In 1979, she applied for 
·. 
2. 
permission to take the February 1979 New Hampshire bar 
examination. After signing a statement of intent to establish 
permanent residence in New Hampshire, Piper received permission 
to take the test, and did so. On April 18, 1980, she was informed 
that she had passed the examination, but was told that she would 
not be eligible for admission to the bar until she established 
residence in New Hampshire. Although nonresidents are permitted 
to take the bar examination, New Hampshire Supreme Court Rule 42 
requires that the applicant be a bona fide resident of the state 
at the time the oath of office is administered. -
Piper requested a dispensation from the residency 
requirement on the ground that personal circumstances made it 
impossible for her to move to New Hampshire. The state supreme 
court denied her request on December 31, 1980. Piper then filed 
a complaint in DC claiming that the residency requirement 
violated various constitutional provisions, including the 
Privileges and Immunities Clause of article IV, §2. 
II. The Decisions Below 
In granting Piper's motion for summary judgment, the DC ~<: 
held that Rule 42 violated the privileges and immunities clause.~ 
The DC recognized that only "fundamental rights" merit the ~ 
protection of the clause, see Baldwin v. Fish 
436 u.s. 371 (1978), but it held that the 
~4lt.... & Game Commission, 
~~4~1-
right to become a A.1( 
~ic.{ 
member of a bar was "fundamental" within the meaning of Baldwin. 
o:::---' 
The state could not escape the command of the Privileges and 
,_.;. 
3. 
Immunities Clause simply because it , was responsible for 
regulating the practice of law. 
Finding that the practice of law was a "fundamental ~ 
right" did not end the lower 
privileges and immunities clause 
court's inquiry, 
is not absolute. 
since the J-1.,.., 
~~-­
clause  The 
states does not preclude discrimination against citizens of other 
where there is a "substantial reason" for the difference 
. - +~ 
1n~~ 
is -~ treatment. A state's discrimination against nonresidents 
justified if: (1} nonresidents constitute a "peculiar source" of ~ 
the evil at which the statute is aimed: (2} there is a reasonable 
relationship between the danger represented by non-citizens as a 
class, and the discrimination practiced upon them: and (3} there 
are no less restrictive alternatives available to the state. 
0 Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 u.s. 518 (1978). In this case, the DC bG 
found that the state failed to proffer a "substantial reason" for /h...tJ 
~
the residency requirement, and therefore held that Rule 42  
violated the privileges and immunities clause. 
A panel of CAl reversed the DC's decision, holding that 
the residency requirement for admission to the bar did not 
violate the privileges and immunities clause. CAl subsequently 
reheard the case en bane, and an equally divided court affirmed 
the lower court's judgment. Judges Coffin and Bownes stated that 
Rule 
v Judge 
42 violated the privileges and immunities ·· clause. 
Campbell and ~udge Breyer stated that nothing 
Chief 
in the 




Jud~_:offin ~nd Bownes~ated •that the practice of law 
"fundamental right,"~ the · meaning of Baldwin v. 
Montana Fish & Game Commission. They noted that this Court 
always has included "the right to pursue a livelihood" among the 
interests protected by the privileges and immunities clause. 
Moreover, although a "sovereignty exception" allows states to 
establish certain residency requirements, that exception is 
inapplicable here. The practice of law is "squarely outside the 
range of occupations implicating state sovereinty." After 
concluding that the practice of law was a "fundamental right," 
the two judges considered whether the state had a "substantial 
reason" for discriminating against noncitizens. They decided 
~~.&u.~ 
that the state did not have such a reason-; --a na neld that the 
discrimination therefore violated the privileges and immunities 
clause. 
Chief and Judge con tended that 
Rule 42 did not 
They argued that "principles of federalism" require that each 
state be given "considerable leeway" in setting bar standards. 
The judges claimed that if the residency requirement were 
invalidated, "large firms in distant cities" would come to 
dominate the New Hampshire bar. The dominance of out-of-state 
v 
lawyers would mean that: (1) less ~bono work would be done in 
...... 
the state; (2) local citizens would have to travel to distant 
....... 
locations for legal assistance; and ( 3) attorneys would be less 
familiar with local customs that underlie the state's substantive 
laws. Therefore, New Ham shire or 
'7 . 
5. 
making in-state residence a prerequisite for admission to the 
bar. 
The Supreme Court of New Hampshire filed a timely 
petition for the writ of certiorari, which was granted by this 
Court. 
DISCUSSION 
I. Is the Practice of Law a "Fundamental Right"? 
A. Basic to the Maint / nce or Well-Being of the Union 
In Corfield v. Coryell, 6 Fed.Cas. 546, 551-52 (No. 
3230) (C.C.E.D.Pa~, the first major case decided under 
article IV, §2, Justice Bushrod Washington concluded that the 
privileges and immunities clause encompassed those privileges 
"which are in their " very nature fundamental." Among the 
"fundamental rights," he listed "the right of a citizen of one 
statt1fo pass through or reside in any other state, for purposes 
of trade ••• or otherwise; to c~ the benefit of th~it of 
habeas corpus; to institute and maintain actions of any kind in 
® 
the~urts of the state; to take, hold, and dispose of property; 
an~ exemption from higher taxes or impositions than are paid 
by the citizens of the state." According to Tribe, Coryell can 
be viewed as an attempt to import the natural rights doctrine 
into the Constitution by way of the privileges and immunities 
clause. The Supreme Court never adopted the natural rights 
~~,~~v~ 
~~~~.6-u~~ 
doctrine, however. See Paul v. Virginial 75 u.s. (8 Wall.) 168, ~ 
180 (1869) • 4~ 
a.::~ 
In Toomer v. Witsell, 334 u.s. 385 (1948), the Court 
indicated that it was more concerned with analyzing the 
f3 ustifications~for a discriminatory burden than with determining 
~
whether the right involved was "fundamental ... l Nevertheless, 
Baldwin 
clear 
v. Fish & Game Commission, 436 u.s. 371 (1978), makes it ~ 
the "fundamental rights" doctrine is not dead~ JA...-r that 
Baldwin, the Court considered a Montana statute that charged 
nonresidents seven times more for elk hunting licenses than it 
did residents. The Court held that the statute did not violate 
the privileges and immunities clause because elk hunting for 
pleasure was not a "fundamental right." According to the Baldwin 
Court, the only rights that are "fundamental" are those that are 
. If~ 
"basic to the maintenance or well-being of the Union." Us1ng 
this standard, the Court found that access to Montana elk was not 
a "fundamental right." Therefore, the discriminatory statute 
was held not to violate the the privilges and immunities clause. 
I think that equal acess to state bars, unlike elk 
1 In Toomer, the Court ~validated a South Carolina statute that 
limited commercial access to migratory shrimp in the three-mile 
maritime belt off the state's coast. The state imposed a license 
fee of $25 for each shrimp boat owned by a resident, but $2500 
for each such boat owned by a nonresident. Although the Court 
mentioned that "doing business" in another state had long been 
protected by the privileges and immunities clause, it did not use 
the phrase "fundamental right," nor did it suggest that the 
finding of such a right would be necessary in future cases. The 
opinion was devoted almost exclusively to the state's 
justifications for the discrimination. 
~J.4~~ 
 ~ ~ -:z-.c.-~~ /.9~ 
vr- c;c...t.L ~~ ..,..-(_-
"maintenance or well-being of hunting, may be necessary to the 
~-
the Union." In our highly b '1 · t t · and c <?'-'L mo 1 e soc1e y, corpora 1ons 
/?-t-tf~. 
individuals often are involved in business transactions and 
litigation all over the country. It is inefficient to require } 
that a different attorney be hired in each state in which legal 7 
problems might arise. The inefficiencies and confusion resulting 
from multiple representation would be eliminated if one attorney, J7 
or one law firm, handled all of a client's legal work. Moreover, 
if more attorneys are allowed to develop national practices, it 
seems likely that state laws will become more uniform, thereby 
facilitating commercial transactions. Finally, it is sometimes 
necessary for nonresident attorneys to champion national ideals 
in the face of local hostility. Daniel Webster, Charles Evans 
Hughes, Clarence Darrow, and William Jennings Bryan all tried 
cases of national importance as out-of-state counse1. 2 
B. Attorneys Engaged in Economic Pursuit 
Petitioner argues that the practice of law is not a 
"fundamental right" because it is not an "economic pursuit." The 
2A lawyer who is not a member of the New Hampshire bar may be 
permitted to enter an appearance in a case if a member is 
assoc~e~~~m. N.H. Sup.Ct. Rul~ ~3. This E£Q_ nac vice 
ru~DKe-sfffiflar rules in other states, does not protect 
adequately the interests of the nonresident attorney. The state 
court has absolute discretion in deciding whether to grant a E£Q_ 
hac vice motion. See Leis v. Flynt, 439 u.s. 438 (1979). 
Furthermore, even when the non-member's motion is granted, he 
must become associated with local counsel. The local attorney, 
who is often unnecessary, burdens the out-of-state attorney with 
an additional expense. 
immediate predecessor of the privileges ' and immunities clause, 
the fourth article of the Articles of Cdnfederation, referred to 
the "privileges of trade and commerce." Moreover, this Court 
repeatedly has spoken of the "mutually reinforcing relationship" 
between article IV and the Commerce Clause. See, e.g., Hicklin 
v. Orbeck, 437 u.s. 518, 531 (1978). According to petitioner, 
this history suggests that the sole purpose of the privileges and 
immunities clause was to create a national economic union by 
eliminating burdens upon individuals engaged in trade or 
commerce. 
Petitioner's argument must fail for two reasons. First, 
this Court has not held that the scope of the privileges and 
immunities clause should be limited to "economic pursuits." 
Under Baldwin, a right is "fundamental" if it is "basic to the 
maintenance or well-being of the Union." This test puts to rest 
any notion that only economic interests are protected. 3 Second, 
even if the applicability of the clause were so limited, it is 
clear that the practice of law is an "economic pursuit." 
------------~--------~------~--~-----· 
In ~ 
Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 u.s. 773 (1975), the Court 
noted that "in the modern world it cannot be denied that the 
activities of lawyers play an fmportant part in commercial 
~ 
intercourse." Similarly, in Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 
u.s. 350 (1977), the Court cited with approval the candid 
3 In Doe v. Bolton, 410 u.s. 179 (1973), the Court held 
violative of the privileges and immunities clause a Georgia law 






concession of the State Bar that "law off,ices are big business." 
c. The Sovereignty Exception 
The Court has long recognized that "political rights" 
are exempt from the strictures of article IV, §2. In Baldwin, 
the Court stated that nonresidents may be prohibited from voting 
or from holding public office. The rationale for this exception 
is that while each state ratifying the federal constitution~ 
relinquished a large portion of its power to discriminate against 
nonresidents, it retained the independence to protect its 
sovereignty or separate polity. Note, A Constitutional Analysis 
of State Bar Residency Requirements Under the Interstate 
Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, 92 Harv. L. Rev. 
1461 (1979). The petitioner argues that the state's control over 
the bar bears a close relationship to its "sovereignty" for two 
reasons: (1) the attorney exercises state power on a daily basis; 
and (2) the lawyer is an "officer of the court." 
Petitione~ contentions appear to be foreclosed by your 
opinion in In r e G r i f f i t h s , 413 U • S • 71 7 ( 19 7 3 ) . In G r i f f i t h s , 
the Court held that Connecticut's exclusion of aliens from the 
practice of law violated the Equal Protection Clause of the 
fourteenth amendment. The Court rejected the argument that 
because lawyers exercise the state's power, aliens could be 
excluded from the bar. You stated that the powers to sign writs 
and subpoenas, and to administer oaths "hardly involve matters of 
state policy or acts of such unique responsibility as to entrust 
them only to citizens." You also recognized that while attorneys 
10. 
are officers of the court, they are not "officers in the ordinary 
sense." Lawyers are not officials of government, nor are they 
formulators of public policy. The reasoning of Griffiths 
suggests a states should not be able to exclude nonresidents from 
the practice of law on the ground that the state's control over 
the bar bears a close relationship to its sovereignty. 
II. Balancing Test 
Although the practice of law is a "fundamental right," 
Rule 42 is not necessarily violative of article IV, §2 of the 
Constitution. This Court has repeatedly stated that the 
privileges and immunities clause is G:ot absolute) See United 
......... 
Building & Construction Trades Council v. Camden, 52 U.S.L.W. 
4187 (1984). A state law that discriminates against nonresidents 
will be upheld if: (1) nonresidents constitute a "peculiar 
source" of the evil at which the law is aimed; (2) there is a 
reasonable relationship between the danger represented by 
nonresidents as a class, and the discrimination practiced upon 
them; and (3) less restrictive alternatives are impractical. See 
Hicklin ~ v. Orbeck, 437 u.s. 518 (1978); L. Tribe, American 
Constitutional Law §6-33. The Supreme Court of New Hampshire has 
proffered several justifications for its refusal to admit 
nonresidents to the state bar. These justifications must be --
scrutinized to determine if they provide a "substantial reason" 
for th~ate's d~-i-m-1-.n-a __ t _i _o_n-.--------------------------------------
11. 
The state contends that it is necessary to exclude 
nonresidents from the bar because they · are less likely to be 
familiar with local rules and procedures. The state bar 
certainly has a legitimate interest in excluding those attorneys 
who are unfamiliar with local rules. I am not sure, however, 
that nonresident attorneys would be less likely to keep abreast 
of local law. The petitioner's argument assumes that most 
nonresident attorneys would have a limited practice in the state. 
It is doubtful, however, that a nonresident would exert the time 
I. \ II 
and effort necessary to become a member of the New Hampshire bar, 
~~.'-------~----------~------------------
if he intended to maintain only a minimal practice in the state. 4 
Even if one assumes that nonresident attorneys would be 
less likely to be familiar with local rules, the requirement in 
question might violate article IV, §2 of the Constitution. No 
"reasonable relationship between the danger represented by 
nonresidents, and the discrimination practiced upon them" 
appears to exist. 5 Rule 42 excludes many nonresidents who 
4The state charges $18~ for the administration of the test and 
the character investigation. Annual dues are $125 plus special 
assessments. _. - .. 
5New Hampshire has a "simple" residency requirement. Although 
the applicant must be a resident at the time of admisssion, he is 
not required to maint~iQ his home in t fi e state. There f ore, th~e 
is arguably no "rea sonable relationship between the evil 
represented by non-citizens and the discrimination practiced upon ~~r 
them." Rule 42 is underinclusive because there are a number of ~ .c::;.._ 
nonresident lawyers who are allowed to practice in the state. 
The fact that they resided in New Hampshire at the time of their ~- ~ 
admission to the bar does not mean that they are more likely to ~ S~ 
remain familiar with local rules, etc. ~ 
The link between the state's interests and the discrimination ~~ 
practiced is not perfect. Nevertheless, New Hampshire's failure 




would remain familiar with local rules. Many incompetent 
attorneys, on the other hand, are presumed to be familiar with 
local rules simply because they reside in the state. 
Furthermore, there are 
available to the state: 
several less restrictive alternatives ~ --------.- . ~~~ 
(1) requiring periodic bar exam1nat1ons; ..._ ~1-
(2) requiring continuing legal education, including seminars on t-1-
~ 
local rules and procedures; and (3) excluding attorneys from th ~ 
courtroom unless they have appeared in New Hampshire courts x " ·~ 
~
times in x years. ~ 
The state also contends that nonresident attorneys woul~~ 
not be subject to "local peer pressure," which helps curb 
unethical and incompetent conduct. Nonresident lawyers, however, 
would not be immune from peer pressure. Only those out-of-state J 
attorneys who intended to maintain an active practice in New ? 
Hampshire would become members of the state bar. These 
individuals, regardless of where they resided, would be subject 
to "peer pressure" from the attorneys and judges with whom they 
worked on a regular basis. Moreover, the state does not explain 
why disciplinary proceedings could not be used to exclude both 
to adopt a continuing residency requirement, standing alone, 
should not mean that Rule 42 violates the privileges and 
immunities clause. Very few lawyers will move out of New ') ( ~ 
Hampshire, and yet continue to practice law in that state. ) 
Therefore, the state is probably justified in avoiding the 
administrative inconvenience inherent in enforcing the continuing 
residency requirement. ~ew York is the only state that requires 
either continuing residency or continuing maintenance of an 
office. Note, A Constitutional Analysis of State Bar Residency 
Requirements Under the Privileges and Immunities Clause of 
Article IV, 92 Harv. L. Rev. 1461, 1461-1462 n.S (1979) • 
unethical and incompetent lawyers. Finally, higher admission 
standards, continuing legal education, and periodic retesting 
would ensure the competency of the state bar without 
discriminating against nonresidents. 
are 
The petitioner further argues that nonresident attorneys ~~ 
less likely to be available for court appearances,,....... 
---------~ --
disciplinary proceedings, and ~~ono work. There is no reason 
--------------~ 
to believe, however, that nonresident attorneys will be 
unavailable for court appearances. An attorney who fails to 
appear in court may be sued for malpractice, if his client's 
action is adversely affected. Moreover, an attorney may be 
disbarred if he repeatedly fails to appear in court. There is 
also no basis for the claim that nonresidents will be unavailable 
for disciplinary proceedings. Assuming that proper notice has 
been given, an attorney could be disbarred or otherwise 
disciplined in his absence. This certainly would give 
nonresident attorneys an incentive to be present at these 
proceedings. 
There is some merit in petitioner's argument that 
nonresident attorneys would be less likely to perform ~ bono 
work. It is possible that a nonresident lawyer, with a 
substantial practice in New Hampshire, will choose to perform al 
of his volunteer and ~bono work in his home state. 
attorneys to represent indigent clients and to bar 
is not a wholly satisfactory solution. attorneys are 
compelled to perform this work, its may be poor as a 
result of lack of enthusiasm. The extent of the problem is 
14. 
exaggerated, however. Many nonresident attorneys will 
undoubtedly perform volunteer work in the state in which they 
practice law. Moreover, if residency requirements are 
invalidated by this Court, some members of other bars will choose 
to reside in New Hampshire. These attorneys, who may or may not 
become members of the New Hampshire bar, should perform volunteer 
work in the state. 
The outcome of this case will depend upon the level of £ i2? a 
------- s;:~ 
scrutiny used to examine the state's justifications. Although ~ 
t:-court has never stated that discrimination against~~ 
nonresidents must be necessary to a compelling state interest, a 
standard approaching "strict scrutiny" probably is appropriate. 
The privileges and immunities clause, 1 ike the Equal Protection 
Clause, serves to protect outsiders. And although the rights of 
nonresidents are protected to some extent by their home states, 
the protection comes in the form of retaliatory trade barriers. 
The Court should adopt an intermediate level of review that has 
"teeth," and should not accept every justification proffered by 
the state. Given this rather demanding standard, I believe that 
the justifications proffered by the state for Rule 42 are not 
"substantial." 
SUMMARY 
New Hampshire's residency requirement violates the 
privileges and immunities clause. The practice of law is a 
"fundamental right" within the meaning of Baldwin, and the state 
has not proffered a "substantial reason" for its discrimination 
15. 
against nonresidents. Therefore, I recommend that this Court 
affirm the judgment of CAl. 
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